SUNSEEKER INVESTMENTS, INC.,

v.

ENTERPRISE MAINTENANCE AND CONTRACTING, INC., D/B/A LEONARD'S PAINTING & MAINTENANCE

PER CURIAM.

“The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied to bar subsequent causes of action even where the second claim requires proof of different essential facts than those required to be proved in the initial suit.” Felder v. State, Dep’t of Mgmt. Services, Div. of Ret., 993 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Five factors must be met for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue:

(1) an identical issue must have been presented in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the prior determination; (3) there

must have been a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue; (4) the parties in the two proceedings must be identical; and (5) the issue must have been actually litigated.

Id. at 1034−35 (quoting Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So. 2d 544, 546–47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)).

In this case, the trial court entered a judgment against Appellee enforcing a written loan agreement between the parties. The trial court then granted rehearing, amended its original judgment, and reduced the interest rate owed on the loan balance to the statutory rate rather than the rate written in the agreement. The trial court believed collateral estoppel prevented it from enforcing the written rate because a prior tribunal, in a bankruptcy proceeding, described the loan arrangement between the parties as “informal.” Appellant argues the bankruptcy court’s description has no impact on the correct interest rate, and we agree.

The issue presented to the bankruptcy court was whether Appellee proved an embezzlement claim against the company’s president for taking funds under the guise of making loan payments to Appellant. The bankruptcy court found Appellee failed to prove embezzlement.¹ The issue of what interest rate should apply on the loan was never presented or litigated.

Because collateral estoppel did not preclude its enforcement of the written rate, the trial court erred when it granted rehearing and amended its original judgment.2

We reverse the amended final judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to reinstate its original judgment. Appellant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is granted, and we

remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount of fees. All other pending motions are denied.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, NORDBY, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________