NANCY DAY SPEIGNER, FORMER WIFE

v.

BRIAN WADE SPEIGNER, FORMER HUSBAND

BILBREY, J.

Nancy Day Speigner, the former wife, appeals the award of durational, rather than permanent alimony, upon the dissolution of this long-term marriage. Because an award of durational alimony instead of the requested permanent alimony was not supported by sufficient findings in either the Final Judgment of Dissolution or the Supplemental Final Judgment, the durational alimony award is reversed, and the issue remanded for further proceedings.

Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2017), allows a trial court to award various forms of alimony. A trial court’s award of alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rhoden v. Rhoden, 295 So. 3d 864, 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“This court will not disturb an alimony award if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence and the trial court complied with the law.”).

However, a trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Broemer v. Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284, 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

The parties were married on May 31, 1997. The former wife filed the action for dissolution of marriage on May 2, 2017. Since the marriage had “a duration of 17 years or greater,” it was a long-term marriage. See § 61.08(4), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.”).

There is a rebuttable presumption that if alimony is to be awarded following a long-term marriage, the award should be permanent alimony. Rhoden, 295 So. 3d at 867; see also Baron v. Baron, 300 So. 3d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

If a court finds permanent alimony inappropriate because, based on the statutory factors under section 61.08(2), the recipient spouse has “no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis,” durational alimony may be appropriate even in a long-term marriage. See § 61.08(7)–(8), Fla. Stat. Even so, to support an award of durational, rather than permanent alimony following a long-term marriage, a court must make sufficient findings. Baron, 300 So. 3d at 370. For instance, if supported by competent, substantial evidence, a trial court could find that the recipient spouse will attain a level of self-support commensurate with the marital standard of living by the time the durational alimony expires so as to rebut the presumption in favor of permanent alimony. Cf. Molina v. Perez, 276 So. 3d 80, 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that without evidence to support a finding that the former wife’s income would increase, it was error to award durational rather than permanent alimony in a long-term marriage); Gilliland v. Gilliland, 266 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding that former wife’s “age, good health, and current income” were not sufficient grounds to award durational rather than permanent alimony in a long-term marriage).

Here, the Final Judgment included the trial court’s determination that the former wife had need for alimony and the former husband had the ability to pay. The court set out its findings on each factor listed in section 61.08(2) in the Final Judgment and corrected certain matters in its Supplemental Final Judgment. Based on the competent, substantial evidence, the court found that the former wife had worked consistently throughout the marriage while raising the children and running the household, and that the former husband had always had the larger income. The court awarded the former wife $2,123.88 per month in alimony to meet her “financial needs shortfall” but concluded that “durational and not permanent alimony is appropriate.” The court fixed the duration of alimony initially at seven years and increased this period to eight years in the Supplemental Final Judgment.

The trial court found that the former wife had business ability and acumen and that both parties had the ability to earn additional income. The court therefore concluded that durational alimony was “fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” But the court did not make a finding in either judgment that at the end of the durational alimony period the former wife would no longer require the financial assistance of alimony to fully support her needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage. See Rhoden, 295 So. 3d at 867; Broemer, 109 So. 3d at 290. The court did not rely on a particular event or development to occur at the end of eight years or otherwise explain this expiration date. The amount of alimony awarded by the trial court is fully supported in the record.

However, the court’s denial of permanent alimony in favor of durational alimony for eight years, without explanation of how the former wife’s ongoing need for support will expire after eight years, is reversed, and this case remanded for reconsideration of the proper type of alimony. If the trial court again concludes that durational not permanent alimony is appropriate, the court must support this determination with findings of fact regarding how the court arrived at the termination date and what change in the former wife’s need or the former husband’s ability to pay would take place by that date.*

* Of course, if permanent alimony is awarded, it later “may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. LEWIS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur. _____________________________