DECA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN OWNERS INSURANCE CO./AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE CO.

v.

FAYE O. BECKETT

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejecting their statute of limitations defense. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. Claimant was injured in early 1990, and is subject to the 1989 version of the Workers’ Compensation Law. That version contained an exemption from its statute of limitations: “However,

no statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body.” § 440.19(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989); see City Investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Roe (Roe I), 566 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (characterizing it as “exemption”), affirmed in relevant part by Roe v. City Investing/Gen. Dev. Corp. (Roe II), 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991).

As a result of Claimant’s injury, the authorized surgeon inserted “screws and rods,” which the doctor testified was to “[s]tabilize the cervical spine” and was “the only way to preserve the anatomy.” The JCC found that these screws and rods were “placed in the cervical spine to allow for a discectomy and laminectomy surgery to join 2 vertebral bodies in the cervical spine” to treat her compensable injury. Based on these findings— which the record evidence supports—the JCC found Claimant had a prosthetic device.

Thus, Claimant argues that the statute of limitations does not apply to her, and that the E/C did not meet their burden to show that it does apply. But it is not clear that the benefits Claimant requested “relate to” the prosthesis. She sought pain management and a replacement mechanical bed without establishing that either had anything to do with the screws and rods in her spine. The fact that she may have a prosthetic device is not, standing alone, sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from accruing. In that respect, this case stands in contrast to Peo v. Maas Brothers, 634 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), where bursitis treatment was not barred by the statute of limitations because the medical evidence showed that it was related to the claimant’s hip replacement as a result of his compensable work injury. Here, unlike in Peo, there is no evidence that either the prosthesis—or the surgery required to insert it—is causing the need for the requested treatment and the benefits as opposed to the underlying condition that necessitated the prosthesis in the first place. It follows that the Employer/Carrier encounter no obstacle to application of section 440.19 in this case.

Moreover, the “tipsy coachman” doctrine will not permit affirmance here, on either of two theories.

First, although the Employer/Carrier paid for some medications on dates that could potentially have rendered Claimant’s petition timely, we read the JCC’s order as indicating that those payments were a mistake, and thus implicitly finding that Dr. Gerges was properly deauthorized. Although the JCC declined to address the legal significance of those findings and instead focused on the presence of the prosthesis, the legal significance is that mistaken payments do not toll the statute. Cf. Cole v. Fairfield Cmtys., 908 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that mistaken payment of single chiropractic bill did not estop employer from denying compensability of neck injury).

Claimant cannot now challenge that finding because Claimant did not cross-appeal the order. See Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 130 So. 3d 243, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“A cross-appeal is an appellee’s exclusive method of obtaining relief from error in an order.”).

And even if she could, her challenge would fail because the record supports the finding; the adjuster testified that those payments were a mistake.

Second, although continued use of a prosthetic will toll the current version of the statute of limitations, it does not toll the 1989 version of the statute, given its inapplicability to remedial treatment “relating to” the prosthesis. Cf. Gore v. Lee Cty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding “continued use” of a prosthesis constitutes remedial treatment that tolls the statute of limitations so long as the employer/carrier has actual knowledge of the treatment). The exclusion was not removed from the statute of limitations until 1994. See Ch. 93-415, § 23, Laws of Fla. (substantially rewording section 440.19); Ch. 93-415, § 112, Laws of Fla. (making the legislative act effective January 1, 1994).

Therefore, the JCC erred by denying the E/C’s statute of limitations defense. REVERSED. OSTERHAUS and JAY, JJ., concur; KELSEY, J., concurs in result with opinion.