ALVIN POWELL, FATHER

v.

LEAH EVANSON, MOTHER

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Alvin Powell, the father of the parties’ two minor children, appeals the trial court’s order, which, in addition to ruling on other issues, granted the motion for contempt filed by Appellee, Leah Evanson, the children’s mother. Appellant argues, and we agree, that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt for violating a prior court order by driving from Colorado (where he lives) to Appellee’s home in Tallahassee to pick up the children for his summer timesharing.

As Appellant contends, the prior order primarily addressed the children’s air travel by explaining that Appellant had unilaterally purchased plane tickets on an earlier occasion without the approval of Appellee or the court, by describing Appellee’s request that all future air travel to Colorado for the children be in and out of the Tallahassee airport, and by ruling that Appellee was not required to bring the children to Atlanta to fly “as [Appellant] has insisted.” In addition to the foregoing, the order directed that “all future travel for the children shall be agreed upon in writing in advance, including flight times and locations, prior to any party purchasing plane tickets.”

The trial court found that Appellant violated this provision by driving to Appellee’s home to pick up the children on a date that, while initially agreed to by the parties, was later rejected by Appellee. Appellant cannot be held in contempt for noncompliance with a provision in an earlier court order that does not expressly address the conduct at issue.

See Lynne v. Landsman, 306 So. 3d 390, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (noting that where a final judgment or order is not sufficiently explicit or precise to put a party on notice of what the party may or may not do, it cannot support a conclusion that the party acted willfully, explaining that the standard of review is de novo where a party is held in noncompliance with something an order does not say, and holding that the trial court erred by finding the former wife in contempt for failing to comply with a provision of the final judgment that was not sufficiently precise or explicit to support the contempt); Preudhomme v. Bailey, 257 So. 3d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that the trial court erred in finding the appellant in contempt for violating the parenting plan because the plan did not contain an express provision on school attendance and did not address the issue of school tardiness so that the appellant was not adequately apprised of the consequences of delivering the children late to school); Kane v. Sanders, 232 So. 3d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (holding that the challenged order failed to contain a clear and definite command sufficient to notify a party of his or her required conduct and was not enforceable via contempt and explaining that a contempt order cannot be based on behavior that the court order does not contain); Stusch v. Jiruska, 188 So. 3d 874, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that the father should not have been held in contempt for failing to pay attorney’s fees where the father did not violate any court order by failing to do so).

Because the prior court order in this case required an agreement by the parties regarding the children’s future air travel and did not explicitly prohibit Appellant from driving to Appellee’s home, the trial court erred in holding him in contempt.

Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal as to that issue.

REVERSED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________