TYREE WASHINGTON

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

At the age of sixteen, Washington participated in the shooting death of Chris Pitcock. Washington planned to scare Pitcock and to rob him. But Pitcock was ultimately killed by a co-perpetrator. Washington was found guilty of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life. He was resentenced pursuant to an order of this Court on direct appeal. Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The resentencing was ordered on the authority of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and was guided by sentencing factors subsequently enacted by the Florida legislature codified in section 921.1401, Fla. Stat. (2014). At resentencing, he received a life sentence with an entitlement to a later judicial review. He now appeals his new sentence.

“[S]entencing remains largely discretionary” and “the scope of our review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Thomas v. State, 461 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). On careful review of the trial court’s sentencing order, we cannot say that it abused its discretion in its application of the sentencing factors because “reasonable [judges] could differ as to the propriety” of Washington’s sentence. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). We reject Washington’s argument to the contrary.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and LONG, JJ., concur; MAKAR, J. concurs with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

MAKAR, J., concurring.

I fully concur, noting that affirmance of the sentence imposed on Tyree Washington is required because of the discretion that trial judges have in passing judgment on whether a life sentence is appropriate for juvenile offenders based on the statutory multi-factor analysis prescribed in section 921.1401, Florida Statutes. Phillips v. State, 286 So. 3d 905, 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (finding “no abuse of the court’s discretion in its determination that ‘life’ was an appropriate sentence” for juvenile offender), review denied, No. SC20-81, 2020 WL 3412398 (Fla. June 22, 2020).

The “abuse of discretion” standard on appeal creates the potential for, and allows in actual operation, sentencing disparities between similarly situated criminal defendants. That’s because trial judges may place differing weights on the multitude of factors to be assessed, leading some judges to impose a life sentence while others impose something less. Had the trial judge in this case

determined that Washington’s sentence should be lessened somewhat because Washington shows the potential for rehabilitation (a former Florida State Prison warden and others testified so), no abuse of discretion would be shown and the lesser sentence would be affirmed: same facts, different judicial weights, dissimilar outcomes, but no abuse of sentencing discretion. Likewise, a single fact—such as the impact of the crime on a victim’s family—could shift a judicial view one way or the other; it’s all but impossible to ferret out what role each statutory factor played in the sentencing judge’s mind.

By statute, as recognized in the trial court’s sentencing order, Washington is eligible for judicial review of his sentence in 2026, making his ongoing efforts to demonstrate rehabilitation of importance in that process, as well as the opinions of the victim’s family. § 921.1402(6)(a) & (c), Fla. Stat. (2020) (subsection (a) addresses whether “the juvenile offender demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation” while subsection (c) addresses the “opinion of the victim or the victim’s next of kin”).

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.