JAMES D. SHELBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1989-12-20
No. 89-01193
SCHEB, A.C.J., and LEHAN and PARKER, JJ., concur.
554 So. 2d 24 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that trial courts lack the authority to rule on the award of gain time, which is a function of the Department of Corrections.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant pleaded no contest after his convictions were reversed and sought credit for gain time previously earned. The trial court determined it lack…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Following the reversal of appellant’s convictions, see Shelby v. State, 541 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), and upon remand for retrial, appellant pleaded no contest to certain charges and was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated plea. Appellant, relying on State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989), contends that the trial court erred in deciding that it did not have the authority to rule on whether he would receive credit for gain time previously earned while serving the sentences that were subsequently reversed. The state contends that awarding gain time is a matter that should be left to the Department of Corrections, not to the courts.

In Green, the supreme court held that trial courts have no authority to deny credit for gain time earned while previously incarcerated against a sentence imposed after revocation of probation, stating:

Further, as the district court noted, “[t]he awarding of statutory gain time is solely a function of the [department], and the trial court is without authority to prevent such award or order its waiver.” Green [v. State ], 539 So. 2d at 485 [Fla. 1st DCA 1988]. The statute places in the hands of the department the ability to award, forfeit, or restore gain time. There is no statutory authority for the court to initiate the forfeiture of gain time by denying credit for accrued gain time at resentencing.

547 So. 2d at 926-927.

In accordance with Green, appellant should be given credit for gain time earned while serving his previously-imposed sen tence. The trial court’s action is not inconsistent with Green, and indeed, is in compliance with that decision. The trial court neither granted nor denied credit for gain time earned. It determined correctly that it did not have the authority to rule on gain time. That function is with the Department of Corrections, which we are confident will award appellant the gain time he has earned.

Affirmed.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and LEHAN and PARKER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Desue v. State, 605 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …a court, as here, to simply award a defendant with time served and thereafter permit the department to make such calculation. See Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Rice v. State, 563 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Shelby v. State, 554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Hampton v. State, 421 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In regard to Desue’s final argument, the state concedes that the trial court erred by failing to make the written order conform to its oral pronouncement that Desue violated…
  • Walker v. State, 619 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …r counters that credit for previously-earned gain time has been denominated a judicial function, Cole v. State, 569 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The award of gain time is solely a function of the Department of Corrections. Green; Shelby v. State, 554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In the Green line of cases, the defendants had completed the incarcer-ative portions of split sentences, then violated the succeeding probations. The cases simply held that, at sentencing after the violation of probation, a court…
    1 / 2
  • Rice v. State, 563 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …rceration in the county jail and in state prison. We find the argument that the trial judge should determine the appropriate amount of earned gain time to be without merit. That is the function of the Department of Corrections. See Shelby v. State, 554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Although we affirm the trial judge, it is without prejudice to appellant to file a 3.850 motion alleging sufficient facts to establish a prima facie claim for correction of jail time credit. See Martin v. State, 525 So. 2d 901 (…

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