FAYE TOWNSEND
v.
MARTHA MANSFIELD, JENNIFER GLASS, NOLAN TOWNSEND, & LARRY JOE TOWNSEND

Fla. 1st DCA | 2021-10-06
No. 20-0110
329 So. 3d 174 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2021) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The appellate court affirmed a trial court's supplemental judgment awarding attorney's fees from an estate. The court denied the appellees' motion for appellate attorney's fees, holding that such awards are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.


Holding

The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for services rendered on appeal in a probate matter. This authority rests exclusively with the probate court.


Headnotes

[1] In probate matters, the award of attorney's fees for appellate services rendered to an estate falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court, not the appell…

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Key Quotes

“For an appellant to raise an issue properly on appeal, he must raise it in the initial brief. Otherwise, issues not raised in the initial brief are considered waived or abandoned.”

This quote explains why the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, as the appellant failed to raise any cognizable issues.

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellant failed to raise any cognizable issues on appeal. The appellees moved for attorney's fees for services rendered during the appeal, arguin…

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Opinion of the Court
Long

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has failed to raise any cognizable issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s supplemental judgment and order granting the assessment of attorney’s fees against Appellant’s share of the estate. See Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (en banc) (“For an appellant to raise an issue properly on appeal, he must raise it in the initial brief. Otherwise, issues not raised in the initial brief are considered waived or abandoned.”).

We write to address Appellees’ motion for attorney’s fees for services rendered in this appeal. Attorney’s fees in probate cases

are governed by the Florida Probate Code’s fees and costs provisions. § 733.106, Fla. Stat. (2012).* The probate court is a court of equity. § 733.106(1), Fla. Stat. The probate court has authority to award fees to “[a]ny attorney who has rendered services to an estate.” § 733.106(3), Fla. Stat. As a court of equity, the probate court is also expressly permitted to make discretionary allocations for fee awards. “When costs and attorney’s fees are to be paid from the estate, the court may direct from what part of the estate they shall be paid.” § 733.106(4), Fla. Stat. This discretionary allocation of costs and fees is part of the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the settling of estates. And this Court is without authority to award attorney’s fees in probate matters, even for appellate services performed, where the basis of the claim is provision of a benefit to the estate. This remains true where, as here, the benefit to the estate is defense against another beneficiary’s frivolous action.

The supreme court held “the award of attorney’s fees against a decedent’s estate for services to the estate in an appellate court is part of the settlement of estates of decedents as to which probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction.” Garvey v. Garvey, 219 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fees arising from disputes between heirs and devisees, where all the relevant litigants claim to act on behalf of the estate, generally fall within this class. See In re Est. of Udell, 501 So. 2d 1286, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (distinguishing between fees based on claims against an estate and those for the benefit of an estate, and holding that the latter is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court).

Notwithstanding our obiter dictum in Carrithers v. Cornett’s Spirit of Suwannee, Inc., 93 So. 3d 1240, 1241–42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), Florida courts have followed the plain language of the statute and supreme court precedent in holding such fees are exclusively in the jurisdiction of the probate court. See In re Estate of Gray, 626 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding the

* The statutes in effect at the time of the decedent’s death control. The relevant provisions have been amended since 2012, but not in a way that affects today’s outcome.

appellate court was “without jurisdiction to award” attorney’s fees for appellate legal services rendered and denying the motion without prejudice to petition the probate court for the same relief); Bissmever v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 596 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (holding that the allocation of appellate attorney’s fees for services rendered to an estate “rests within the exclusive province” of the probate court); Udell, 501 So. 2d at 1288 (holding “the authority to award attorney’s fees from the estate for services rendered on appeal vests in the lower tribunal, rather than the appellate court.”); In re Estate of Garvey, 212 So 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that the power to award fees for appellate services rendered to an estate belongs exclusively to the probate court).

We therefore deny Appellees’ motion without prejudice to their right to move the probate court to award attorney’s fees for defending this appeal and a corresponding assessment against Appellant’s portion of the estate.

B.L. THOMAS, ROBERTS, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________


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Citator

Cited By

  • Aldacosta v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2026)
    …–to say nothing of professionalism and a long appellate tradition–'suggest that courts . . ought not consider arguments outside the scope of the briefing process.' (quoting Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))); Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("An appellate court is 'not at liberty to address issues that were not raised by the parties.' " (quoting Anheuser-Busch Co. v. Staples, 125 So. 3d 309, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))). My concerns are beyond academic. Because t…
  • Mesa v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2026)
    …0 So. 3d 136, 139 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“For an appellant to raise an issue properly on appeal, he must raise it in the initial brief. Otherwise, issues not raised in the initial brief are considered waived or abandoned.” (quoting Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019))). [*4] Mesa's second argument is that condition eight of his probation order violates the double jeopardy clause because it contains special conditions that were not orally pronounced at the time of his sentencing. We agree…
  • Green v. Green (Fla. 5th DCA 2026)

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