CHARITO MELVIN
v.
PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, PAUL RICCI, AND THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH RICCI
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Charito Melvin to disqualify a trial judge. The court held that prohibition is not an appropriate remedy when a motion to disqualify has not first been filed with and denied by the trial court.
No, a writ of prohibition is not an appropriate remedy in this situation. A facially sufficient motion for disqualification and an erroneous denial of that motion by the trial court must be pleaded as a basis to grant prohibition relief.
[1] A petition for a writ of prohibition to disqualify a trial judge must be preceded by a motion to disqualify filed with the trial court and an adverse ruling on that motio…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A writ of prohibition “is meant to be very narrow in scope, to be employed with great caution and utilized only in emergencies,” and it is available as relief only “when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction.””
Establishes the limited nature and requirements for a writ of prohibition.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharito Melvin sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial judge from continuing to preside over a case. Melvin did not first file a motion to dis…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judicial Jurisdiction cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Charito Melvin seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial judge from continuing to preside in the litigation below. However, Melvin did not file a motion to disqualify with the trial court first, as required by rule. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330. A facially sufficient motion for disqualification and an erroneous denial of that motion must be pleaded as a basis to grant prohibition relief. Cf. Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978) (“Once a basis for disqualification has been established, prohibition is both an appropriate and necessary remedy.”). In an original proceeding for prohibition, we do not resolve disputed
issues of fact; we consider only whether the motion for disqualification (filed with the trial court) was legally sufficient and whether the order denying the motion was correct. See Bay Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lewis, 634 So. 2d 672, 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
See also Kline v. JRD Mgmt. Corp., 165 So. 3d 812, 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“In determining whether a motion to disqualify is legally sufficient, the appellate court reviews the motion’s allegations under a de novo standard.”).
A writ of prohibition “is meant to be very narrow in scope, to be employed with great caution and utilized only in emergencies,” and it is available as relief only “when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction.” English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977).
Absent a motion to disqualify and a trial court order denying it, there is nothing that could give rise to doubt about the trial court’s jurisdiction. Cf. Brown v. Rowe, 118 So. 9, 10 (Fla. 1928) (treating legally sufficient and supported allegations of disqualification, filed with the trial judge, as depriving the judge of authority to preside in the case); see Bay Bank, 634 So. 2d at 678 (explaining that the purpose of prohibition in this context “is to determine, not whether the judicial or quasi-judicial officer involved should be disqualified for bias or other reasons, but whether such an officer has exceeded the jurisdiction of the office by denying a clearly valid motion for disqualification” (emphasis supplied)).
Melvin’s failure to plead an adverse ruling by the trial court on a motion to disqualify the judge presiding in his case renders his petition fatally flawed on its face. DISMISSED. RAY, JAY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- THE Florida BAR v. Sanford Freed, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978)
- Brown v. Rowe, 96 Fla. 289 (Fla. 1928)
- Felice Kline v. JRD Mgmt. Corp. & Ccmsi, 165 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
- BAY Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lewis, 634 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)