HENRY SEGURA

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

LONG, J.

Henry Segura appeals his convictions and life sentences on four counts of first-degree murder. He advances five arguments for reversal. We write only to address the first. In his lead argument he urges the Court to engage in a weight-of-the-evidence review because, as Segura characterizes it, the evidence below was overwhelmingly in favor of innocence. The other arguments relate to evidentiary rulings which we have carefully considered and reject without further discussion.

I. A jury found Segura guilty of the premeditated and brutal murder of Brandi Peters and her three children, one of whom was also Segura’s son. There was significant evidence of Segura’s guilt.

The State’s established motive was that Peters had repeatedly taunted Segura with an allegation that his son was not biologically his, yet he still had to pay child support he could not afford. A girlfriend of Segura’s testified that he approached her close in time to the murders, shaking with rage and asking for a gun. A jailhouse informant relayed Segura’s confession to the murders which included a statement from Segura corroborating the girlfriend’s testimony. And Segura’s DNA was discovered on the bathtub where the children’s bodies were found.

Before Segura was a suspect, police interviewed him a day after the murders. Segura acknowledged his relationship with Peters but denied his presence at her house on the day of the murders. He repeatedly said he was at his house all day, even explaining inconsequential details of his home activities. He denied owning the same caliber gun as the bullets found at the crime scene, and he said he only had one phone. At a second interview, he was given an opportunity to correct his story. He admitted only to having a second phone that he used to talk to his girlfriends behind his wife’s back, and claimed to have disposed of it well before the murders. He continued to deny everything else.

At trial, and in the face of conclusive evidence that each of these statements were false, Segura changed his tune. He acknowledged that, on the day of the murders, he was at the crime scene, he did own the same caliber gun, he did have two phones and had left his primary phone at home, and he went to several other places. He claimed he lied because he was worried his wife would find out about his infidelity. He said he was in an ongoing sexual relationship with Peters. Despite these concessions, Segura insisted he left Peters’ house before the murders occurred.

He also presented his own theory—that a seven-member drug cartel hit squad was responsible for the murders. The tent-pole of the defense case, aside from Segura’s testimony, was the testimony of James Santos. Santos is a self-proclaimed drug cartel leader, currently imprisoned, who confessed to ordering a hit on Peters. There was evidence that Santos and Peters had some sort of relationship through jail-mail in the days before her murder. Santos claimed this relationship was transactional—that Peters worked for him as a drug trafficker and had for years. Santos said he ordered her death when he discovered she was stealing from him.

But Santos’ testimony had problems, the first being that his story evolved significantly leading up to the trial. He initially denied any involvement in the murders. As names of potential suspects were raised at publicized court hearings, Santos incorporated them into his story. The final version, after several revisions, had him as the behind-the-scenes leader of the hit squad. But the details are wanting.

At trial, he could only name two of the seven-member group, and those two names were previously publicized by the media. Santos also admitted to confessing to another murder he did not commit, a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and hearing voices. And despite claiming to know her for years, Santos could not name a single characteristic about Peters other than that she was a black woman.

As part of the defense theory, Segura also pointed out that his DNA was only found on the bathtub by the children’s bodies and nowhere else in the large crime scene. He noted that several samples of foreign, unidentified DNA were collected. He presented a cartel expert that testified the scene was consistent with a cartel hit. And he pointed to other suspects, eliminated by police based on phone records, who made arguably incriminating statements.

II. Segura asks us to engage in a weight-of-the-evidence review on appeal in the “interest of justice.” Segura argues his case is unique because of “the overwhelming nature of the unrebutted evidence of innocence” and there was “no room for rational minds to disagree about the fact that the State failed to carry its burden.” There is no legal support for Segura’s argument.

He cites Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1126 (Fla. 1981), for the proposition that the interest of justice, standing alone, is “a viable and independent ground for appellate reversal.” This phrase is contained in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(i), which states that “[i]n the interest of justice, the court may grant any relief to which any party is entitled.” But the plain language requires the party to first have a legal entitlement to relief. And this entitlement cannot be a re-weighing of the evidence, as Tibbs explicitly found. Tibbs “eliminat[ed] evidentiary weight as a ground for appellate reversal.” Id.

Segura’s real request is for us, as appellate judges, to substitute our verdict for the jury’s. We cannot. Opposing theories must be weighed by the jury. We do not try the case again on appeal. There was sufficient evidence for the jurors to reasonably reach a finding of guilt. Absent prejudicial error, appellate courts must respect a jury’s verdict.

AFFIRMED.

JAY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. _____________________________