CHRISTINE ANN CRIME
v.
JOHN LOONEY
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's decision in a vehicle collision case, finding that the trial court improperly applied the rear-end presumption and erred in disallowing a comparative fault defense. The court ordered a new trial on both liability and damages.
Yes, the trial court erred in its application of the rear-end presumption and its ruling on the comparative fault defense. Yes, a new trial on damages is warranted because the issues of liability and damages were inextricably intertwined in this case.
[1] The judicially created rear-end collision presumption in vehicle negligence cases disappears and loses its legal effect when admissible evidence demonstrates that the rea…
[2] Under Florida Statute section 768.81(3)(a)1, a defendant asserting comparative fault against a nonparty need only describe the nonparty as specifically as practicable and…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because there was admissible evidence that Appellant was not the sole cause of the accident, the presumption should have “vanishe[d] and los[t] its legal effect.””
Establishes that the rear-end presumption should not have been applied to defeat the appellant's claim of comparative fault.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court interpreted a judicially created rear-end presumption to defeat the appellant's claim of comparative fault. The court also found a com…
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PER CURIAM.
The trial court erred by interpreting the judicially created rear-end presumption in vehicle collision cases to defeat Appellant’s claim of comparative fault. Because there was admissible evidence that Appellant was not the sole cause of the accident, the presumption should have “vanishe[d] and los[t] its legal effect.” Birge v. Charron, 107 So. 3d 350, 359 (Fla. 2012). The presumption “is not an alternate means of tort recovery in derogation of Florida’s well-established system of recovery based on comparative negligence.” Id. at 361.
The trial court also erred in finding that a comparative fault defense was unavailable to Appellant because she could not specifically identify the nonparty she sought to allocate fault to.
Section 768.81(3)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2019), states that a defendant need only “describe the nonparty as specifically as practicable” when the nonparty’s identity is not known. The cases relied on by the trial court in reaching a different conclusion were decided before this language was added to section 768.81. Appellee concedes, and we agree, that the errors require a new trial on liability. Appellant also asks us to remand for a new trial on damages, claiming that the issues of liability and damages were “inextricably intertwined.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Appellee argues we are bound by Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 1996) which held “a reversal precipitated by [comparative fault] errors does not affect the determination of damages.” However, in Nash, the parties had put on their entire case before the trial court denied their motion to include a nonparty on the verdict form for the purposes of a comparative fault determination. Here, the decision was made at the beginning of the proceeding and affected its entirety.
We agree with Appellant that fairness demands reversal of the damages award and therefore remand for a new trial on both issues. REVERSED and REMANDED. B.L. THOMAS, NORDBY, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________
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Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Chadwell, 338 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)…. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Chadwell, 306 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). In so doing, we acknowledged conflict with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Whitmire, 260 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice (Prentice I), 290 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), in which the First District Court of Appeal found substantially similar evidence of detrimental reliance to be insufficient to support the fraud counts as a matter of law. The Florida Supreme Court granted discretionary review…1 / 2
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Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Cuddihee, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…ime, we possess the added benefit of a recent on-point decision by the Florida Supreme Court. See Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., --- So. 3d ---, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S78, 2022 WL 805951 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2022) (approving R.J. Reynolds v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)). According to Prentice, to prevail on concealment or concealment conspiracy claims, “an Engle progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement that was made by an Engle defendant (for a concealment claim) or co-conspirator (…
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Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Chadwell, 306 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…that in order to support a claim for fraudulent concealment, an Engle plaintiff must “prove that they individually relied to their detriment on false statements from the tobacco companies.” Id. at 539; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (following the holding in Whitmire). Here, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Mr. Chadwell’s reliance on statements, advertisements, or omissions via the tobacco companies’ pervasive misleadi…1 / 3
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Birge v. Charron, 107 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2012)
- R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)