CURTIS ANTON FAULK

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

Curtis Faulk appeals the dismissal of his rule 3.800(a) motion. In 1996, a jury found Faulk guilty of armed robbery (14 counts), attempted armed robbery (1 count), false imprisonment (7 counts), armed kidnapping (6 counts), and unlawful carrying of a concealed firearm (1 count). The trial court imposed habitual felony offender (HFO) sentences that included life imprisonment for the armed robberies and 25 years’ imprisonment for the armed kidnappings. In 1998, this Court affirmed the judgments and sentences.

In August 2020, Faulk filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, alleging two claims for relief. First, he argued that his 25-year HFO sentences for armed kidnapping—a life felony—were illegal because chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, was held unconstitutional in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999). Second, he argued that his HFO sentences were illegal because documentation of an out-of-state predicate conviction failed to indicate an actual adjudication of guilt.

In April 2021, the lower court summarily dismissed the motion, finding Faulk failed to demonstrate the existence of an illegal sentence.

We affirm on the second claim without further comment. Regarding the first claim, on each of the armed kidnapping counts, the trial court sentenced Faulk to 25 years’ imprisonment as an HFO. Because Faulk used a weapon or firearm, the court reclassified these offenses to life felonies pursuant to section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, amended the habitual offender statute, allowing for life felonies to be properly subjected to HFO sentencing enhancement. See § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1996). Prior to that amendment, life felonies were not subject to HFO sentencing. See § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Thus, when the trial court announced the sentence, it properly imposed HFO punishments on the armed kidnapping counts.

However, in 1999, the Florida Supreme Court struck down chapter 95-182 as violative of the single subject rule. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 649. As a result, the HFO designation on Faulk’s life felonies is rendered illegal. See Bell v. State, 219 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Sexual battery with the use of physical force likely to cause serious personal injury is a life felony. While it is true that the habitual offender statute was amended to apply to life felonies by chapter 95–182, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 1995, that amendment was subsequently held to be unconstitutional. The window period for its unconstitutionality ran from October 1, 1995, through May 24, 1997. The appellant's offenses were committed within that window period. Given this authority, the HVFO designation was not properly imposed as to the sexual battery convictions.” (citations omitted)); Sims v. State, 997 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“The window period for unconstitutionality was October 1, 1995, through May 24, 1997. Because the defendant’s crime date fell within the window period, it was not permissible for an HVFO adjudication to be imposed on count two, armed kidnapping, which is a life felony.” (citation omitted)). Because Faulk’s armed kidnapping offenses took place within the window discussed in Bell and Sims, the HFO designation on these sentences is illegal. Regardless, Faulk received well below the maximum sentences he could have received on the armed kidnapping counts as they are life felonies regardless of application of the habitual offender statute. Thus, Faulk has not demonstrated, on the face of the record, that his 25-year sentences would be illegal under the applicable sentencing guidelines.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal but remand only with instruction for the trial court to strike the HFO status on the armed kidnapping counts. Faulk need not be present for this action by the trial court.

On July 1, 2021, Faulk submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed under the same case number and raising similar issues. We dismiss that petition as unauthorized. See Moultrie v. State, 310 So. 3d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5).

It is so ordered.

JAY, M.K. THOMAS, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________