MICHAEL JOSEPH NILIO

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

The appeal involves a challenge to an order denying all of Appellant’s postconviction claims without an evidentiary hearing. In addition to denying those claims summarily, the lower tribunal ordered Appellant to show cause why the court should not bar him from filing additional pro se motions. Because the order denying postconviction relief also included an order to show cause, the lower tribunal classified the order as “a non-final, non-appealable order.” This classification was erroneous.

An order that resolves all of the claims raised in a motion for postconviction relief is a final order because such an order ends judicial labor on that motion. See State v. Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 941 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Taylor v. State, 140 So. 3d 526, 528 (Fla. 2014)) (“The order resolved Jackson’s claims and ‘marks the end of the judicial labor which is to be expended on the motion.’”); see also Malone v. State, 330 So. 3d 969, 972 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (quoting Jackson, 306 So. 3d at 944) (“[A]n order granting in part and denying in part a rule 3.850 motion is ‘final for purposes of appeal’ in its entirety because it resolves all the defendant’s claims.”).

The fact that an order denying postconviction relief also directs a party to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed does not alter the finality or appealability of the order denying relief. See HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n for Fremont Home Loan Tr. 2005-B, Mortg.-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-B v. Buset, 216 So. 3d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citations omitted) (“It is well established that a trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award fees, costs, or sanctions does not affect the finality of a judgment.”); see also Spencer v. State, 717 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“Spencer I”), approved in part, State v. Spencer 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999) (“Spencer II”) (“Prior to the imposition of sanctions, the trial court must issue an order to show cause which initiates a separate proceeding independent of the 3.800 action.”); see also Spencer I, 717 So. 3 at 96 n.1 (“An independent order assures that review of the 3.800 motion in the appellate court will proceed in a timely manner and assures preparation of an adequate record in the sanction action. The same rule would apply if the issue is raised in the context of a 3.850 proceeding.”); but see Spencer II, 751 So. 2d at 49 n.3 (“We do not express an opinion as to whether it is always necessary, as a matter of procedure, for the order to show cause issued by a trial court to be initiated by a separate proceeding, as stated in the First District's opinion.”).

In this case, the order denying Appellant’s motions for postconviction relief is indeed a final order as it resolves all of Appellant’s claims and therefore ends judicial labor on the motions. See Jackson, 306 So. 3d at 941; see also Malone, 330 So. 3d at 972 n.3. The lower tribunal’s decision to include language in that order directing Appellant to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed does not alter this conclusion. See HSBC Bank USA, 216 So. 3d at 703; see also Spencer I, 717 So. 2d at 96.

Accordingly, the Court denies Appellant’s “Motion to Hold Post-Conviction Appeal in Abeyance or Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice.” This case will continue to proceed as an appeal of a final order summarily denying Appellant’s claims for postconviction relief. Appellant may serve an initial brief within thirty days of the date of this opinion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(C)(i).

ROBERTS, MAKAR, and JAY, JJ., concur. _____________________________