NANCY H. RAIK, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BRIAN K. RAIK, DECEASED, AND

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF VICTIM COMPENSATION

NANCY H. RAIK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brian K. Raik, deceased, and on behalf of the Estate and Survivors of Brian K. Raik,

Appellant,

v. DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF VICTIM COMPENSATION,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Department of Legal Affairs, Bureau of Victim Compensation. Gary Howze, Division of Victim Services & Criminal Justice Programs, Director. July 13, 2022

B.L. THOMAS, J.

Brian Raik was killed in a criminal act: vehicular homicide. He and his wife, Appellant Nancy Raik, had been married for thirty-one years. They had two children. She applied for victim compensation under the “Florida Crimes Compensation Act.”

§§ 960.01–.28, Fla. Stat. The Bureau of Crimes Compensation erroneously denied compensation to a surviving spouse of a deceased victim in direct violation of the Legislature’s expressed intent that “aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims . . . .” § 960.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The Bureau’s interpretation and the dissenting opinion’s interpretation would contradict plain legislative intent, and thereby wrongfully deprive crime victims of their rightful compensation.

Therefore, we reverse with direction that the Bureau compensate Mrs. Raik in compliance with the Act. The probable cause affidavit noted that the other driver, Elie Charles, was traveling at an “excessive/reckless” speed—seventy miles per hour in a forty-five miles per hour zone—when he lost control of his vehicle while attempting to pass another car. His vehicle flew over a median and crashed head-on into Mr. Raik’s car, killing him. The force of the impact on Mr. Raik’s car caused it to hit another car and inflicted serious injuries on that driver. Mr. Charles was taken to the hospital but left “against medical advice.” The State charged Mr. Charles with vehicular homicide under section 782.071(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2019).

Mrs. Raik filed a victim’s compensation claim with the Bureau under section 960.07, Florida Statutes (2021), listing herself and her two children as dependents. After the accident, Mrs. Raik was in financial straits. She had to borrow money from family and friends to cover not only the bills, but also Mr. Raik’s funeral expenses. In her claim form, she noted that her husband’s cause of death was vehicular homicide. The Bureau denied Mrs. Raik’s claim, interpreting the Florida Crimes Compensation Act to exclude compensation for claims from the families of deceased victims of vehicular homicide, unless the perpetrator left the crime scene or intentionally caused the victim’s death. Our standard of review is de novo. Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. (“In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court . . . may not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo.”) (emphasis added).

The Bureau’s denial is subject to the provisions of chapter 120, Florida Statutes. § 960.09(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). “A party who is adversely affected by [a] final agency action is entitled to judicial review.” § 120.68(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021).

If the agency incorrectly interprets a provision of law and a correct interpretation would compel a particular action, then the reviewing court may set aside the agency action. § 120.68(7)(d).

The Florida Crimes Compensation Act Section 960.03 provides the definitions applicable throughout the Florida Crimes Compensation Act, which are to be used, “unless the context otherwise requires.” § 960.03, Fla. Stat. And the correct context must always be based on a reading of the relevant statute as a whole. Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2006).

In Koile, the supreme court emphasized this principle in holding that Florida’s crime-victim restitution statute permitted a trial court to award lost future income of a murder victim to his estate, where, as here, the Legislature decreed that the state had a “moral responsibility” to crime victims: The clear language of the statute is bolstered by the Legislature’s explicit statements of intent in respect to the statute. In numerous years, the Legislature has passed and amended the restitution statute, and each time the Legislature has stated that its intent is to ensure that victims of crime are properly compensated and respected by the criminal justice system. For example, in 1984 when the Legislature amended section 775.089 to include the provisions at issue, the Legislature made explicit findings that “[e]ven though there is growing recognition that the criminal justice system would cease to function without the cooperation of victims and witnesses, the historic unresponsiveness of the criminal justice system to the real needs of victims and witnesses has not yet been fully corrected.” Ch. 84–363, § 2, at 2144, Laws of Fla.

Moreover, in the same legislative findings, the Legislature also noted that “[w]hile state law provides the option of financial restitution to victims by defendants, most victims are never fully or even partially compensated by defendants for their injuries and other losses.” Id.

Accordingly, the Legislature required courts to order the defendant to make restitution to the victims unless clear and compelling reasons existed to justify the nonpayment of restitution.. . . In 1992, the Legislature amended section 775.089 slightly, and in the bill amending the statute specifically noted that it had previously determined that “the state has a moral responsibility to provide aid, care, and support to victims of crime.” Ch. 92–107 at 901, Laws of Fla. (preamble).

The main purpose of section 775.089 has been to uphold the rights of crime victims by guaranteeing that they are compensated for their losses. Anything less than full compensation for those items discussed in section 775.089 would defeat the legislative intent of the statute. 934 So. 2d at 1232–33. In a very similar fashion here, as noted, that correct context requires an interpretation that is faithful to the express legislative intent and moral purpose of the Act: The Legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal injury or death as a direct result of criminal acts . . . . Such persons or their dependents may thereby suffer disabilities, incur financial hardships, or become dependent upon public assistance. The Legislature finds and determines that there is a need for government financial assistance for such victims of crime.

Accordingly, it is the intent of the Legislature that aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of crime. It is the express intent of the Legislature that all state departments and agencies cooperate with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. Ch. 77-452, § 1, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). That intent has not changed in forty-five years, except as it has been expanded to specify that it includes juvenile crimes. See § 960.02, Fla. Stat. (2021).

Accordingly, every section of the Florida Crimes Compensation Act, and every amendment to it, must be read and interpreted to effectuate the Legislature’s explicit intent to financially aid the victims of crime. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000) (noting that statutes should be interpreted to effectuate their stated purposes).

Further, the Florida Crimes Compensation Act must be interpreted in its historical context. The Act’s definition of “victim” unambiguously includes the deceased victim here and his family. “Victim” means “a person who suffers personal physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime.” § 960.03(14)(a), Fla. Stat. And “[a] surviving spouse . . . of a deceased victim” shall be eligible for awards under the Act. § 960.065 (1)(c), Fla. Stat. The Bureau may award compensation if it determines a crime has been committed. § 960.13(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2021).

The Act broadly defines crime to include misdemeanors which result in physical injury or death: (a) A felony or misdemeanor offense committed by an adult or a juvenile which results in physical injury or death . . . . (b) A violation of s. 316.027(2), s. 316.193, s. 316.1935, s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b), or s. 860.13(1)(a) which results in physical injury or death. (c) An act involving the operation of a motor vehicle, . . . which results in another person’s injury or death that is intentionally inflicted through the use of the vehicle . . . ; however, no other act involving the operation of a motor vehicle . . . constitutes a crime for purposes of this chapter. . . . . § 960.03(3)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added).

The Bureau concluded that subsection (3)(c) limits the compensable crimes involving motor vehicles to only those listed in subsection (3)(b) and those where a person intentionally causes the victim’s personal injury or death while operating a motor vehicle. The Bureau reasoned that Mrs. Raik’s claim was not compensable because the person who caused Mr. Raik’s death was charged under section 782.071(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which is not a crime listed in section 960.03(3)(b).

The Bureau’s incorrect reading of the statute unduly limits the Legislature’s stated declaration to compensate victims and their families.

First, the statute’s definition of a crime does not require a conviction of a “felony or misdemeanor offense committed by an adult or a juvenile which results in physical injury or death” before a victim of an “offense” is eligible for compensation under the Act. This will be discussed below regarding the correct interpretation of the statute as a whole.

Second, the Bureau’s interpretation nullified other provisions of section 960.03(3), Florida Statutes. The Bureau’s reading of the statute contradicts the specific and express legislative intent to compensate crime victims, misreads the plain text of the statute and applicable definitions of crime, and results in the wrongful exclusion of victims and their families from compensation.

Thus, the Bureau’s reading of the statute defeats the legislative purpose and rationale of the Act. History of the Florida Crimes Compensation Act The original version of the Crimes Compensation Act defined “crime” as: [T]he commission of a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this state by any person which is punishable under the criminal laws of the State of Florida and which results in physical injury or death of a resident of this state; provided, however, that no act involving the operation of a motor vehicle . . . which results in injury or death shall constitute a crime for the purpose of this chapter unless the injury or death was intentionally inflicted through the use of such vehicle . . ., or unless such vehicle . . . is an implement of a crime to which this act applies. Ch. 77-452, § 1, Laws of Fla. The Legislature has consistently broadened the definition of “crime” to include more crime victims. In 1985, the Legislature expanded the definition of compensable crimes to include violations of section 316.193, Florida Statutes, that result in serious injury or death. Ch. 85-326, § 1, Laws of Fla. In 1992, the Legislature again amended the definition of crime to include violations of sections 316.027(2) and 782.071(2), Florida Statutes, that result in serious injury or death.1 Ch. 92-107, § 4, Laws of Fla. That same year, the Legislature expanded the definition of crime to include crimes committed by juveniles. Ch. 92-287, § 19, Laws of Fla. In 1997, the Legislature amended the definition of crime to include acts of mass violence or international terrorism committed outside the United States resulting in physical injury or death for victims not otherwise covered under federal law. Ch. 97-41, § 1, Laws of Fla. In 1999, the Legislature again amended the definition to include violations of sections 327.35(1) and 860.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, resulting in physical injury and death. Ch. 99-373, § 2, Laws of Fla. In 2008, it included in the definition crimes relating to online sexual exploitation and child pornography. Ch. 2008-172, § 7, Laws of Fla. In 2012, the Legislature “redefin[ed] the term ‘crime’ for purposes of crime victims compensation to include additional forms of injury” to compensate victims of child abuse resulting in mental injury. Ch. 2012-155, § 15, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added).

The Legislature again expanded the definition to include “forcible felon[ies] committed by an adult or juvenile which directly results in psychiatric or psychological injury . . . .” Ch. 2015-92, § 14, Laws of Fla. 1 This expansion abrogated opinions such as Davis v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation, which held that one of section 960.03(3)’s earlier definitions of crime only applied to “overt acts of a driver while using [an] automobile, and not to any subsequent intentional omission of the driver to render aid to another.” 406 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

And in its latest revision, the Legislature enlarged the definition of crime to include felonies or misdemeanors that result in the death of an emergency responder. Ch. 2017-155, § 13, Laws of Fla. And even where the Legislature removed provisions from the Florida Crimes Compensation Act, its intent was to expand the Act. In 2001, the Legislature amended the 1992 definition of crime by removing reference to section 782.071(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and instead making section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes, compensable. See Ch. 2001-147, § 4, Laws of Fla. This change coincided with the amendment to section 782.071, Florida Statutes, which expanded the definition of “vehicular homicide” to include the killing of a viable fetus by any injury to the mother. Ch. 2001-147, § 2, Laws of Fla. In 2007, the Legislature removed from the definition of crime the 1997 amendments, which covered acts of mass violence and international terrorism committed outside the United States. Ch. 2007-129, § 3, Laws of Fla. But the Legislature revised the definition so that this deletion would not affect the scope of coverage. See id.; see also Fla. H.R. Homeland Sec. & Pub. Saf., HB (2007) Post-Meeting Analysis 4–5 (Mar. 9, 2007), https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.asp x?FileName=h0989a.HSPS.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillN umber=0989&Session=2007 (last visited May 06, 2022).

Between 1977 and 2011, section 960.03, Florida Statutes, would have specifically included the crime at issue here because Mr. Charles’ vehicle was the “implement of [the] crime” of vehicular homicide. Compare Ch. 77-452, § 1, Laws of Fla. (making crimes where a vehicle is the implement of the crime resulting in death or physical injury a compensable crime), with Ch. 2012-155, § 15 Laws of Fla. (removing the implement of a crime provision).

The Legislature’s removal of the “implement of a crime” clause does not resolve the issue here, because the Legislature removed it with the intent to expand the definition of crime. See Ch. 2012-155, Laws of Fla. (nothing in the title indicates that the legislation was “redefining the term ‘crime’ for purposes of crime victim compensation to include additional forms of injury”).

This is especially true when considering the Crimes Compensation Act’s express intent to fulfill the state’s “moral responsibility” to aid crime victims. See § 960.02, Fla. Stat. (2021).

Textual Considerations As noted, in interpreting the Florida Crimes Compensation Act, this Court must honor the stated legislative purpose: to help victims like Mrs. Raik, whose husband was killed by a criminal act, which the Legislature defined as a “homicide.” See Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1232 n.5 (citation omitted) (“It is important to keep the expanded definition of “victims” in mind while reviewing the legislative intent because the expressed intent behind the amendment was to protect the ‘victims’ and ensure the state ‘do all that is possible’ to assist the ‘victims.’”); Joshua, 768 So. 2d at 435 (noting that courts are “guided by the Legislature’s stated purpose for enacting” a piece of legislation).

Second, in properly and reasonably interpreting the statute, we must consider the relevant statutory definitions as a whole, against the backdrop of the historical context, as noted above. See Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774, 777 (Fla. 2012) (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides the interpretation and construction of a statute. . . . When the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, a court may turn to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction.”) (citations omitted).

If a statute is ambiguous and contains internally inconsistent provisions, our interpretation cannot render any provision illusory. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366–67 (Fla. 2005) (“Court[s] cannot engage in a narrow, limited reading of an individual subsection . . . , which would render another coequal provision of the statute entirely nugatory.”).

Rather, “our duty [is] to read the provisions of a statute as consistent with one another . . . and to give effect and meaning to the entirety of the legislative enactment . . . .” Id. (citations omitted).² Further, we must not literally interpret a statutory provision if doing so “would lead to an unreasonable conclusion or defeat legislative intent . . . .” Joshua, 768 So. 2d at 435 (quoting Las Olas Tower Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

Only after we discern legislative intent may we read the statute “as a whole to properly construe its effect.” Id. This is because a statute’s stated intent must guide our decision-making. See id.

Section 960.03(3)(a), Florida Statutes, unambiguously defines a compensable crime as every felony and misdemeanor offense committed by an adult or juvenile that results in personal injury or death. Vehicular homicide is a second-degree felony, punishable by up to fifteen years in state prison. § 782.071(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021).

And while vehicular homicide is enhanced to a first-degree felony if the offender leaves the scene of the fatal accident, the substantive and core definition of the crime does not require the perpetrator to leave the crime scene. § 782.071(1)(b).

Rather, the statute simply increases the penalty for the underlying criminal act if such attempt to elude detection occurs. Id. The Bureau’s literal and isolated reading of section 960.03(3)(c) would contradict and invalidate much of subsection (3)(a).

This interpretation would prevent victims of felonies involving the unintentional use of an automobile, resulting in deaths or physical injury, from receiving compensation. This interpretation violates core principles of statutory construction and the express legislative intent of section 960.02, Florida Statutes, and leads to absurd results. For example, the Bureau’s interpretation would exclude the offense which resulted in the death of a child in State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1990).

Ellison was convicted of second-degree murder, later reduced to manslaughter, after losing control of a vehicle in a high-speed police chase and hitting another vehicle, killing a sixteen-month-old victim. Under the Bureau’s interpretation, the child’s parents would not be eligible for compensation, because the perpetrator in Ellison did not intentionally use the vehicle: “Ellison’s act of losing control of the car was not committed from ill-will or spite.” Id. at 577.

Thus, under the Bureau’s literal reading of subsection (3)(c) in isolation,

the state would fail in its “moral responsibility” to aid those victims in violation of the stated purpose of the Act. See. § 960.02, Fla. Stat. Similarly, under the Bureau’s literal interpretation of section 960.03(3)(c), Florida Statutes, the victim’s family in Hicks v. State, 41 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010), would be ineligible for compensation. There, Hicks drove the wrong way on the interstate and killed the victim. Id. at 328–29. The court reduced the conviction from second-degree murder to manslaughter on the rationale that there was no “evil intent” to kill the victim. Id. at 331.

Thus, the victim’s family could not show the offender’s car was “intentionally” used in the crime. Such a result would contradict the express intent of the Act and lead to an absurd result. The supreme court’s decision in Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2006), is instructive regarding the error of an absurd, literal interpretation of a statute. Maddox concerned the interpretation of section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes, which stated that a traffic citation was not admissible “in any trial.” Id. at 444.

The Second District declined to apply a literal interpretation of the statute and held that a traffic citation was admissible in an unrelated criminal trial. Maddox v. State, 862 So. 2d 783, 784–85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), aff’d, 923 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2006).

The Second District also certified conflict with this Court’s decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 784–85. In Dixon, this Court held that section 316.650(9) applied even when a person forged a false name on the citation and was later prosecuted for forgery. 923 So. 2d at 448. The supreme court rejected this Court’s literal interpretation of the statute and approved the decision of the Second District Court. Maddox, 923 So. 2d at 448. The supreme court noted that a literal interpretation of the phrase “at any trial” would lead to an absurd result and be contrary to legislative intent: Moreover, . . . if we were to agree . . . [that] the phrase “any trial” . . . was intended to absolutely encompass all proceedings in a court of law, we would in essence be sanctioning a construction of this statutory provision that would lead to “unreasonable or ridiculous” results.

. . . . . . . In a similar manner, under . . . [this] view, a citation found at the scene of the murder of a police officer would be inadmissible to show the last person having contact with the officer when the substance of the particular citation was in no way in controversy.

We find further support for our conclusion in this matter when recognizing that the First District’s [literal] interpretation of section 316.650(9) essentially eradicates all prosecutions for forgery of a traffic citation. . . . . . . . [A]lthough the strict meaning of the words in the abstract employed by the Legislature when it drafted section 316.650(9) may admittedly support the outcome of the First District’s opinion . . . , such a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results. 923 So. 2d at 447–48 (citations omitted).

And a literal interpretation of the clause at issue here would necessitate just that—an absurd result. If the language “however, no other act involving the operation of a motor vehicle . . . constitutes a crime for purposes of this chapter” means that “no other [such] act” can be a “crime” eligible for victim compensation, then much of section 960.03(3)(a) is nullified. As noted, the victims of many crimes which would qualify as an “offense” under subsection (3)(a), including even homicide and manslaughter offenses involving a vehicle not intentionally used, would be unable to receive compensation under a literal reading of subsection (3)(c).

This result would be particularly absurd, as subsection (3)(a) does not even require a conviction for such offenses. But almost all offenses in subsection (3)(b) would not allow for victim compensation under a literal reading of subsection (3)(c), as noted below:

(b) A violation of s. 316.027(2), s. 316.193, s. 316.1935, s. 327.35(1), s. 782.071(1)(b), or s. 860.13(1)(a) which results in physical injury or death.

. . . . § 960.03(3)(b), Fla. Stat. And although the Bureau interprets subsection (3)(c) to include all of subsection (3)(b), there is no logical basis for such a reading. Either subsection (3)(c) must be read literally, and apply to the entire definition of a “crime,” including the crimes designated in subsection 93)(b) by its plain terms, or it cannot be read literally. No text in (3)(c) exempts (3)(b) from its reach. If subsection (3)(c) is to be read literally and in isolation, it necessarily excludes a broad swath of crimes, including felonies resulting in the deaths of victims. We either, therefore, adopt a literal interpretation of subsection (3)(c), which we cannot do without violating express legislative intent and repealing preceding subsections, or we must interpret subsection (3)(c) in harmony with subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) to adhere to the declared legislative intent to fulfill the state’s “moral responsibility” to devastated crime victims, which we must do. The sentence in subsection (3)(c) regarding crimes in which an automobile is “intentionally used,” and which results in personal injury or death, if read literally, is redundant to language in subsection (3)(a), which makes all felonies resulting in injury or death subject to compensation to the victims of those crimes.

Thus, that sentence must be read in conjunction with the following clause: “no other act involving the operation of a motor vehicle . . . constitutes a crime for purposes of this chapter.” § 960.03(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

The only reasonable interpretation of this language, in light of the unambiguous declaration of legislative intent, the broad language in subsection (3)(a), and the proper context of the statute as a whole, is to read the sentence as confirming legislative intent that victims of crimes involving the intentional use of an automobile are entitled to compensation. And “acts” (not criminal offenses) involving only negligence or other civil wrongs involving motor vehicles are not covered by the statute. This interpretation preserves every provision of the Legislature’s definition of “crimes” without invalidating any provision, as mandated by rules of statutory construction addressed in Plaza Materials. 908 So. 2d at 366–68. The subsection’s reference to “acts,” not “crimes,” further supports this correct interpretation. These references indicate that the Legislature intended this language to operate as a fallback provision to ensure that no deaths or injuries to crime victims were excluded, while simultaneously ensuring that the statute, and the limited funds appropriated to that statute, were not depleted in any manner for injuries or deaths resulting from civil torts. As this Court held in Owens v. State, 303 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), which involved a very similar question of statutory interpretation, a court cannot adopt a literal and sterile statutory interpretation that produces an absurd result. In Owens, this Court addressed a statute that provided a more lenient sentencing scheme for certain probationers who violated their terms of supervision and who met “any” of four enumerated criteria. See id. We held the word “any” had to be interpreted to read that “all” requisite criteria applied: Here, although the use of “any” rather than “all” before the list of four conditions in subsection 948.06(2)(f)1 creates an ambiguity, it is not unresolvable. We must read all parts of the amended section 948.06 together so as “to ascertain their meaning.” Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000). “It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992). “In certain circumstances, the absurdity doctrine may be used to justify departures from the general rule that courts will apply a statute’s plain language.” State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 2012).

If we were to read “any” strictly and not in context with the four conditions that follow, we would give an absurd reading to the revised statute. “[A] sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results.” Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 448 (Fla. 2006).

If “any” in context here did not mean “all,” everyone on probation would meet the requirement of subsection 948.06(2)(f)1.a. The conditions in b. through d. would be superfluous since anyone found to have violated probation must, of course, be on probation. . . . Lastly, regardless of how many previous violations of probation have been committed, if “any” was read literally, then subsection 948.06(2)(f)1.d would be meaningless and probation could never be revoked. Such readings would not give meaning to the whole of the statutory amendment and would be absurd. Courts must be careful in applying the absurdity doctrine so as to not “substitute their judgment of how legislation should read, rather than how it does read, in violation of the separation of powers.” Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Courts should not resort to the absurdity doctrine merely because of disagreements with the result of legislation. Lewars v. State, 277 So. 3d 143, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

But, “a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).

We believe it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended the new subsection 948.06(2)(f)1. apply to every probationer irrespective of whether the probationer complied with all the listed conditions. Rather than benefitting all probationers, it seems clear that the Legislature intended section 948.06(2)(f) 1 apply only to persons who meet all four conditions. 303 So. 3d 993, 997–98 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (internal footnote omitted).

This Court’s logic in Owens was partly incorporated by the Fifth District in Kirk v. State, and is also instructive here:

Two rules of statutory construction justify that position. The first is the doctrine of in pari materia, which provides that we should view statutes in a manner that would harmonize the applicable law. See Deen v. Wilson, 1 So. 3d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

The second, referred to as the absurdity doctrine, is that “a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citing Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1970)).

Given the outcomes invited by Kirk’s interpretation, these two principles compel the conclusion that section 948.06(2)(f) 1. requires all conditions to be met, rather than just one. While utilizing a slightly different approach, this is the same conclusion reached in Owens v. State. . . . . . . . Rather than finding an ambiguity, [as this Court did in Owens] we should recognize that despite the lack of ambiguity, this statute is ripe for the utilization of the absurdity doctrine. . . . Certainly, the use of the absurdity doctrine should be exceptional. It is not intended to allow courts to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature.

However, viewing the statute as a whole, it is clear that the Legislature intended that all conditions be met before a probationer obtains its benefits. Kirk v. State, 303 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citations omitted). There is no other reasonable interpretation of the language at issue without violating the expressed legislative intent of the Florida Crimes Compensation Act to fulfill the state’s moral obligation to compensate victims of crime. Appellant’s late husband was killed in an accident in which the responsible driver was charged with vehicular homicide. This Court’s interpretation ensures that the state’s moral obligations to crime victims and their families is fulfilled, and properly reads section 960.03(3)(a)–

(c), Florida Statutes, “to give effect and meaning to the entirety of the legislative enactment . . . .” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d at 366–67. The Bureau’s interpretation cannot stand in light of the Legislature’s broad definitions of crime victims and its expressed intent to ameliorate the suffering of those victims. Conclusion We reverse the Bureau’s decision denying Appellant compensation from the fund with directions to approve her application. REVERSED. M.K. THOMAS, J., concurs; MAKAR, J. dissents with opinion