JAMES DWIGHT EDWARDS

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

ROWE, C.J.

James Dwight Edwards petitions for a writ of prohibition seeking to quash the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a charge of manslaughter after an evidentiary hearing. Edwards asserts that he is immune from criminal prosecution under section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2019), because he was acting in self-defense when he shot and killed his stepson.¹

Because competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings and because the State presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome Edwards’ self-defense claim, we deny the petition on the merits.

Facts

Edwards shot and killed the victim, his stepson. Just before the shooting, Edwards and the victim had a physical and verbal altercation on the porch of the trailer where Edwards lived with the victim’s mother, Marisa Knight. Edwards discovered that the victim crashed Edwards’ car and left the scene of the accident. Knight witnessed a scuffle between Edwards and the victim on the porch. Knight saw the men pushing each other, but she saw neither throw punches. When the men moved from the porch and entered the trailer, Knight lost sight of them for ten to fifteen seconds.

The next time Knight saw the men was when she entered the trailer and walked toward the master bedroom. Both men were in the bedroom. Knight saw the victim punch Edwards in the head, but she could not see Edwards’ hands. Knight continued to walk toward the men. When she reached for her son’s shirt to pull him away from Edwards, Knight realized that her son had been shot. Edwards exclaimed, “Oh, God. I shot him.” Edwards was a surgical nurse. But at no point after the shooting did Edwards try to render aid to the victim.

Instead, Edwards called 911 and gave a false version of events. Contrary to Knight’s report to police that Edwards and the victim were fighting on the porch of the trailer before the shooting, Edwards told the 911 operator that he was sound asleep when he woke up to the victim on top of him and beating him. Edwards repeated this story to the EMT who examined him at the scene.

One of the officers who responded to the scene observed a mark on Edwards’ head. But he did not see a “big goose egg.” The characterize the relationship between Edwards and the victim just as Edwards did.

emergency room doctor who examined Edwards that evening testified that Edwards had mild, localized bruising.

The victim did not survive the shooting. The medical examiner concluded that the victim died from a gunshot wound to the upper mid abdomen. He explained that the gun was fired while in contact with the victim’s skin or clothing.

The State charged Edwards with manslaughter. Edwards moved to dismiss the charge on grounds that he was acting in self-defense when he shot the victim. Edwards alleged that the victim took his cell phone before following Edwards into the trailer. He claimed that the victim threatened to kill him, punched him in the head, and placed a hand over his mouth to prevent him from breathing. Edwards alleged that he shot the victim because he was in fear for his life. Based on these allegations, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court considered testimony from multiple witnesses and denied Edwards’ motion to dismiss.

Procedural Posture

First, a few words about the posture of this case. There are two paths for a criminal defendant to seek review of a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss claiming self-defense immunity. When raising a substantive challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a self-defense immunity claim, a defendant may seek relief by petitioning for a writ of prohibition.² State, 326 So.² Some nonfinal orders denying immunity claims are reviewable by appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) (e.g., orders denying a motion to dismiss based on worker’s compensation immunity or sovereign immunity), but a ruling on a self-defense immunity claim is not. See Boston, 326 So. 3d at 677. In 2014, when the supreme court considered amendments to rule 9.130(a), it authorized review by appeal of nonfinal orders denying sovereign immunity, but it did not expand review to nonfinal orders denying other types of immunity claims. See In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, 151 So. 3d 1217, 1217–19 (Fla. 2014).

The court explained that it had “concerns that claims pertaining to immunity as a

3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021) (“[A] defendant who avails him or herself to a pretrial immunity hearing and who believes legal error was committed at the pretrial immunity hearing may still seek relief by filing a petition for writ of prohibition.”).

When a defendant seeks to challenge the procedure used by the trial court in considering a self-defense immunity claim, he may petition for a writ of certiorari. See Rogers v. State, 301 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (considering by certiorari petition argument that the trial court erroneously required petitioner to present evidence in support of his immunity claim); see also Corbett v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D1069 (Fla. 5th DCA May 13, 2022) (explaining that if the petitioner’s challenge to a ruling on an immunity claim “is procedural, e.g., whether the trial court applied the correct evidentiary burden, rather than substantive, e.g., where the [petitioner] is entitled to immunity, then prohibition is not the appropriate remedy”).

Edwards challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues an whole may be too broad” an expansion of the orders reviewable by appeal. Id. at 1217.

Even so, it remains unclear whether a petition for writ of prohibition is an appropriate means for a defendant to challenge a trial court’s order denying a self-defense immunity claim. Prohibition is “very narrow in scope, to be employed with great caution and utilized only in emergencies. . . . It is preventive and not corrective in that it commands the [the lower tribunal] not to do the thing which the supervisory court is informed the lower tribunal is about to do.” Sarasota Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. v. Venice HMA, LLC, 325 So. 3d 334, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977)). “Prohibition was never meant to be a substitute for appellate review.” Id. “In other words, ‘[p]rohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting English, 348 So. 2d at 297).

error in the procedure applied by the trial court—asserting that the court misapprehended the burden of proof and shifted the burden to him. This claim is reviewable by certiorari.

Edwards also challenges the trial court’s order on substantive grounds, asserting that the State did not meet its burden to overcome his immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence.

We review this aspect of Edward’s challenge by prohibition. See Morris v. State, 325 So. 3d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (holding that a defendant may challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss on self-defense immunity by petition for writ of prohibition); Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (explaining that prohibition is the appropriate remedy to raise substantive claims because the trial court lacks authority to proceed against a defendant entitled to statutory immunity under section 776.032). As explained below, we find no merit in Edwards’ procedural challenge to the trial court’s ruling. And we deny on the merits Edwards’ substantive challenge to the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss.

Edwards’ Procedural Challenge

Edwards argues that the trial court misapprehended the burden of proof and shifted the burden to him. Treating Edwards’ petition for writ of prohibition as a petition for writ of certiorari, we hold that Edwards failed to show that the trial court misapprehended or shifted the burden of proof or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of the law. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. (requiring the supreme court to adopt rules requiring that “no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought; provided that it shall not be the responsibility of the court to seek the proper remedy.”).

“In a criminal prosecution, once a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has been raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the immunity from criminal prosecution. . . .” § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. The trial court’s oral pronouncement at the pretrial immunity hearing shows that it understood that the State had the burden to disprove by clear and convincing evidence Edwards’ claim that he was acting in self-defense, and he reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to defend himself.

When making its oral ruling, the trial court stated: “[T]he State has met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the [petitioner] did not reasonably believe that his use of force was necessary to defend himself from the alleged victim, specifically.” The trial court also stated that it found “the credible evidence and testimony shows by clear and convincing evidence that the [petitioner] was not acting in self-defense at the time of the charged offense.” Besides holding the State to its burden to disprove Edwards’ self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court construed the evidence in a light most favorable to Edwards.

And contrary to Edwards’ claim, the trial court never shifted the burden to him. It is true that the trial court expressed interest in hearing Edwards’ version of events at the pretrial hearing. But there was nothing improper in the trial court’s expression of interest in hearing from Edwards. A trial court may inquire whether a criminal defendant wishes to present evidence or testimony at a pretrial immunity hearing. Despite the burden being on the State to come forward with clear and convincing evidence to overcome the petitioner’s prima facie claim, a petitioner asserting self-defense immunity must raise his prima facie claim “at a pretrial immunity hearing.” § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. In raising such a claim, the defendant may choose to present evidence or testimony in support of his prima facie claim. See Langel v. State, 255 So. 3d 359, 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that a party asserting self-defense immunity must ordinarily “testify or to otherwise present or point to evidence from which the elements for justifiable use of force can be inferred”); but see Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1027 (“[T]here is no evidentiary burden upon the person seeking Stand Your Ground immunity.”).

Here, while ensuring that Edwards understood it was his decision whether to testify, the trial court explained how Edwards’ testimony could help resolve conflicts in the evidence. The trial court explained that Edwards’ exculpatory hearsay statements to the paramedics, for example, would not be considered by the court based on its ruling to not allow those statements to be admitted into evidence. The court also informed Edwards that it would not consider as relevant testimony that the victim had once struck his mother because there was no testimony that Edwards was aware of that incident.

But despite its desire to hear more about what happened on the night of the shooting, the trial court never stated that Edwards needed to testify. And there is no indication in the trial court’s oral or written findings that it held against Edwards his decision to not testify.

Based on the trial court’s findings and statements at the immunity hearing, the trial court understood that the State had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Edwards was not acting in self-defense. And thus, Edwards failed to show any procedural error by the trial court or any departure by the trial court from the essential requirements of the law.

Edwards’ Substantive Challenge

Edwards also claims that the trial court committed a legal error in evaluating his immunity claim. He argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because the State did not meet its burden under section 776.032(4) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death when he shot his stepson. Edwards contends that “no evidence exists, except as found in [his] Motion to Dismiss, regarding how Mr. Edwards was acting at the time of the shooting.” We disagree.

To begin with, the burden shifts to the State to overcome a defendant’s self-defense immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence, only after “a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has been raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing.” § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied).

To raise a prima facie claim of self-defense, a defendant must show that the elements of justifiable force are met. State v. Moore, 337 So. 3d 876, 880–81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

Section 776.012(1), Florida Statutes (2019), provides, A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. A conclusory allegation that the defendant acted in self-defense is not enough. Moore, 337 So. 3d at 882. Rather, the defendant must allege specific facts that show or tended to show that he (1) used deadly force; (2) reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another; (3) used such deadly force while resisting the victim’s attempt to murder him, to commit a forcible felony on him, or to commit a forcible felony on or in Edwards’ dwelling; and (4) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in place he had a right to be. See Fla. Std.

J. Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f).

And so, here, Edwards needed to point to facts that showed or tended to show that: he used deadly force; he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another; he used deadly force while resisting the victim’s attempt to murder him, to commit a forcible felony on him, or to commit a forcible felony on or in Edwards’ dwelling; and Edwards was not engaged in criminal activity and was in a place he had the right to be. Id. Edwards did not present any evidence in support of his motion to dismiss. And the unsworn allegations in Edwards’ motion lack evidentiary value. See MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Merrill, 312 So. 3d 986, (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (holding that unsworn representations of counsel about factual matters are not competent evidence absent a stipulation).

Thus, it is questionable whether Edwards “raised” a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity sufficient to shift the burden to the State under section 776.032.

But see Riggens v. State, 344 So. 3d 625, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (explaining that “an accused must simply allege a facially sufficient prima facie claim of justifiable use of force under chapter 776 in a motion to dismiss . . . and present argument in support of that motion at a pretrial immunity hearing” (quoting Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1028–29); see also Casanova v. State, 335 So. 3d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (holding that a motion to dismiss can raise a facially sufficiently claim of immunity “even though the motion to dismiss is not sworn to by someone with personal knowledge or supported by evidence or testimony establishing the facts in the motion to dismiss”).

Even so, the State does not challenge whether Edwards raised a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity at the pretrial hearing. And thus, we leave for another day what is required for a defendant to “raise” a prima facie claim of immunity at “a pretrial immunity hearing” under section 776.032. Instead, we consider only Edwards’ argument that the State did not meet its burden to overcome his self-defense claim by clear and convincing evidence.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion seeking dismissal on grounds of self-defense immunity, this Court (1) considers whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings, and (2) reviews de novo whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he faced an imminent threat of great bodily harm or death. See Fletcher v. State, 273 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“A trial court’s denial of pre-trial self-defense immunity involves a mixed standard of review.”); Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 479–80 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (explaining that a mixed standard is applied to the trial court’s denial of a motion seeking dismissal on self-defense immunity grounds); State v. Marrero, 299 So. 3d 489, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (same); State v. Peraza, 226 So. 3d 937, 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (same).

The first question requires deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. We must presume that those findings are correct and disregard them only if they are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Swift v. State, 342 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact carry a presumption of correctness and may only be reversed if they are not supported by competent, substantial evidence.”); see also Craven v. State, 285 So. 3d 992, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); Hart v. State, 308 So. 3d 655, 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion” and evidence is “competent” if it is “sufficiently relevant and material.” De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957).

The second question can be answered only by examining the credible testimony and evidence presented at the immunity hearing to determine whether there was competent, substantial evidence from which this Court can determine whether the State overcame the petitioner’s immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence. Bouie, 292 So. 3d at 480 (“[W]e should review a trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm under the de novo standard.”).

Put differently, there must be a corpus of competent, substantial evidence formed from the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations for the appellate court to draw on to reach the legal conclusion that the evidence was clear and convincing that the petitioner was not acting in self-defense. In determining whether such a corpus of evidence exists, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or revisit the trial court’s credibility determinations.

Then, assuming there is a corpus of competent, substantial evidence to draw from, we must then determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing. Clear and convincing evidence has both qualitative and quantitative aspects.

Clear and convincing evidence has been quantified as an intermediate level of proof that falls between proof by a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Edwards v. State, 257 So. 3d 586, 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Preponderance of evidence requires a greater weight of the evidence or “more than a fifty percent likelihood of guilt.” See In re

Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet Corvette, 571 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). And proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires “an abiding conviction of guilt.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.7. It is hard to pinpoint exactly where on the spectrum between the other two standards of proof clear and convincing proof falls. See N.L. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 843 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Suffice it to say that clear and convincing evidence is a higher evidentiary burden than proof by a preponderance of evidence, but lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the qualitative aspect of the clear and convincing standard, evidence is clear and convincing when the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. See Cummings v. State, 310 So. 3d 155, 158–59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Or when the evidence is credible, the witnesses distinctly remember the facts, and the testimony is precise and explicit. See Inquiry Concerning Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). Courts have also found evidence to be clear and convincing when “the sum total of the evidence [is] of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.” Edwards, 257 So. 3d at 588 (quoting N.L., 843 So. 2d at 999).

Even so, clear and convincing does not mean that there are no inconsistencies in the evidence. In re Petition for Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice & Consent or Consent Only to Termination of Pregnancy, 333 So. 3d 265, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“It is possible for the evidence in such a case to be clear and convincing, even though some evidence may be inconsistent. Likewise, it is possible for the evidence to be uncontroverted, and yet not be clear and convincing.” (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989))).

If there are inconsistencies, it is not for the appellate court to resolve them; only the trial court may resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995) (“[O]ur task on review is not to conduct a de novo proceeding, reweigh the testimony and evidence given at the trial court, or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.”).

An appellate court also may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Edwards, 257 So. 3d at 588.

Here, our task is to determine, based on the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations about the testimony and evidence presented at the immunity hearing, whether there is a corpus of competent, substantial evidence to support the legal conclusion that the evidence was clear and convincing enough to overcome Edwards’ immunity claim. In so doing, we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Swift, 342 So. 3d at 855.

Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, we hold that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. And from that competent, substantial evidence, we hold that the State met its burden to overcome Edwards’ immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence. Stated differently, the State met its burden to show that it was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death when he shot his stepson.

Evidence Missing from the Appendices Supporting the Petition

Before beginning our examination of the trial court’s credibility findings on the testimony and evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, we pause to explain what is lacking in Edwards’ presentation to this Court. Edwards submitted several appendices in support of his petition. Those appendices included his unsworn motion to dismiss, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the transcript of the court’s oral pronouncement, and the written order denying the motion to dismiss. But several critical pieces of evidence considered by the trial court when it denied the motion to dismiss are missing. That evidence includes:

• Photographs of the layout of the trailer where the shooting occurred. Those photographs would have informed the trial court’s determination of how much time it took Edwards and his stepson to move from the porch, through the trailer to the master bedroom, where Edwards shot his stepson.

• Photographs depicting the location of the nightstand in Edwards’ bedroom, the gun, and the gun safe, which would also have informed the trial court’s determination of the timing of the shooting and whether there was time for Edwards to walk to the bedroom, remove the gun from the gun safe, and fire it at his stepson before Knight entered the bedroom.

• Photographs depicting Edwards’ injuries right after the shooting, as well as photographs depicting Edwards’ injuries at the hospital, which would have informed the court’s view on the severity of the injuries to Edwards.

• Photographs depicting the stepson after the shooting, which would have revealed the placement and position of his body when discovered.

• An audio recording of the 911 call Edwards made right after shooting, during which Edwards stated that he was attacked by his stepson, that his stepson was beating up Edwards, that Edwards shot his stepson in the chest, and that Edwards was sound asleep when his stepson just started beating on Edwards. Edwards also stated that he “fucked up.”

• A recording from the in-car audio and video system of the patrol car driven by the first deputy to arrive on the scene after the shooting. The recording includes Edwards’ statement: “I shot my stepson.”

These critical pieces of evidence contributed to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. But despite these omissions, in the appendices that Edwards did choose to submit, there is competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations from which we can determine that the State met its burden to overcome Edwards’ immunity claim by clear and convincing evidence.

Testimonial Evidence Presented at the Immunity Hearing

The appendices to Edwards’ petition include a transcript of the pretrial immunity hearing. The trial court heard testimony from Marissa Knight, two witnesses from the medical examiner’s office, two police officers, two crime scene investigators, a doctor who examined Edwards the night of the shooting, and a paramedic. The court found that the testimony presented by these witnesses was credible. And the trial court made the following factual findings:

• Edwards viewed the victim as his son/stepson.

• But the relationship between Edwards and his stepson deteriorated. In the days before the shooting, Edwards left several degrading messages for his stepson.

• The degrading messages hurt his stepson’s feelings, and Edwards laughed at this reaction. Edwards’ reaction showed he was not afraid of his stepson.

• Before the shooting, Edwards and his stepson had both been drinking.

• On the day of the shooting, the stepson wrecked Edwards’ car and left the scene of the accident. Edwards was irate and furious with his stepson about these actions.

• After the wreck, the stepson arrived at Edwards’ trailer where Edwards lived with Knight. A physical altercation between Edwards and his stepson broke out on the porch. While on the porch, Edwards and his stepson grabbed and pulled each other. • Starting on the porch, Edwards was engaged in mutual combat with his stepson.

• After the altercation began, Edwards went inside the trailer and his stepson followed.

• Edwards kept his gun in a locked case in a nightstand by the bed in his bedroom in the trailer. • “[D]uring a physical altercation where the alleged victim struck the [petitioner] with his hands, the [petitioner] responded by shooting his stepson at point blank range.”

• Edwards and his stepson were inside the trailer for ten to fifteen seconds between the time Knight saw them tussling on the porch and when she saw them again upon entering the trailer and walking to the bedroom.

• Knight never heard a gunshot.

• Knight never heard any calls for help or demands to cease before the gun was fired.

• As Knight walked toward the bedroom, she saw her son punch Edwards in the head more than once.

• It was unlikely that the gunshot occurred while Knight was in the bedroom based on the time it took her to enter the home, her position behind her son, and the location of the gun.

• The evidence showed it was more likely that the shot occurred before Knight entered the room.

• The description of the location of Edwards and the victim at the end of the altercation in the bedroom near Knight suggested that Edwards retrieved the gun close to the time when he entered the bedroom—before the punching occurred.

• Edwards’ demeanor during the 911 call and when the police arrived on scene was “wholly inconsistent with someone who had acted in self-defense in shooting and killing their son or stepson.”

• Edwards, a hospital surgical nurse, rendered no first-aid even though he knew that his stepson was dying.

• There was no history of violence between Edwards and his stepson.

• The victim was significantly smaller than Edwards. Edwards was over 300 pounds—his stepson weighed 160 pounds.

• The stepson was not “particularly physically fit” and had no prior fighting experience.

• The stepson injured his shoulder when he wrecked Edwards’ car, hours before the shooting.

• Edwards had an injured hand at the time of the altercation.

The court considered these facts, as well as the relationship between Edwards and the victim. In evaluating the self-defense immunity claim, the court questioned “whether or not a reasonable and prudent stepfather or father, situated in the same circumstances as the [petitioner] and his stepson or son, would have felt deadly force had to be used to prevent great bodily harm or death.” The court found that there was no reasonable interpretation of the facts to support Edwards’ claim that he had an objectively reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death.

Other Evidence Supporting the Trial Court’s Factual Findings

In assessing whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, we also consider the trial court’s implicit findings and other credible evidence presented at the pretrial hearing.

Implicit in the court’s credibility finding in favor of the testifying witnesses is a rejection of Edwards’ version of the facts— alleged in the motion to dismiss and expressed in his hearsay and other statements Edwards made in the minutes and hours after the shooting. In his motion to dismiss, Edwards alleged that he fired the gun while his stepson was punching him and blocking his airway. Edwards also alleged that his stepson placed his hand over Edwards’s mouth to prevent him from breathing.

At the pretrial hearing, the State presented testimony that Edwards told a 911 operator and a paramedic that he was asleep when his stepson started beating him. He also told the 911 operator that he was lying on the bed with his stepson on top of him when he shot his stepson.

But to find Edwards’ version of the facts credible, the court would have needed to discount Knight’s description of the events just before the shooting about the fight between Edwards and her son on the porch. Knight testified that the men were fighting on the porch for fewer than fifteen seconds from the time she lost sight of them until she discovered her son shot in the bedroom. This testimony conflicts with Edwards’ assertion that he was asleep when the fighting began.

Further, if Edwards shot his stepson while or after being smothered on the bed, then how was it that both managed to return to a standing position before Knight approached them and before the stepson delivered three blows to Edwards’ head? When Knight encountered the two in the bedroom, she testified that her son was punching Edwards and the two of them were standing on their feet. It is unclear whether the three punches Knight saw occurred before, simultaneously with, or after the shooting. The trial court concluded that “it appears from the evidence that the shot more likely occurred prior to [Knight] even making it to the room.”

No witness testified about the precise sequence of events that happened inside the home during the ten to fifteen seconds it took Knight to leave the porch and follow the men inside the home. But based on the evidence and testimony before it, the trial court found that these things occurred: Edwards went to his bedroom, he opened his nightstand, he opened his gun safe, and retrieved his gun. The trial court also found that the stepson punched Edwards in the head, Edwards shot his stepson, and Knight grabbed her son while he was still standing, but after he was shot.

Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s view of the evidence and conclusion that Edwards shot his stepson before Knight entered the room and before the stepson struck

Edwards in the head.³ To reach this conclusion, the trial court relied on Knight’s testimony, pictures of the crime scene, and the medical examiner’s testimony:

First, Knight testified that she did not hear a gunshot and that the men were standing when she entered the bedroom. And she explained that the gun was in a locked case on the nightstand by the bed. Second, the trial court reviewed photographs of the crime scene, which were not provided to this Court, showing the location of the gun in relation to where the stepson was shot. Finally, the medical examiner explained the single bullet to the stepson’s abdomen did not sever his spinal cord, testifying that it was possible that the stepson could have run around the block before collapsing. This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that it was after the single shot to his abdomen that the stepson struck Edwards in the head.

Edwards’ statements that his stepson was beating him to death also conflict with other evidence presented at the pretrial immunity hearing. There was testimony to suggest that the injuries to Edwards’ head later observed by the emergency room physician were not sustained during his altercation with his stepson. The first deputy to arrive on the scene after the shooting observed only a “mark” on Edwards’ head; he never saw a “goose egg” on Edwards’ forehead. Although the medical examiner never examined Edwards, he testified that generally that a “goose egg” “show[s] up pretty fast.” The medical examiner explained that a “goose egg” could be formed by a “moving body striking a firm surface.”

Edwards’ assertions that he was severely beaten also conflict with other physical evidence suggesting that the bruising to Edwards’ head was minor. Dr. Acri, the doctor who examined Edwards the night of the shooting, did not consider Edwards to be significantly injured. He described Edwards’ bruising as mild and localized. Edwards was alert, was not dizzy or nauseous when he presented to Dr. Acri, nor did he report any of those symptoms— even though earlier he told the paramedic who responded to the scene of the shooting that he was experiencing those same symptoms.

Even so, Dr. Acri agreed that when he examined Edwards at the hospital after the shooting, Edwards then had a “goose egg” on his forehead and three other bruises. When asked how the “goose egg” might have been caused, Dr. Acri testified that it “would take a punch . . . or a hit by an object.” It was defense counsel who characterized the bruises on Edwards’ head as “five distinct injuries.” Dr. Acri testified to four. Additionally, when Edwards reported to Dr. Acri that he had been beaten, he did not report the alleged smothering to him.

The State Overcame Edwards’ Self-Defense Claim with Clear and Convincing Evidence

Based on the circumstances as they appeared to Edwards at the time of the altercation, we hold that the State met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonably prudent person in the same position would not believe that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.

Despite the testimony on the “goose egg” observed on Edwards’ head and Knight’s testimony that her son landed three punches to Edwards’ head, not every blow to the head is deadly. And not every fist fight justifies defending oneself with deadly force. Context matters. See Bouie, 292 So. 3d at 481 (“The question under this objective evaluation of a defendant’s conduct is whether, based on the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time of the altercation, a reasonable and prudent person in the same position as the defendant would believe that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm or the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”).

His stepson was no stranger to Edwards. His stepson had a key and free access to Edwards’ trailer. Their interaction was frequent. Edwards knew his stepson’s behaviors and tendencies. Even so, Edwards shot his stepson, who was half his size, who had no history of violence as far as Edwards knew, who had never threatened Edwards, who did not have specialized fighting knowledge, and who had just injured his shoulder in a motor vehicle accident.

In the days before the shooting, Edwards had been aggressive toward his stepson. He left explicit, degrading messages for his stepson to find. When he learned that those messages hurt his stepson’s feelings, Edwards laughed.

The relationship between Edwards and his stepson, the testimony on the minor nature of Edwards’ injuries, along with all the testimony and evidence at the hearing, provides the context to evaluate whether it was objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death when he shot his stepson at point-blank range.

Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings and based on our review of the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, we hold that there was a corpus of competent, substantial evidence from which we can conclude that the State met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death when he shot his stepson. For these reasons, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition on the merits.

DENIED.

OSTERHAUS, J., concurs with opinion; B.L. THOMAS, J., dissents with opinion.