FRANK BALL, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
ZITA L. BALL, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1989-12-28
Nos. 88-1295, 88-2548
WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur., GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
554 So. 2d 629 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the equitable distribution of property but reverse the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The financial status of the wife after the award of alimony, equitable distribution, and requirement that the husband pay joint debts leaves the parties with substantially equal resources. An award of attorney’s fees under these circumstances is an abuse of discretion. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 502 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

Other
GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that the equitable distribution should not be disturbed, but disagree with the reversal of attorney’s fees.

The majority, I believe, has done a disservice to the people of this district by adopting Blankenship. In my view, the rule of that Fifth District case is too broad a rule. It should be noted that Blankenship cites only Fifth District cases for its authority. All of the Fifth District cases cited in Blankenship show the root to be that court’s decision in Ariko v. Ariko, 475 So. 2d 1852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). When one looks at Ariko, two things stand out. First, the wife received $120,000 in lump sum alimony. Second, Ariko cites Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976).

From a reading of Cummings it is clearly seen that the court speaks of “equal footing.” It does not say “equal assets.” There is, in many cases, as here, a genuine difference. A wife’s assets may be equal to the husband’s by a final judgment, then rendered substantially less than the husband’s by requiring her to pay her attorney’s fee. This wife has so little earning capacity, and the husband has not only a real earning capacity but union benefits to protect him.

Trial judges have the responsibility of ' producing a mosaic by their final judgments in dissolution cases. Attorney’s fees can be a substantial piece of that mosaic to the party paying the fees; trial judges surely must take these prospective fees into consideration when structuring their judgments. Otherwise, it would be like planning a home, but leaving the kitchen out of the plans.

I believe the wife — and a lot of wives in this district — will be inequitably penalized by the majority’s action here. Equally important, why should trial judges — or parties — believe that decisions come here with a presumption of correctness if we tamper with the exercise of sound discretion?


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Kovar v. Kovar, 648 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
    …$40,-000 lump sum and $1,500 monthly permanent alimony, the parties were placed in substantially equal financial positions; thus, fees and [*180] costs should not have been awarded. Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Ball v. Ball, 554 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees when the award of alimony, equitable distribution, and a requirement that the husband pay joint debts leaves the parties with substantially equal resources). AFFIRME…
  • Boyett v. Eldis Raymell Boyett, 683 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …(Fla. 5th DCA 1985)). We recognize that in making an attorney’s fees award, trial courts are given broad discretion, and therefore, an appellate court will not reverse absent a showing that the trial court abused that discretion. See Ball v. Ball, 554 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In the present ease, however, the parties’ relative financial circumstances fol [*1143] lowing the final judgment demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in making the attorney’s fees award. We therefore reverse t…
  • Fenner v. Fenner, 599 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …and requires the husband to pay most of the other debts of the marriage, the trial court has placed the wife in an equal if not superior financial position in this dissolution, making it an abuse of discretion to award fees to her. See Ball v. Ball, 554 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).…

Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw