LYNDA LEONARD - BOYCE
v.
IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF TERI VAN WINKLE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2021-07-02
No. 20-2689
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2021)

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Synopsis

The appellate court reversed a lower court's order reducing a guardian's hourly fee without explanation or a hearing. The court held that such reductions must be supported by competent, substantial evidence and that the guardian must be given an opportunity to be heard.


Holding

Yes, the circuit court erred by reducing the guardian's requested hourly fee without providing a reason or affording the guardian an opportunity to be heard. Such discretionary acts must be supported by logic, justification, and competent, substantial evidence.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's discretionary reduction of a guardian's requested hourly fee rate must be supported by competent, substantial evidence and logic, and the guardian must be…

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Key Quotes

“The amount of guardian's fees to be awarded as compensation for services rendered is in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be disturbed unless there is a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the award.”

Establishes the general standard for reviewing guardian fee awards.

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Facts & Procedural History

A guardian sought payment for 63.7 hours of guardianship work at $95 per hour. The circuit court, without a hearing, reduced the hourly rate to $90 an…

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Opinion of the Court
Stargel

LUCAS, Judge. Linda Leonard-Boyce, an appointed guardian for Teri Van Winkle, appeals an order that authorized payment of her fees at a reduced hourly rate from what she had sought.1 Leonard-Boyce's petition included a timesheet that reflected she had performed guardianship work totaling 63.7 hours at a billing rate of $95 per hour. No one contested the amount of hours or the hourly rate Ms. Leonard-Boyce requested.

The circuit court's order, entered without a hearing, awarded her 63.7 hours, but at $90 per hour. The court did not indicate the reason why it had unilaterally reduced Ms. Leonard-Boyce's rate. The court then summarily denied the guardian's motion for reconsideration. Ms. Leonard-Boyce has filed this timely appeal. Ordinarily, "[t]he amount of guardian's fees to be awarded as compensation for services rendered is in the discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be disturbed unless there is a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the award." White v. Guardianship of Lubin, 150 So. 3d 1256, 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting In re Guardianship of Sapp, 868 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). "Nevertheless, in guardianship cases, as in other cases, discretionary acts are subject to the test of1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.170(b)(21).

reasonableness, i.e., they must be supported by logic and justification for the result and founded on substantial, competent evidence." In re Guardianship of Sapp, 868 So. 2d at 693 (citing In re Guardianship of Sitter, 779 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)).

In the order before us, we cannot ascertain what competent, substantial evidence supported the unilateral reduction of Ms. Leonard-Boyce's rate. Nor does it appear that the circuit court afforded Ms. Leonard-Boyce an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Both errors compel reversal of the guardian's fee order. See In re Kesish, 98 So. 3d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing guardian's fee award as "[t]he order entered in this case fails to set out the considerations that resulted in the trial court's reduction of the only fee established by the evidence presented"); Shappell v. Guardianship of Naybar, 876 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (recognizing that many guardianship expenses are disposed of informally without a hearing but that "the circuit court should not reduce the amount of compensation requested by the guardian without first providing the guardian with an opportunity to be heard on the petition"); see also In re Guardianship of Sitter, 779 So. 2d at 348-49 ("We will not burden guardianship division courts with a time consuming requirement that they make findings of fact to support every award of guardian fees. But when the parties . . . question the court's reasoning, and such findings would be necessary to permit appellate review of the matter, the court should express findings either in its order or on the record." (citing Haas v. Haas, 552 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989))).

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand for the court to convene a hearing on Ms. Leonard-Boyce's petition.

Reversed and remanded with instructions. SLEET and STARGEL, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

Footnotes
1 Ms.

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