UNNI HASKELL

v.

JOHN S. HASKELL, ET AL

a Connecticut Corporation, Appellees. No. 2D21-214 January 21, 2022 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Doneene D. Loar, Judge. Eric R. Maier and Michael L. Lundy of Older, Lundy Alvarez & Koch, Tampa, for Appellant. Lindsay Patrick Lopez and Marie Tomassi of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee John S. Haskell. No appearance for remaining Appellees.

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge. Unni Haskell, the Former Wife in the underlying dissolution proceeding, appeals from the trial court's order awarding her only a portion of the postjudgment fees and costs that she requested. The Former Wife argues that the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to award fees and costs that she had incurred in connection with an appraisal of business membership units awarded to her in the equitable distribution. She argues further that the court abused its discretion by declining to award her an additional significant amount of attorney's fees and forensic expert fees without explanation. Having had the benefit of both briefing and oral argument, we reject the first argument without further discussion but reverse the award for additional findings.

This is not the parties' first appearance in this court, and a detailed recitation of how they arrived here this time will neither benefit them nor elucidate any point of law. Suffice it to say, the trial court concluded that the Former Wife was entitled to attorney's fees and forensic expert fees that she had incurred in connection with litigation enforcing her right to an appraisal but not to any fees or costs incurred in connection with the appraisal itself. The court ultimately awarded the Former Wife approximately one-third of her requested fees—a reduction of more than $100,000 even after subtracting the appraisal-related expenses. Considering the factors set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (Fla. 1985), the court found reasonable the hourly rates charged by the Former Wife's law firm and accounting firm but significantly cut the number of hours that each averred in their affidavits to have reasonably expended. See Beck v. Beck, 852 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("[I]n making an attorney's fee award in a dissolution proceeding, the trial court must determine the proper amount of fees by considering the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended in the case, and setting forth specific findings as to these factors as required by [Rowe].").

The trial court did not explain the basis for this significant further reduction in the requested number of hours; nor can we discern the basis from the record without resorting to speculation.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to enter an order that includes specific findings that support its award. See Lizardi v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 322 So. 3d 184, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ("[T]he order as written, merely stating the hourly rate and reasonable number of compensable hours without any elucidation as to why those figures were used instead of the requested figures, does not comport with the requirements of Rowe."). In so ruling, we do not pass on the correctness of the court's determination of the appropriate amount of the award but simply hold that the order is insufficient to support that determination without further explanation.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. MORRIS, C.J., and KHOUZAM, J., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.