ANDRE Q. SLATON,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders denying postconviction relief and prohibiting the appellant from filing further pro se pleadings. The court found that the appellant had abused the judicial process through repeated, meritless filings related to his 1987 convictions.
No, the trial court did not err. The appellate court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and the prohibition of further pro se filings, finding that Slaton had abused the judicial process.
[1] A court may prohibit a pro se litigant from filing further pleadings after determining that the litigant has abused the judicial process through the continued filing of s…
[2] The right to proceed pro se is not absolute and may be forfeited upon a finding of abuse of the judicial process, following proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The right to proceed pro se may be forfeited where it is determined, after proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, that the party has abused the judicial process by the continued filing of successive or meritless collateral claims in a criminal proceeding.”
This quote establishes the legal principle that the right to represent oneself can be lost due to abuse of the court system.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAndre Slaton, representing himself, appealed three trial court orders: denial of a successive motion for postconviction relief, denial of a motion for…
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PER CURIAM.
Andre Slaton appeals three orders entered by the trial court in lower court case number 87-35741B: (1) a September 17, 2019 order denying his successive motion for postconviction relief and issuing a show cause order why Slaton should not be prohibited from filing further pro se pleadings in case number 87-35741B; (2) a November 19, 2019 order denying his motion for rehearing; and (3) a November 19, 2019 order prohibiting Slaton from filing further pro se pleadings in case number 87-35741B.
We affirm the trial court’s orders in all respects. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE We further note that Slaton contends his convictions and sentences in case number 87-35741B (“1987 case”) were relied upon by the trial court as a basis for the imposition of an enhanced sentence in case number 93-10228 (“1993 case”).
In the trial court, Slaton filed more than thirty pro se motions attacking the convictions and sentences in his 1993 case. And in this Court, Slaton has filed at least twenty pro se appeals or original proceedings related to his 1993 case. These collateral attacks on his 1993 case did not merely prove unsuccessful; they were ultimately determined to be meritless, successive and time barred. Indeed, both the trial court and this court eventually barred Slaton from filing further pro se pleadings related to case number 93-10228.1 See Andre Slaton v. State, 3D11-235 (August 5, 2011
court order barring Slaton from filing further pro se pleadings in this court related to case number 93-10228).
Having met with no success in his postconviction attacks in the 1993 case, and having been barred from filing further pro se pleadings in that case, Slaton then targeted his 1987 case, believing that if he succeeded in vacating his 1987 convictions and sentences, it would invalidate the enhanced sentence imposed in the 1993 case (enhanced in part based on his prior convictions in the 1987 case), thereby entitling him to a new sentencing hearing in the 1993 case. In pursuit of this strategy, from 2009 to 2019, Slaton filed at least seven postconviction motions or petitions attacking the convictions and sentences in his 1987 case, each of which was denied or dismissed by the trial court. In addition, this is Slaton’s eighth appellate proceeding related to the convictions and sentences in his 1987 case.2
In the instant case, the trial court issued an order directing Slaton to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing further pro se pleadings in the will not consider the repetitive petitions of persons who have abused the judicial processes of the lower courts such that they have been barred from filing certain actions there.” Slaton v. Blanks, 2016 WL 1412207 (Fla. April 11, 2016). 2 See Slaton v. State, 3D19-2499; Slaton v. State, 3D19-527; Slaton v. State, 18-2093; Slaton v. State, 3D14-975; Slaton v. State, 3D13-2846; Slaton v. State, 3D13-2525; Slaton v. State, 3D09-2466.
trial court related to his 1987 case. Slaton filed a response to the show cause order and, following a review of same, the trial court determined that Slaton has abused the judicial process and that, absent an order barring further pro se pleadings, Slaton will continue to file frivolous and successive motions in case number 87-35741B.
We find no error in the trial court’s determinations. By engaging in equivalent conduct in this court with regard to his 1987 case, it appears Slaton has abused the judicial process, continuing to seek relief from this court by raising procedurally barred claims and urging wholly meritless positions. Slaton’s actions have caused this court to expend precious and finite judicial resources which could otherwise be devoted to cases raising legitimate claims. Hedrick v. State, 6 So. 3d 688, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (noting: “A legitimate claim that may merit relief is more likely to be overlooked if buried within a forest of frivolous claims.”) While pro se parties must be afforded a genuine and adequate opportunity to exercise their constitutional right of access to the courts, that right is not unfettered. The right to proceed pro se may be forfeited where it is determined, after proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, that the party has abused the judicial process by the continued filing of successive or meritless collateral claims in a criminal proceeding. State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).
As our sister court aptly put it, there comes a point when “[e]nough is enough.” Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d
409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Although termination of the right to proceed pro se will undoubtedly impose a burden on a litigant who may be unable to afford counsel, courts must strike a balance between the pro se litigant’s right to participate in the judicial process and the courts’ authority to protect the judicial process from abuse.
Therefore, Andre Slaton is hereby directed to show cause, within forty-five days from the date of this opinion, why he should not be prohibited from filing with this court any further pro se papers relating to his convictions, judgments and sentences in circuit court case number 87-35741B. Absent a showing of good cause, we intend to direct the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal to refuse to accept any paper relating to circuit court case number 87-35741B unless it has been reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a duly licensed member of The Florida Bar in good standing.
Additionally, and absent a showing of good cause, any such further and unauthorized pro se filings by this defendant will subject him to appropriate sanctions, including the issuance of written findings forwarded to the Florida Department of Corrections for its consideration of disciplinary action, including the forfeiture of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
- Hedrick v. State, 6 So. 3d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)