DAVID BEEM, ET AL.,

v.

KIM FERGUSON, ET AL.,

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from litigation initiated in 2008 between former business partners, Gary Ferguson and David Beem. Ferguson sought relief from Beem for, inter alia, breach of contract and several other claims related to Beem’s alleged embezzlement of company funds. Beem counterclaimed against Ferguson, and also asserted third-party claims against Ferguson’s wife, Kim Ferguson (“Mrs. Ferguson”), based on an alleged conspiracy with her husband to harass and defame Beem.

Beem was ultimately successful on some of the claims between himself and Mr. Ferguson; however, he was unsuccessful on all of his claims against Mrs. Ferguson. Accordingly, Mrs. Ferguson sought attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2011); section 607.07401, Florida Statutes (2011); and the court’s inherent authority to sanction Beem, and his attorney, Jeffrey Norkin, for engaging in bad faith conduct.¹

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Mrs. Ferguson’s motions for attorney’s fees and costs, finding there was no evidence or factual support for the claims against her, that Norkin and Beem engaged in vexatious litigation strategies, and that Mrs. Ferguson was entitled to fees and costs pursuant to sections 57.105, 607.07401, and the court’s inherent authority. Following this entitlement

order, Norkin sought to individually intervene in the action, under an assignment of rights by Beem, but this motion was denied by the court. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of Mrs. Ferguson’s attorney’s fees and costs, found her fees and costs were reasonable, and ultimately entered final judgment in her favor and against both Beem and Norkin.

In this appeal, Beem and Norkin seek review of nineteen trial court orders entered below, many related to Mrs. Ferguson’s attorney’s fees and costs, in addition to several other orders involving discovery issues and Beem’s attempts to recover on his judgment and for attorney’s fees against Mr. Ferguson.

After careful review, we affirm all nineteen orders, save for a partial reversal of two orders entered on July¹, 2019: (1) the order denying Beem’s motion to amend the final judgment as to prejudgment interest on costs; and (2) the final judgment on costs. On appeal, the Fergusons concede that the trial court erred in calculating prejudgment interest on the award of costs to Beem (for his successful claims against Mr. Ferguson) from February 25, 2019 (the date of the amended final judgment). We agree. Florida has adopted the “loss theory” of prejudgment interest. See Boulis v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 733 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1999). This means that prejudgment interest accrues on the date of the loss, and accordingly, “if proof is adduced that fees were ‘incurred and paid’ by a party ‘prior to the entry of judgment,’ prejudgment interest is proper [from that date].” Burton Family P’Ship

v. Luani Plaza, Inc., 276 So. 3d 920, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Boulis, 733 So. 2d at 962.) We reverse and remand these two orders for the trial court to determine the date of accrual, and thereafter to award the proper amount of prejudgment interest on costs.

We find no merit in the claims raised on the remaining seventeen orders, and note that this court is unable to meaningfully review a vast majority of them, given the lack of transcripts and/or an adequate record. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979). Accordingly, we affirm the remaining orders on appeal in their entirety and without further discussion.