ZABARIEL MOSS
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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The appellate court affirmed a lower court's denial of a motion to vacate a juvenile's sentence. The court found that the juvenile was not entitled to resentencing under recent case law because his forty-year sentence was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence.
No, a juvenile offender is only entitled to Eighth Amendment relief if they are serving a life sentence or its functional equivalent. A forty-year sentence for a homicide committed as a juvenile does not qualify as such.
[1] A juvenile offender is only entitled to Eighth Amendment relief if serving a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence.
[2] A forty-year sentence for a homicide offense committed as a juvenile does not constitute the functional equivalent of a life sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mr. Moss argued he was entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, given his juvenile status and the length of his sentence.”
Describes the appellant's argument for resentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceZabariel Moss, a juvenile offender, was serving a forty-year sentence for a homicide offense. He filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence, arguing…
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PER CURIAM.
Zabariel Moss is serving forty years in prison for a homicide offense committed when he was a juvenile. In 2017, Mr. Moss filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017); Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016); and Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015). Mr. Moss argued he was entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, given his juvenile status and the length of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion, in part, on the grounds that Mr. Moss had not been sentenced to life without parole. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Mr. Moss asserted he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to Kelsey and Thomas v. State, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 2015), irrespective of the fact that his sentence was not a de facto life sentence. On January 4, 2019, the State moved this Court to hold Mr. Moss’s appeal in abeyance pending the Florida Supreme Court’s resolution of Pedroza v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S93 (Fla. Mar. 12, 2020). Pedroza involved the exact same issue as involved herein, i.e., the constitutionality of a forty-year sentence for a second-degree murder committed as a juvenile. Mr. Moss did not join the State’s motion but acknowledged that Pedroza’s holding would resolve this case. We granted the State’s motion and held the appeal in abeyance.
On March 12, 2020, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in Pedroza, which clarified Kelsey, receded from Johnson, and held that a juvenile offender is only entitled to Eighth Amendment relief if he or she is serving a “a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence.” Pedroza, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at S95. The defendant in Pedroza did not seek rehearing and so the Court’s mandate issued on April 3, 2020. On April 17, 2020, we requested supplemental briefing addressing Pedroza.
We agree with Mr. Moss’s commendable concession that Pedroza is on point with Mr. Moss’s case. Both cases involve the same offense and the same sentence. Accordingly, because Mr. Moss does not—and cannot—argue that a forty-year sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence, and does not otherwise distinguish his case from Pedroza, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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Cited By (13 total)
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Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016)…lly, the First District stated, “Because the concurrent resentences at issue in this case do not violate Graham, we are constrained to deny relief.” Id. After recognizing our guidance in Thomas v. State, 135 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), quashed, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 2015) (table decision), the First District distinguished Kelsey, opining that the decision in Thomas was based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012),3 and its progeny, and not Graham. The First District rec…
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Peterson v. State, 193 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…hirty-year sentence for armed robbery and concurrent forty-year sentence for first-degree murder. The Florida Supreme Court quashed this decision and remanded for sentencing in conformance with the 2014 juvenile sentencing statutes. Thomas v. State, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla.2015). Though Thomas involved a juvenile who committed a homicide, thereby impheating Miller and not Graham, as noted by Judge Benton in his dissenting opinion in Kelsey, if the constitutionality of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s sentence is…
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Tarrand v. State, 199 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…s, we believe our supreme court intends to apply the holdings of Henry and Gridine to juvenile homicide offenders who receive lengthy term-of-years sentences. We reach that conclusion based on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. State, 177 So. 3d 1275 (Fla.2015), which quashed the underlying decision approving a juvenile homicide defendant’s forty-year prison sentence. The supreme court ordered the juvenile to be resentenced in conformance with the 2014 juvenile sentencing statutes. Thus, we hol…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leighdon Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015)
- Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016)
- Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017)
- Allen v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)