UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
DOCTOR REHAB CENTER, INC., ETC.,
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The appellate court denied a petition for second-tier certiorari review, finding that the lower court correctly applied the law and afforded procedural due process. The case involved the application of collateral estoppel.
No, the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law. It afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law concerning collateral estoppel.
[1] Second-tier certiorari review is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law, or departed from the essential requirem…
[2] A departure from the essential requirements of law for granting certiorari is more than a simple legal error.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.”
Defines the scope of review for second-tier certiorari.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUnited Automobile Insurance Company sought review of a circuit court order affirming a final judgment in favor of Doctor Rehab Center. The core issue …
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, United Automobile Insurance Company, seeks second-tier certiorari review of an order of the appellate division of the circuit court affirming the entry of final judgment in favor of Doctor Rehab Center.
“[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995)).
“The departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for granting a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error.” Id.; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003).
“Rather, a district court should exercise its discretion to grant review only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id.; see Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at 889.
Upon review of the record, we conclude Petitioner is not entitled to the writ because the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. See Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[C]ollateral estoppel may be applied to bar subsequent causes of action even where the second claim requires proof of different essential facts than those required to be proved in the initial suit.” (quoting Larimore v. State, 76 So. 3d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012))); see also R.D.J. Enters., Inc. v. Mega Bank, 600 So. 2d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Any right, fact or matter in issue and directly adjudicated, where necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree has been rendered upon the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated by the same parties and their privies, whether the claim, demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits is the same or not.” (quoting In re Constructors of Fla., Inc., 349 F. 2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1965))).
Petition denied.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keely Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2003)
- Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 2010)
- Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
- R.D.J. Enters., Inc. v. Mega Bank & Charles Kantor, 600 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- In re Constructors OF Fla., Inc. v. The Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank & John Nicholas, 349 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1965)
- Larimore v. State, 76 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)