GALLEON BAY CORPORATION

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL.,

SCALES, J.

Appellant, plaintiff below, Galleon Bay Corporation appeals the trial court’s August 15, 2019 order that denied Galleon Bay’s March 19, 2019 post-judgment Motion to Declare Final Order Null and Void (the “Motion”).

The Motion sought to void a May 26, 2016 final judgment that the trial court entered after a jury awarded Galleon Bay approximately $480,000 in damages for its inverse condemnation claim against appellees, defendants below, Monroe County and the State of Florida.¹ Galleon Bay appealed (and Monroe County and the State of Florida cross-appealed) that May 2016 judgment, and this Court affirmed the judgment in an unelaborated opinion. See Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs. of Monroe Cty., 272 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

Galleon Bay unsuccessfully moved this Court for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and for a written opinion. Several months later, in March 2019, Galleon Bay filed its Motion, asserting for the first time that the inverse condemnation proceedings resulting in the May 2016 final judgment, as well as the final judgment itself, were null and void because the defendants did not, within twenty days after rendition of the May 2016 final judgment, deposit into the registry of the court the amounts set forth in that judgment, as required by section 73.111 of the Florida Statutes.

In relevant part, section 73.111 reads as follows: “Within 20 days after the rendition of the judgment, the petitioner shall deposit the amount set forth into the registry of the court for the use of the defendants, or the proceeding shall be null and void . . . .” § 73.111, Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis supplied).

After conducting a hearing on Galleon Bay’s Motion, the trial court entered the challenged order denying the Motion, concluding that, “Section 73.111, Fla. Stat., does not apply to this inverse condemnation proceeding or the Final Judgment.” We affirm because the trial court correctly concluded that section 73.111 is inapplicable to Galleon Bay’s inverse condemnation proceeding.² Chapter 73 plainly governs eminent domain proceedings where the condemning authority, rather than the landowner, initiates the takings lawsuit. Indeed, as is evidenced throughout chapter 73,3 the statutory scheme demonstrates that a “petitioner” initiates an eminent domain lawsuit by filing a petition meeting with the requirements of section 73.021 of the Florida Statutes.

Section 73.111 becomes

applicable toward the end of the petition process – it allows the condemning authority to walk away from a valuation it deems too costly or unaffordable, which only makes sense in an eminent domain context. It is axiomatic that statutes must be read in conjunction with related statutory provisions. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (“Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”).

Galleon Bay initiated inverse condemnation proceedings in 2002; Galleon Bay never was a “petitioner” of an eminent domain proceeding as contemplated by section 73.111. Galleon Bay provides this Court with no relevant authority supporting its position that chapter 73, and particularly section 73.111, apply to inverse condemnation proceedings initiated by a landowner.

Affirmed.