CARLTON OWENS,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

LINDSEY, J.

Petitioner/Defendant Carlton Bradford Owens petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition after the trial court denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the information. In May of 2018, Owens was arrested for disorderly conduct, resisting an officer with violence, and stalking with prejudice following an incident with his neighbor. The State’s information charged Owens with (1) stalking and (2) resisting an officer with violence.

Owens filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) on the basis that there were no material facts in dispute and the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt. In its Response, the State partially admitted to the facts Owens set forth in his motion but added additional facts to support the charges of stalking. The lower court denied Owens’s pretrial motion to dismiss, and this petition for writ of prohibition followed.

We dismiss the petition because we agree with the State that Owens has an adequate legal remedy in the form of a direct appeal. Non-final orders denying pretrial motions to dismiss on the grounds that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt are reviewed, not by way of prohibition, but on direct appeal once the defendant has a final, appealable order. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 835 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reviewing, on appeal, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4) following entry of an order withholding adjudication and imposing probation); Velazquez v. State,

561 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reviewing, on appeal, the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss following entry of a final judgment of conviction); Adderly v. State, 462 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (reviewing, on appeal, the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss following entry of a plea of nolo contendere); Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (reviewing an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss in an appeal of defendants’ convictions and sentences). Although Owens cites cases where courts have reviewed, by way of prohibition, orders denying motions to dismiss based on different grounds from those alleged in his motion, Owens has cited no cases supporting his argument that prohibition is the proper vehicle to review orders denying pretrial motions to dismiss on the grounds that the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt.

Petition dismissed.