JOSEPH CLARK

v.

DAVE BANEY

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Joseph Clark, seeks review of the trial court’s order that bars him from filing any pro se documents in the Second Judicial Circuit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order. I.

Appellant, an Ohio resident appearing pro se, filed a defamation complaint against Appellee, Dave Baney, who is a probation officer in Ohio. The trial court ordered Appellant to show cause why it should not (1) take judicial notice of a 2020 Escambia County case in which Appellant was designated as a vexatious litigant and (2) use its inherent authority to prohibit Appellant

from appearing pro se in the Second Judicial Circuit. The show cause order noted that since 2020, Appellant had filed more than 120 lawsuits in 58 Florida counties, none of which had resulted in a victory for him.

Appellant’s response to the show cause order was riddled with profanity and insults directed at the court.¹ The following week, Appellant filed a second show cause response that was also laced with profanity and accused the trial judge of corruption and being a “clown.”² I will file what the [expletive] I want, when I want and where I want. [Expletive] you!!!” 3 Without objection from Appellant, the trial court had previously taken judicial notice of the relevant court records from Ohio. As to Appellant’s activities in Florida, the court found that since October 2018, Appellant had filed 137 lawsuits in 61 of Florida’s 67 counties. Despite that volume of cases, Appellant had had only one (partial) victory: a default summary judgment as to one count of one complaint. The court then summarized Appellant’s disgraceful conduct in this case before making the following conclusion:

It is clear that Clark has brought his vendetta against several Ohio public officials to Florida. He takes the time to learn the basics of Florida law so that each time he initiates an action, he can survive long enough to have the case filed, accepted, and served on his litigation abuse victims, without having to pay a fee, and then dismisses his case before any serious sanctions can be administered. In doing so, he can harass and embarrass these officials and sometimes cause them to incur the expense of attorney’s fees as revenge for their audacity to prosecute him in Ohio. As the saying goes, enough is enough.

The order’s decree prohibits Appellant from filing any document in the Second Judicial Circuit unless the document is signed by a member of The Florida Bar. This appeal followed, in which Appellant contends that the court lacked the authority to impose that sanction.

II.

Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution protects the right of access to courts. However, this right does not include the unlimited ability to appear pro se. See Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So. 2d 1216, 1216–17 (Fla. 1995). When a litigant “abuses the right to pro se access by filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings,” he necessarily diminishes “the ability of the courts to devote their finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims.” State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999); see also In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s

responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”).

Therefore, when necessary to ensure the timely review of other parties’ legitimate filings and to conserve the judiciary’s limited resources, a court has the “inherent authority” to sanction an abusive litigant. Tate v. State, 32 So. 3d 657, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Indeed, it is the court’s duty to do so. Golden v. Buss, 60 So. 3d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“It is well-settled that courts have the inherent authority and duty to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants.”).

Under this inherent authority, a court may bar a litigant from appearing pro se when the litigant’s “frivolous or excessive filings interfere with timely administration of justice.” Ardis v. Pensacola State Coll., 128 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); see, e.g., Lussy v.

Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 828 So. 2d 1026, 1027–28 (Fla. 2002) (directing the clerk to “reject any civil filings from Lussy unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar” in a case where the appellant “repeatedly filed lawsuits that included personal attacks on judges,” abused the judicial process with his “constant filings,” and had a history of meritless lawsuits in another state and federal court); Attwood, 661 So. 2d at 1216–17 (citing the court’s “inherent authority to prevent abuse of the judicial system” and ordering the clerk to reject “any civil petitions and appeals therefrom unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar” in a case where the appellant had filed “more than a hundred frivolous petitions and appeals in the appellate courts of this state in the past year”); Johnson v. Wilbur, 981 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“After considering the Johnsons’ [show cause] response, we are convinced that they have abused the judicial system and will continue to abuse the judicial system if they are not sanctioned.

Accordingly, in the exercise of our inherent power to prevent abuse of court procedure, it is ordered that Frank C. Johnson, Jr., and Ruth B. Johnson are prohibited from filing any document in this Court on their own behalf, in this or any other case, as appellants or petitioners.”); Birge v. State, 620 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“[I]n the exercise of our inherent power to prevent abuse of court procedure, it is ordered that Jimi L. Burge is prohibited from henceforth appearing on his own behalf in this court in this or other causes as an appellant or as a petitioner.”).

Here, there is no question that Appellant has substantially interfered with the timely and orderly process of judicial administration. See Ardis, 128 So. 3d at 264; Attwood, 661 So. 2d at 1217; Birge, 620 So. 2d at 235.

The trial court gave Appellant ample opportunity to explain his abusive filings. Appellant instead chose to continue his outrageous behavior. Indeed, Appellant’s show cause responses show that he is proud of being a serially abusive litigant. The law does not require the Second Judicial Circuit to indulge this bizarre, ill-conceived hobby. See Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398, 401 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]here are a handful of petitioners who have so abused the system that failure to restrain them could deny or delay the right of access to courts for the rest of the populace.”); Prater v. McDonough, 947 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (recognizing that “a trial court’s inherent power to sanction vexatious litigants is not obliterated simply because such a litigant might stumble upon a procedural error now and again”); Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”).

III.

The trial court acted well within its inherent authority by sanctioning a chronically abusive pro se litigant whose activities undermine the court’s ability to fulfill its constitutional duties. The court’s order is not a “wholesale” denial of Appellant’s right to access the courts; rather, it recognizes that because of his egregious conduct, Appellant has forfeited his right to proceed without counsel. See Sibley v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 973 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 2006) (“Under the sanction herein imposed, Sibley is not wholesale being denied access to the courts. He may petition the Court through the assistance of counsel other than himself, whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be filed in good faith.

However, petitioner’s frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come to an end.”); Cannie v. State, 296 So. 3d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Any future filings in this Court on behalf of Petitioner must be signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Counsel may file on Petitioner’s behalf if counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be brought in good faith.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the order requiring

any future filings from Appellant in the Second Judicial Circuit to be signed by a Florida Bar member in good standing.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, M.K. THOMAS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________