CASEY MARTINA
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Discretionary costs such as fines and surcharges must be orally pronounced at sentencing to provide the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard, and failure to do so requires vacation of the sentencing order as to those costs.
[1] Discretionary costs, including fines and surcharges, must be orally pronounced at sentencing to provide the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard, and failure t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[D]iscretionary costs must be orally pronounced at sentencing because such costs may not be imposed without affording the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Court's statement of the legal standard for imposing discretionary costs at sentencing.
Martina was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, seven counts of grand theft of a firearm, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft. The trial …
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PER CURIAM.
Casey Martina appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary of a dwelling, seven counts of grand theft of a firearm, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft. He argues for reversal, raising three issues. We affirm two of the issues without further discussion. As for the third, we vacate the sentencing order as to the imposition of certain fees.
Martina contends that the trial court reversibly erred in imposing a fine and surcharge at sentencing. The trial court imposed a lump sum of $2,765 in court costs. Martina moved for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). He argued that the trial court erred when it imposed a $2,000 fine under section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes, and a related $100
surcharge under section 938.04, Florida Statutes, without providing him notice and an opportunity to heard. The trial court did not rule on Martina’s motion within sixty days, so it is deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B).
We agree that the sentencing order should have been corrected to delete the fine and the surcharge. “[D]iscretionary costs must be orally pronounced at sentencing because such costs may not be imposed without affording the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard.” See Davis v. State, 277 So. 3d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“Because these are discretionary costs, the court was required to specifically pronounce them at sentencing [to give the defendant] notice and an opportunity to be heard.”). Because the trial court did not orally pronounce the fine or surcharge at sentencing, we vacate the sentencing order as to the fine and the surcharge. See Jack v. State, 349 So. 3d 925, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). On remand, the trial court must render a corrected sentencing order that reflects our disposition.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.
ROWE, C.J., and BILBREY and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________