WILLIAM JOHNSON

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

OSTERHAUS, J.

William Johnson appeals an order granting Bank of America an equitable lien on a home in Gainesville arising from a reverse mortgage loan. Johnson contends that the trial court improperly disregarded the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes. We affirm because this limitations provision doesn’t apply in this case. The salient facts date back to 2009 when Mildred Harden owned a home in Gainesville that was encumbered by first and second mortgages. In August 2009, Harden deeded herself a life estate in the property and conveyed remainder interests to her three sons and to Appellant. Four months later, Harden obtained a reverse mortgage from Bank of America. In her bilateral deal

with the Bank, Harden was inaccurately identified as the fee simple owner of the property. The four individuals to whom she had conveyed remainder interests were not part of the deal, although one of the remainder interest-holding sons signed the agreement as Harden’s attorney in fact. Harden secured the note with the property and the Bank subsequently satisfied her two preexisting mortgages in the amount of $29,000 and it also paid Harden a lump sum.

In May 2020, the Bank filed a complaint in circuit court seeking an equitable lien on the property to attach beyond Harden’s life estate.

The trial court granted the lien because proceeds from the reverse mortgage secured by the property were used to pay off the two previously existing mortgages on the property. The equitable lien prevented the property’s owners from escaping their mortgage debts at the Bank’s expense and being unjustly enriched. See Palm Beach Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993) (allowing an equitable lien to prevent a wife’s unjust enrichment where an estranged husband forged the wife’s signature on mortgage documents and used the funds to satisfy their preexisting mortgages).

Similar to Fishbein, the trial court here noted that the $29,000 equitable lien amount tracked the amount the Bank paid to satisfy the preexisting mortgages on the property. Id. at 270.

And the property owners were in no worse position than prior to the execution of the reverse mortgage. Id. “On the other hand, to have denied the lien would have left [the homeowners] vastly and unjustly enriched.” Spridgeon v. Spridgeon, 779 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (affirming an equitable lien on a homestead based upon Fishbein).

With these facts in view, Johnson’s argument on appeal is that the four-year statute of limitations on the Bank’s action has already expired. Specifically, § 95.11(3)(k) sets a four-year statute of limitations for “legal or equitable action[s] on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.” But we don’t see that this limitations period bars the Bank’s lien because Harden’s reverse-mortgage deal has not (yet) created an obligation or liability for Johnson. Nor has Johnson assumed the benefit of the Bank’s satisfaction of Harden’s pre-existing mortgages at this juncture.

See Flatirons Bank v. Alan W. Steinberg Limited Partnership, 233 So. 3d 1207, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim begins to run at the time the alleged benefit is conferred and received by the defendant.”).

Rather, the borrower Harden remains obligated, liable, and the beneficiary of the Bank’s payoff of her previous mortgages for as long as she lives in the home and retains a life interest. Indeed, under present circumstances, she alone is responsible for repaying the debt: “The full debt . . . if not paid earlier, is due and payable on January 30, 2082.” Only if Harden dies or loses her interest in the property before this date would part of the reverse mortgage debt become an obligation or liability affecting Johnson’s remainder interest in the property. Given the still-contingent nature of the obligation, liability, or benefit in Johnson’s case, we cannot conclude that the statute of limitation in § 95.11(3)(k) applies. AFFIRMED. BILBREY and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________