STOREY MOUNTAIN, LLC A/A/O IBERIABANK
v.
FREESTONE ENTERPRISE, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, JAMES C. SPRINGER,
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of an equitable receivership. The court held that a party seeking an equitable receiver must demonstrate a specific need for such a remedy, beyond merely holding an unsatisfied writ of execution.
Holding an unsatisfied writ of execution is not sufficient, on its own, to warrant the appointment of an equitable receiver. The party seeking the receivership must demonstrate a need for the appointment based on the specific circumstances of the case.
[1] Equitable receivership is an inherent equitable power of the trial court, not a matter of right, and must be exercised in the court's sound discretion according to the ci…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court ruled it was wrong, and we agree. Storey Mountain must show a need for the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances. It made no showing at all and instead relied only on legal argument.”
Establishes the core reason for affirming the trial court's denial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStorey Mountain, LLC sought an equitable receivership, asserting it held an unsatisfied writ of execution. The trial court denied the motion. Storey M…
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LONG, J.
Storey Mountain claims it is entitled to the appointment of an equitable receivership on a simple showing that it holds an unsatisfied writ of execution. The trial court ruled it was wrong, and we agree. Storey Mountain must show a need for the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances. It made no showing at all and instead relied only on legal argument. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to appoint a receiver. See Colley v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n.
of Panama City, 516 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); see also Lehman v. Tr. Co. of Am., 49 So. 502, 503 (Fla. 1909) (noting limited scope of equitable receivership, to be granted in the court’s sound discretion “according to the circumstances and exigencies of each particular case”); Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 128 So. 241, 247 (Fla. 1930) (noting that an equitable receivership is “not a matter of right” but rather an inherent equitable power of the trial court); McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, 40 So. 2d 201, 202–03 (Fla. 1949) (noting that the power to appoint a receiver should not be exercised just because it would “do no harm” and instead requiring caution in deciding whether to appoint equitable receiver, because the power of such an appointment “is a delicate one” that “should be exercised only in those cases where the exigencies demand it and no other protection to the applicants can be devised”).
This conclusion is not inconsistent with Warshall v. Price, 617 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), the case on which Storey Mountain relies. The different opinions in Warshall make clear that the court was evaluating the need for a receivership under the unique circumstances of that case. The defendant there “carrie[d] on business as a sole proprietorship,” and the plaintiff “had unsuccessfully attempted execution on judgments.” That receivership was also limited to the collection of “judgment debt out of monies being paid to the debtor and from accounts payable.” But we know nothing about the circumstances which led to this proceeding and Storey Mountain seeks a receiver over James Springer as an individual, not his business monies.
U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Cramer, 113 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), the one Florida case which cites Warshall, came to the same conclusion we do today. “[T]he considerations dictating a cautious approach to the appointment of a receiver may carry less weight” after the entry of final judgment, but nevertheless, “there must still be some need to protect the property” before the court can appoint a receiver in equity. Id. at 1023–24 (citing Warshall, 617 So. 2d at 752).
AFFIRMED. ROBERTS and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________
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The Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978)…ause the verdict on punitive damages was beyond “the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.” Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Fla.1977). In Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241, 247 (1930), we stated that “judicial discretion” does not imply that a court may act according to mere whim or caprice; such discretion must be exercised within the limits of the applicable principles of law and equity. Judicial discretion is a pow…
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Beulah M. Ellard v. Godwin, 77 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1955)…ty judge. This is not an unbridled power by any means. The exercise of such power is a judicial act and involves the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion, as we pointed out in Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241, 247, “does not imply that a court may act, or fail to act, according to the mere whim or caprice of the presiding judge, but it means a discretion exercised within the limits of the applicable principles of law and equity, and the exercise of which…
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Dixie Music Co., Inc. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671 (Fla. 1938)…la. 96, 160 So. 7, which means discretion exercised within the limits of applicable provisions of law and equity, and does not imply that the court may act according to mere ■whim or caprice. Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241. The appointment of a íeceiver without notice should not be made except upon [*685] positive'verified allegations of fact showing that the injury will be done if an immediate remedy is not afforded. Jacksonville Ferry Co. v. Stockton, 40 Fla. 141, 2…
Previewing 3 of 79 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987 (Fla. 1930)
- Parker v. State, 516 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Terence B. Cramer and Nancy H. Cramer, 113 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)