MOULTON KEANE, M.D., PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE ROBERT LANCE ANDREWS, RESPONDENT
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A trial judge is not required to disqualify himself based solely on campaign contributions from counsel within legal limits, creating direct conflict with Breakstone v. MacKenzie.
A contribution not exceeding the legal limit for campaign contributions made by counsel to a trial judge's campaign is legally insufficient grounds for recusal.
[1] Campaign contributions to a trial judge's campaign within legal limits, made by counsel appearing before that judge, do not constitute grounds for judicial disqualificati…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCounsel for a litigant and several members of counsel's firm each made $500 campaign contributions to the trial judge before whom counsel appeared.…
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PER CURIAM.
The issue presented by the petition for writ of prohibition is whether or not a trial judge is required to disqualify himself where counsel for a litigant before him, as well as several members of counsel’s firm, have each made $500 campaign contributions to the campaign of the trial judge.
This case differs from the recent en banc case of Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 14 F.L.W. 2223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) only in the respect that here the contributions went directly to the judge’s campaign while in Breakstone the contributions went to the campaign of the judge’s spouse.
We align ourselves with the reasoning of Judge Nesbitt and Chief Judge Schwartz in their dissenting opinions, which is in line with our own precedent. Marexcelso Compania Naviera v. Florida National Bank, 533 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). We hold that a contribution not exceeding the legal limit for campaign contributions made by counsel to the campaign of a trial judge before whom counsel then appears is a legally insufficient ground to justify recusal, and a motion for disqualification based solely on that ground may be denied.
We therefore summarily deny the petition, acknowledge express and direct conflict with Breakstone, and certify the question presented herein as one of great public importance.
LETTS, WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1994)…t affirmed a combined sentence of twenty-four months’ incarceration followed by six months of community control because the total was less than the permitted sentencing range of twelve to thirty months’ incarceration. Similarly, in Tillman v. State, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), and Distefano v. State, 526 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the courts held that county jail time coupled with community control did not constitute departure sentences for which written reasons were required. Ewing, Tillman, and…
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Parker v. State, 636 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…he fact that the length of the sentence was within the maximum allowed by general law, cures the illegal sentence. See State v. Davis, 630 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.1994) (disapproving Distefano v. State, 526 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Tillman v. State, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ewing v. State, 526 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). The imposition of community control and incarceration without written reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines violates VanKooten and Davis. Parker’s sentence i…
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Burgess v. State, 569 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…reflected in the written sentencing orders, 6 months incarceration followed by 2 years community control. Although it is not a departure from the second bracket to impose a county jail term as a condition of community control, see Tillman v. State, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), that was not the sentence actually imposed, and no clerical error is apparent. The trial judge abruptly imposed court costs ($232.50) and investigative costs ($200.00) at the sentencing hearing, after his second attempt to pron…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Caleffe v. Judge Linda L. Vitale, 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Marexcelso Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Fla. Nat'l Bank, 533 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)