JANE DOE

v.

CORY L. DAYS

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for injunction for protection against stalking. Appellant argues the trial court improperly denied her petition without a hearing. We agree.

Stalking injunctions are governed by section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2022). Relevant to the issues here, subsections (1) through (5) set forth the pleading requirements, hearing requirements, and what a trial court must do when it denies a request for an ex parte petition. The Legislature has directed trial courts to set a hearing when a petition for injunction for protection against stalking is filed. § 784.0485(4), Fla. Stat. (2022); Fla. Fam.

L. R. P. 12.610(b)(3)(A). That did not happen here. The trial court simply denied the petition. Our review of the petition shows that Appellant complied with the pleading and filing requirements set forth in subsection (3). A review of the trial court’s order denying the petition does not indicate otherwise.

In its order denying the petition, the trial court wrote that the matter was better left to the criminal court. But the existence of a pending criminal case against the respondent is not a legal ground for the denial of the petition. See Pashtencko v. Pashtencko, 148 So. 3d 545, 545−47 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding that trial court failed to state a legal ground when it denied a petition for an ex parte temporary injunction against stalking because law enforcement did not find probable cause for arrest for the same allegations made in the petition and the standard of proof for an ex parte injunction was higher); Hawthorne v. Butler, 151 So. 3d 23, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that the denial of a petition for injunction for protection against sexual violence was reversible error when the trial court denied it because the respondent would be on probation and a no-contact order between the parties should be a provision of probation); Curtis v. Curtis, 113 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that the trial court erred when it denied the petitioner’s petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence because the petitioner could not be in fear since the respondent’s bond conditions contained a no-contact provision). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s petition for injunction for protection against stalking without a hearing.

REVERSED and REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing on the petition for injunction for protection against stalking.

ROBERTS, RAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. _____________________________