DARRYL L. JONES

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

Jones appeals an order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus and warning him against filing frivolous motions and petitions in the circuit court. Finding no error by the circuit court, we affirm. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a trial court may dismiss, rather than transfer, a habeas petition when the petitioner seeks relief that “(1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief, or alleges new or different grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first motion was filed”).

This is the sixth appeal or petition Jones has filed in this Court collaterally attacking his judgment and sentence imposed by the Escambia County Circuit Court following his 2009 guilty plea to sexual battery, grand theft, and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Jones obtained relief in his first post-conviction appeal. Jones v. State, 69 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing order denying rule 3.850 motion and remanding for new evidentiary hearing).

But Jones has obtained no relief in his next five filings in this Court, including the instant appeal. See Jones v. State, 95 So. 3d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (unpublished table decision) (affirming order denying rule 3.850 motion after an evidentiary hearing); Jones v. State, 109 So. 3d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (unpublished table decision) (affirming order dismissing habeas petition); Jones v. State, 1D15–2721 (dismissing appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion); Jones v. State, 348 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus).

The Court finds that this appeal is frivolous and refers Jones to the Department of Corrections for sanctions. See §944.279, Florida Statutes (2022) (providing that “[a] prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous or malicious suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal. . . is subject to disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections”); Ponton v. Willis, 172 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (explaining that a Spencer order is not required before referring the inmate for disciplinary action based on frivolous filing).

Jones is warned that any future filings that this Court determines to be frivolous or malicious may result in the imposition of further sanctions, including a prohibition against any future pro se filings in this Court. AFFIRMED. ROWE, KELSEY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________