CRAIG S. THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Craig Thompson appeals his convictions for cocaine possession and drug paraphernalia possession. The Florida appellate court reversed, finding that the contraband was discovered during an unlawful search and seizure, and that Thompson's consent to the search was presumptively involuntary because it followed an unlawful stop.
The court held that the initial detention was unlawful because Thompson's presence in a high-crime area and his evasive actions did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Additionally, even a valid stop does not warrant a pat-down without reason to believe the suspect has a weapon, and once officer safety concerns are dispelled, the search cannot be extended to seek evidence. Consent given after an unlawful stop is presumptively involuntary.
[1] A person's presence in a high-crime area, alone, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
[2] Evasive actions upon the approach of officers, without more, do not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Neither his presence in a "high crime" area nor his allegedly evasive actions upon the approach of the officers give rise to a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in criminal activity.”
Establishes that presence in a high-crime area and evasive conduct alone do not create reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a detention.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThompson sought shelter beneath a carport during a rainstorm in a known drug area. Officers approached, checked identification and warrants, then sear…
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[*971] PER CURIAM.
Craig Thompson appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine1 and possession of drug paraphernalia.2 We find that the contraband was recovered during an unlawful search and seizure, and reverse.
The first of two encounters between Thompson and the arresting officers occurred during a rainstorm in what was described as a “known drug area.” Thompson and several other persons had sought shelter beneath a carport. The officers approached the group, asked for identification, and checked for outstanding warrants. Then, because “it is pretty well known that some of the subjects there throw crack cocaine or other types of paraphernalia to the ground,” the officers searched the surrounding area. Several pieces of rock cocaine were discovered on the ground three to four feet from where some of the men were standing, and a butcher knife was found in the rafters of the carport. No arrests were made at this time. Later that evening the same officers observed Thompson and another individual standing on a street corner. Upon spotting the officers the two men walked away in separate directions. One officer approached Thompson and asked “if he minded if I checked to see if he had any guns or knives.” The officer stated that he had found weapons “in that area before.” Thompson told the officer to “go ahead.” The patdown revealed no weapons, but the officer felt an object in Thompson’s pants pocket. Thompson said this was “nothing,” but the officer nevertheless asked if he could check the pocket. Again Thompson said “go ahead.” The object was a cocaine pipe.
The initial detention of Thompson was unlawful. Neither his presence in a “high crime” area nor his allegedly evasive actions upon the approach of the officers give rise to a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in criminal activity. Morris v. State, 519 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Furthermore, even a valid stop does not ipso facto warrant a patdown for weapons; the officer must have a reason to believe, not present in the instant case, that the suspect has a weapon on his person. Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 892 (Fla.1978). And once any concern for the officer’s safety has been dispelled by a pat-down — as it was here — the intrusion cannot be extended to a general search for evidence. Dunn v. State, 382 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
The state argues that appellant consented to the search that produced the pipe. However, consent given after an unlawful stop is presumptively involuntary. Gadsden v. State, 498 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). When the validity of a search rests on consent the state must demonstrate that such consent was unequivocally given, and not merely deference to the apparent authority of the police. Talavera v. State, 186 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). That burden has not been met in this case.
Reversed with directions to discharge the appellant.
CAMPBELL, C.J., and RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . § 893.13(1)(f), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. § 893.147(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987).
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COX v. State, 975 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…a constitutional exception, one of which is voluntary consent. See Hicks v. State, 852 So. 2d 954, 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Consent must be given unequivocally and not be mere deference to the apparent authority of the police. See Thompson v. State, 555 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). A search conducted pursuant to freely and voluntarily given consent is lawful. See Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla.1998). Whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined under the totality of…
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Cubby v. State, 707 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…e to the officer’s authority. When the validity of a search rests on consent, the State must demonstrate that such consent was unequivocally given and not merely deference to apparent authority of the law enforcement officers. See Thompson v. State, 555 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Absent any improper conduct prior to securing an alleged consent, the consent issue should be determined by the greater weight of the evidence presented to the trial court. See Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…
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V.H. v. State, 903 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…, one of which is consent. Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Under this exception, the State must show that “consent was unequivocally given, and not merely deference to the apparent authority of the police.” Thompson v. State, 555 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). If there is any doubt as to whether consent was given, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the person who was searched. Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). At the suppression hearing, the State o…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lelis v. State, 186 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Dunn v. State, 382 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Morris v. State, 519 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Gadsden v. State, 498 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)