STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JULIO TREJO, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of second-degree murder charges against Julio Trejo based on the statute of limitations. The court reversed, holding that because the defendant was charged with second-degree murder committed with a weapon, the offense was properly classified as a life felony with no applicable limitations period.
The court held that second-degree murder committed with a weapon is properly reclassified as a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), which carries no statute of limitations. The weapon-use enhancement applies because the weapon is not an essential element of second-degree murder itself, distinguishing this case from Franklin v. State.
[1] The use of a weapon during the commission of a felony, when not an essential element of the underlying offense, reclassifies a first-degree felony to a life felony.
[2] There is no statute of limitations for life felonies.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, use of a weapon during the commission of a felony enhances the degree of that felony, except when the use of a weapon is an essential element of the offense. When a weapon is used a felony of the first degree shall be reclassified as a life felony. § 775.087(1)(a). There is no limitations period for life felonies. § 775.15(1).”
Establishes the statutory basis for reclassifying first-degree felonies to life felonies when a weapon is used, and that life felonies have no limitations period.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTrejo was charged by information on September 16, 1987, with killing an unknown white male whose body was found on November 21, 1979. The state allege…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The state appeals an order of the circuit court dismissing second degree murder charges against appellee Julio Trejo. We reverse.
By information filed September 16, 1987, the state alleged that Trejo killed an unknown white male whose body was found beside State Road 82 on November 21, 1979. The information further charged that the murder was committed with a weapon, specifically a tire tool. Trejo successfully argued that the statute of limitations had run, thereby preventing prosecution.
Ordinarily second degree murder is a felony of the first degree. § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within four years of the commission of the offense. § 775.15(2)(a). However, use of a weapon during the commission of a felony enhances the degree of that felony, except when the use of a weapon is an essential element of the offense. When a weapon is used a felony of the first degree shall be reclassified as a life felony. § 775.087(1)(a). There is no limitations period for life felonies. § 775.15(1). The use of a weapon is not an essential element of the crime of second degree murder, such as would remove that offense from the parameters of the reclassification statute. State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1985).
The trial court’s order of dismissal relies upon our decision in Franklin v. State, 541 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There, as in the present case, the defendant was charged with second degree murder by use of a weapon. The jury, however, convicted him of the lesser included offense of third degree murder, with aggravated battery serving as the predicate felony. For sentencing purposes the offense was enhanced one degree. However, in order to have returned that particular verdict it was essential for the jury to have accepted that a weapon was employed; they were instruct ed accordingly and they made a specific finding that Franklin had used a weapon. Because, under these narrow circumstances, the weapon was an essential element of the offense,1 application of the reclassification statute was error. Such is not the case here. We find that the information filed against Trejo properly charges a life felony, with no applicable limitations period.2
Reversed.
CAMPBELL, C.J., and RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . Under section 784.045, Florida Statutes (1987), a person commits aggravated battery either by using a deadly weapon or by inflicting great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. In Franklin the information alleged that a weapon had been used, not that great harm had resulted. The jury instruction similarly mentioned the weapon element only.
. The state concedes that Trejo cannot be convicted of any lesser offense that might be included within the principal charge. See Holloway v. State, 362 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 953 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gonzalez v. State, 569 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…find that appellant had used a deadly weapon in the course of a battery. Finally, the jury was asked to and did make a specific finding that appellant used a weapon during the commission of the offense. 541 So. 2d at 1228-1229. In State v. Trejo, 555 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the court applied the same reasoning in striking an enhancement. In the instant case, the appellant was charged with second degree homicide “by shooting said Vincente Jimenez with a firearm.” The lesser-included third degree mur…
-
Childers v. State, 800 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…ncompassed within Childers’ charge was second-degree murder, a first-degree felony. Second-degree murder with a weapon would have been reclassified as a life felony, which would not have been barred by the statute of limitations. See State v. Trejo, 555 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In his second claim for postconviction relief, Childers alleged that he received ineffective' assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to request a jury instruction for second-degree murder with a weapon. In summarily denyi…
Authorities Cited
- Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 449 U.S. 905 (U.S. 1980)
- THE Florida BAR v. Jones, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985)
- Franklin v. State, 541 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Holloway v. State, 379 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1980)
- Genter v. State, 362 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Holloway v. State, 362 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)