JOHNSON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 1st DCA | 2025-11-05
No. 2024-0912
2025 FL 9965 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2025)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jamel Johnson appealed his conviction for fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer and driving without a valid driver's license, challenging the admissibility of testimony showing he drove 127 mph in Jackson County when the crime was charged in Bay County. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that evidence need not establish every element of a crime in the charging county.


Holding

No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the speed testimony. The 127 mph speed was relevant because it proved the high-speed/wanton disregard element required for the fleeing to elude charge, and the statute permits prosecution in any county where any act of a multi-county offense occurred, without requiring every element to occur in the charging county.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of a defendant's speed, even if measured in a county different from the one where the crime was charged, is relevant to proving the high-speed or wanton disregar…

[2] A defendant may be tried in any county in which any of the acts constituting an offense occurred, even if the acts were committed in two or more counties.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“If the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any of the acts occurred.”

Establishes that multi-county offenses can be prosecuted in any county where acts occurred, not requiring all elements in charging county.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Following the theft of a vehicle in Bay County, law enforcement officers pursued a car driven by Johnson with lights and sirens activated. The pursuit…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Per_curiam
Per Curiam

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-0912

JAMEL DAQUAN JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County. Shonna Young Gay, Judge.

November 5, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Jamel Johnson challenges his conviction and sentence for fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer (high speed reckless) contrary to section 316.1935(3), Florida Statutes (2023), and driving without a valid driver’s license contrary to section 322.03(1), Florida Statutes. He raises three arguments on appeal.

We affirm his judgment and sentence but write to discuss his second argument: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony that the car was traveling at 127 miles per hour in Jackson County, when the crime was charged in Bay County. Following the theft of a vehicle in Bay County, several law enforcement officers engaged in pursuit in marked cars with lights and sirens activated. The chase did not end until the car driven

2 by Appellant crossed into Jackson County. Several officers testified about the chase being fast while in Bay County but not to the specific speed Appellant was driving.

However, a trooper with Florida Highway Patrol was equipped with speed detection equipment and stationed in Jackson County about a mile from the Bay County line. Defense counsel objected to the trooper’s upcoming testimony, arguing that all the elements of the offense had to occur in Bay County. With the objection overruled, the trooper testified that the radar detected a speed of 127 miles per hour.

On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the trooper’s testimony about Appellant’s speed in Jackson County because it was not relevant to a crime charged in Bay County. A trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008). “However, a court’s discretion is limited by the evidence code and applicable case law.” Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (Fla. 2015) (citation omitted).

Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact. § 90.401, Fla. Stat. “In determining relevance, we look to the elements of the crime charged and whether the evidence tends to prove or disprove a material fact.” Johnson v. State, 991 So. 2d 962, 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The fact that Appellant traveled at 127 mph was relevant because it proved the high-speed/wanton disregard element of the fleeing to elude charge. See § 90.401, Fla. Stat.; § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.8. Contrary to what Appellant claims, the State did not have to prove that each element was committed in the same county. See § 910.05, Fla. Stat. (“If the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any of the acts occurred.”).

There is no requirement that the commission of each element take place in the county in which the defendant is charged. Id.

AFFIRMED.

ROWE, BILBREY, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. 3


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw