FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-0153

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

REVENUE,

Appellant,

v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. John C. Cooper, Judge.

November 12, 2025

OSTERHAUS, C.J.

The Florida Department of Revenue appeals the denial of its summary judgment motion filed in response to Bank of America’s lawsuit seeking refunds of overpaid state stamp and intangibles taxes on thousands of refinanced home loan transactions. The Department asks that we reverse and direct the circuit court to enter judgment in its favor. We affirm, however, seeing no error in the trial court’s decision to deny the Department’s summary judgment motion.

I.

When a person purchases a home in Florida, the state assesses both a stamp and an intangible tax on the amount of the mortgage

In recording these loans and mortgages, the Bank paid documentary stamp taxes and nonrecurring intangible taxes on each loan. Where the new loans were refinanced at amounts greater than the original loans, the Bank agreed that it owed additional documentary stamp and intangible taxes corresponding to “new money” borrowed that exceeded the original home loan amount. But the Department additionally insisted that the Bank must pay stamp and intangible taxes over and above the amount of “new money” it lent to cover the full maximum face amount of the refinanced loan, including amounts rolled over from the original loan. Although the Bank paid what the Department required, it sought refunds for overpayments of the stamp and intangibles taxes under the tax exemption provisions, § 201.09(1)

In response to the Bank’s refund claim, the Department investigated and audited about ten percent of the roughly 9800 subject home loans. During the audit, it created a spreadsheet reporting the facts and figures involved with some 900+ refinancings. After reviewing the information, the Department concluded that the Bank had to pay stamp and intangibles tax on the full amount of the refinanced loans because the Department considered them to be wholly new loans and not renewals or refinancings under § 201.09(1) and § 199.145(1).

In the wake of the Department’s decision to deny its refund claims, the Bank filed a lawsuit seeking refunds. After the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and confirmed that no contested facts existed, the trial court ruled mostly for the Bank. The trial court decided that most of the Bank’s loans qualified as renewal and refinanced loans under the applicable statues, thereby qualifying the Bank to avoid the stamp and intangible taxes fully or in part. The court granted summary judgment for the Bank and denied the Department’s summary judgment motion.

The Department filed a timely notice of appeal and challenges the denial of its motion. It asks that we direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for the Department.

II.

The trial court’s order denying the Department’s motion for final summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Johnson, 413 So. 3d 872, 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Crapo v. Univ. Cove Partners, Ltd., 298 So. 3d 697, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing Coastal Creek Condo. Ass’n v. Fla. Tr. Servs. LLC, 275 So. 3d 836, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows the absence of any genuine issues of material fact—where “facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Washington v. Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 337 So. 3d 502,

Here we must assess whether the Bank supplied admissible summary judgment evidence sufficient to prevent the trial court from granting the Department’s motion. The Department’s first argument in support of its summary judgment motion involves the Bank’s stamp-tax refund claim*. The Department asserts that the

* The applicable stamp tax provision in § 201.09, Florida Statutes, provides that when a loan renews for more than the unpaid balance of the original loan, a tax is due only on the “increase” or new money associated with the renewal note:

(1) When any promissory note is given in renewal of any existing promissory note, which renewal note only extends or continues the identical contractual obligations of the original promissory note and evidences part or all of the original indebtedness evidenced thereby, not including any accumulated interest thereon and without enlargement in any way of the original contract and obligation, such renewal note shall not be subject to taxation under this chapter if such renewal note has attached to it the original promissory note with the proper notation thereon as required by s. 201.133. In order to be exempt from taxation under this section, a renewal note evidencing a term obligation shall not be executed by any person other than the original obligor and must renew and extend only the unpaid balance of the original contract and obligation. In order to be exempt from taxation under this section, a renewal note evidencing a revolving obligation shall not be executed by any person other than the original obligor and must renew and extend no more than the original face amount of the original contract and obligation. A renewal note evidencing a term obligation which increases the unpaid

The problem with this argument is that, whereas the Department asserts no link between the borrowers’ original and new home loans, the Bank supplied admissible summary judgment evidence to establish that the borrowers’ prior home loans were renewed with new home loans from the Bank. Specifically, the Bank filed summary judgment exhibits—including the Departmentprepared spreadsheet with the 980-loan sample together with an affidavit from its Senior Vice President, Home Equity Manager explaining and documenting how the loans were refinanced. The Department conceded in its summary judgment motion that the spreadsheet of loan information provided evidence from which the Court could evaluate all 9800 loans in the case:

balance of the original contract and obligation but which otherwise meets the exemption criteria of this section is taxable only on the face amount of the increase. A renewal note evidencing a revolving obligation which increases the original face amount of the original contract and obligation but which otherwise meets the exemption criteria of this section is taxable only on the amount of the increase.

(2) When any mortgage, trust deed, security agreement, or other evidence of indebtedness evidences a promissory note which would not be subject to taxation pursuant to subsection (1), then such mortgage, trust deed, security agreement, or other evidence of indebtedness shall not be subject to taxation under this chapter. § 201.09, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

6 6. The Department and [Bank] agreed to review a sample of 980 loans to make a determination for the full refund request of 9800 loans. The parties have agreed to use this sampling as the evidence in this case.

The 980-loan spreadsheet supported the Bank’s case that the new home loans were linked to the prior home loans made from the Bank to identical borrowers. This data together with the Bank’s affidavit identified loans that extended the contractual obligations from the borrowers’ original mortgages and notes through to the new home loans. And even though the Bank recorded “satisfactions” of the original home loans once the new loans were finalized, the evidence indicated that the borrowers’ obligations to pay the balance on their original loans to the Bank did not vanish. Rather, the obligations of the old loans listed on the spreadsheet were rolled into the new loans listed on the spreadsheet consistent with the loans being renewed. Thus, the Bank’s summary judgment evidence showed that it refinanced loans that could qualify for the stamp tax exemption under § 201.09. We see no error in the trial court’s decision to deny the Department’s summary judgment motion.

Nor do the Department’s definitional arguments about the terms “renewal” and “renewal notes,” as used in § 201.09, alter this result. The Department distinguishes the statute’s reference to renewal notes with its view that the Bank’s home loans were novation-type agreements involving “the making of a new loan . . . and the satisfaction of the prior loan.” But again here, the agreed summary judgment record lends substantial evidentiary support to the trial court’s conclusion that the borrowers’ obligations under the prior home loans were not satisfied but were extended and rolled into new mortgage-backed loans. § 201.09(1), Fla. Stat. (exempting from tax the renewal note that “extends or continues the identical contractual obligations); see also Fla. Adm. Code R. 12B-4.052(12)(a) (referring to a “renewal” obligation as a written agreement “that alters or modifies the contract or obligation of a previous promissory note, mortgage, . . . or other evidence of indebtedness by [changing various terms]”; Renewal Note, Black’s Law Dictionary 1273 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “renewal note” as “[a] note that continues an obligation that was due under a prior note”). According to the Bank’s evidence, the loans involved here were refinanced by exchanging the existing balances on debts for new debts; repaying existing loans

7 with money acquired from new loans; replacing old contracts with new contracts; and producing notes that continued the obligations due under prior notes.

The Department next argues that its summary judgment motion should be granted because the Bank didn’t show that it could meet the statutory attachment and proper notation requirement of the stamp-tax exemption. See § 201.09(1), Fla. Stat. (exempting renewal notes from taxation “if such renewal note has attached to it the original promissory note with the proper notation thereon as required by s. 201.133”). According to the Department, the original notes with proper notation must have been attached to the renewal notes for the Bank to prevail. But we see no error in the trial court’s application of this statute given how notations operate in the mortgage context. The trial court explained that attaching notes bearing the § 201.133 notation does not fit in the mortgage-loan context because tax-payment notations are made only on the mortgage (the document that requires the payment of tax) instead of on the note. See § 201.08(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (“When there is both a mortgage . . . and a note . . . , the tax shall be paid on the mortgage . . . at the time of recordation.”); see also § 201.133 (requiring a notation “shall be made on each individual document requiring tax”). Because mortgage-backed notes lack a “proper notation thereon,” the Bank couldn’t have violated § 201.09(1)’s attachmentwith-proper-notation requirement by not attaching the un-notated notes involved in this case. As discussed above, the Bank did supply other evidence linking the loans. When the Bank requested refunds, the summary spreadsheet shows that it supplied evidence to the Department linking the borrowers’ original home loans to the renewal loans and showing that stamp taxes were paid. The spreadsheet includes a column indicating if taxes were paid on each borrowers’ loan transactions. All to say, because mortgage-backed notes aren’t notated in accordance with § 201.133, and because the summary judgment evidence indicated that the “new promissory notes [were] given in renewal of existing promissory notes” under § 201.09(1), we do not see error in the trial court’s decision related to the notated-note attachment provision or in the transactionrelated proof supplied by the Bank.

The remainder of the Department’s arguments for reversal revolve around its view that the Bank failed to support its refund

III.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

M.K. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur.