WILLIAM LEWIS LAWLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1989-12-22
No. 89-1862
ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
556 So. 2d 430 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1989) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in enhancing the sentence under the habitual offender statute without sufficient specificity regarding the timing of prior convictions.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted of drug possession and sentenced to enhanced penalties under the habitual offender statute. The trial court relied on prior co…

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Opinion of the Court
SHIVERS, Chief Judge.

SHIVERS, Chief Judge.

Appellant appeals an order denying his Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. We reverse and remand.

Appellant was tried and found guilty on five counts of possession of various controlled substances. He was sentenced to five consecutive five-year sentences on each of the counts. Pursuant to section 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1977), habitual offender statute, the trial court added five years to each count as an enhanced penalty resulting in five consecutive 10 year sentences on each count. The court enhanced the penalty based on its finding that

[t]he defendant was convicted of the felony offense of Armed Robbery in Superi-or Court of Catoosa County, Georgia on the 25th day of September, A.D., 1972. The defendant was further convicted of the misdemeanor of the first degree (escape, on the 25th day of September, A.D., 1972), in the Superior Court, Catoo-sa County, Georgia.

As additional reasons for enhancement, the court referred to other convictions between 1966 and 1978 but it did not do so with the specificity needed to determine whether the dictates of the statute were met.

In order to satisfy the requirements of the habitual offender statute each successive conviction must be for a crime committed after the previous conviction. Lovett v. Cochran, 137 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1962). The trial court’s findings are equivocal; from them we cannot discern with reasonable certainty whether appellant was convicted of armed robbery and escape in Georgia on the same day or whether his escape and conviction therefor were subsequent to his armed robbery conviction. We issued a show cause order to appellee for clarification in this regard and it responded that it was unable to show cause why this case should not be reversed and remanded for reconsideration.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …e, there is no express legislative intent which would preclude utilizing the plain meaning of the statute. The opinions in Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2d 304 (1947), Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979), and Lawley v. State, 556 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), addressed statutory language which is substantially different and far less clear than the language contained in the 1988 and 1989 versions of the habitual offender statute. The case of Collazo v. State, 573 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3rd…
    1 / 4
  • Collazo v. State, 573 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …ay. We agree. Convictions entered on the same date, arising from the same criminal episode, are treated as a single offense. Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Lawley v. State, 556 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.…
  • KEY v. State, 589 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …ore the court, it is impossible to determine whether appellant’s five prior [*351] felony convictions were sequential. Therefore, we vacate the habitual felony offender sentences and remand for clarification and reconsideration. See Lawley v. State, 556 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Accordingly, the denial of the motion to suppress is affirmed; the habitual felony offender sentences are vacated, and the cause is remanded for a determination whether any one of the five prior felony convictions occurred…

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