ORLANDO MACHIN, APPELLANT,
v.
LUMBER TRANSPORT, INC. AND INTERNATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLEES; LUMBER TRANSPORT, INC. AND INTERNATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLANTS, V. ORLANDO MACHIN, APPELLEE
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The court addressed jurisdictional issues regarding an employer's late filing of a supersedeas bond required by statute in a workers' compensation appeal. The court held that the Judge of Compensation Claims lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for filing the bond after the employer had already filed its notice of appeal, and therefore dismissed the employer's appeal for failure to comply with mandatory statutory requirements.
The court held that the Judge of Compensation Claims lacked jurisdiction to grant the extension of time because the employer had previously filed its notice of appeal. The court reversed the JCC's order granting the extension, dismissed the employer's appeal sua sponte for failure to comply with the mandatory bond requirement under section 440.25(4)(c), and remanded for determination of attorney fees in favor of the claimant.
[1] A Judge of Compensation Claims lacks jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to file a supersedeas bond after a notice of appeal has already been filed.
[2] A party's failure to comply with mandatory statutory provisions regarding appeals may result in the dismissal of the appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Judge of Compensation Claims was without jurisdiction to entertain this motion because the employer had previously filed its notice of appeal”
Establishes that once a notice of appeal is filed, the JCC loses authority to grant extensions relating to appellate requirements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn employer appealed an order on the merits in a workers' compensation case but failed to file the statutorily required supersedeas bond with its noti…
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[Original Opinion filed December 14, 1989]
PER CURIAM.
The employer’s motion for rehearing directs our attention to its filing of a motion for extension of time on the last day within which to file an appeal. As indicated elsewhere in the opinion, the Judge of Compensation Claims was without jurisdiction to entertain this motion because the employer had previously filed its notice of appeal. Therefore, as the claimant submits, the opinion is revised to the extent reflected below. In all other respects the employer’s motion for rehearing is denied.
PER CURIAM.
Originally, the employer appealed an order on the merits in case no. 88-1121. Although required by statute to file a su-persedeas bond with its appeal, the employer only filed a notice of appeal. In order to rectify this omission, the employer filed a motion for an extension of time but beyond the period within which the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) had jurisdiction to consider it. The JCC granted the employer seven days to file the bond. The employer filed the required bond and the claimant appealed the JCC’s order granting the extension of time in the instant case no. 88-1500. The claimant also moved this court to consolidate the appeals and later moved to dismiss the employer’s appeal.
This court denied the claimant’s motion to dismiss case no. 88-1121 without prejudice to his right to raise issues on appeal in case no. 88-1500. Also, the court denied his motion to consolidate because his appeal may have been determinative of the employer’s appeal without reaching the merits. Although we find the claimant’s appeal determinative of the employer’s appeal, on reexamination it is necessary to consolidate both appeals to effectuate the requested relief. Finding that the JCC lacked jurisdiction to enter the order extending the time to file a bond, we reverse the order in case no. 88-1500 and grant the claimant’s petition for attorney fees remanding-the case to the JCC to determine the amount of such attorney fees. Furthermore, finding that the employer failed to comply with the mandatory provisions in section 440.25(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), we dismiss sua sponte the employer’s notice of appeal in case no. 88-1121.
BOOTH, JOANOS and MINER, JJ., concur.
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