G.W. LIQUORS OF COLLIER, INC. D/B/A DISCOUNTED BY THE CASE, AND G.W. LIQUORS OF BROWARD, INC., D/B/A CASE DELIVERIES, APPELLANTS,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1990-01-31
No. 88-2719
SMITH, THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur.
556 So. 2d 464 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Eugene Wilner appealed the Department of Business Regulation's per se denial of his alcoholic beverage license application based solely on a prior felony conviction, despite restoration of his civil rights. The court held that while a prior conviction is not an absolute bar to licensure, the Department retains discretion to consider the conviction's circumstances and the applicant's character.


Holding

A prior felony conviction is not an absolute bar or per se disqualification from an alcoholic beverage license when civil rights have been restored. However, the Department retains broad discretion to refuse licensure if it deems the applicant to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or otherwise unfit, and may consider the circumstances surrounding the prior conviction.


Headnotes

[1] Restoration of civil rights following a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify an applicant from obtaining an alcoholic beverage license.

[2] A prior felony conviction is not an absolute bar to obtaining an alcoholic beverage license when civil rights have been restored through executive clemency.

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Key Quotes

“the Department has the broad discretion to license Wilner to sell alcoholic beverages, but may refuse to do so if it deems him to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or otherwise unfit”

Establishes that the Department retains discretionary authority to consider fitness factors beyond the automatic bar of conviction

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Facts & Procedural History

Eugene Wilner applied for an alcoholic beverage license. The Department denied his application based on a prior felony conviction. However, Wilner's c…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Eugene Wilner appeals the per se denial by the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Department) of his application for an alcoholic beverage license. This denial was based on a prior felony conviction although his civil rights lost on conviction were restored prior to submitting his application. He contends that the Department erred as a matter of law by denying his application solely because of his prior felony conviction. We agree with his contention and reverse and remand with directions.

We find Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission, 531 So. 2d 1344 (Fla.1988), to be instructive. In Sandlin, the supreme court affirmatively answered this court’s certified question as to whether a full pardon restoring an applicant’s civil rights relieved him from automatic disqualification from certification as a law enforcement officer. Adopting the same reasoning as expressed by the supreme court in Sandlin, we hold in the instant case that the Department has the broad discretion to license Wilner to sell alcoholic beverages, but may refuse to do so if it deems him to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or otherwise unfit. Sandlin 531 So. 2d at 1347. We hold that Wil-ner’s prior conviction is not an absolute bar or per se disqualification from consideration for an alcoholic beverage license since his civil rights have been restored pursuant to constitutional executive clemency powers. At the same time, however, the department may take into account and rely upon the circumstances surrounding his prior conviction and may give weight to the general policy expressed in section 561.15, Florida Statutes (1985).

Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions to the Department to reconsider appellant’s application for a license in light of this opinion.

SMITH, THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Padgett v. The Est. OF Natasha Maria Gilbert, 676 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …on, 531 So. 2d 1344 (Fla.1988), the trial court may nevertheless consider Gilbert’s prior conviction in ruling upon Gilbert’s motion for appointment as personal representative. See, G.W. Liquors of Collier, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 556 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Article IV, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that “the governor may ..., with the approval of three members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and…
  • Emiddio v. Fla. Off. of Fin. Reg., 147 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
    …“there may be wisdom in the distinction between one who has been pardoned and one who has had his civil rights restored ... we are not at liberty to embrace such a distinction.” Id. (citing G.W. Liquors of Collier, Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 556 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (extending Sand-lin to bar an automatic licensure rejection of convicted felons even without a full pardon)). The Kauk opinion concluded that “Sand-lin does not allow the denial of a license to a restored felon due to prior…
  • Kauk v. Dep't OF Fin. Servs., 131 So. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …restored. He explained that this construction of the statutes is prohibited under Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission, 531 So. 2d 1344 (Fla.1988), and G.W. Liquors of Collier, [*808] Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 556 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), which hold that a statute precluding licen-sure or certification for a particular occupation due to the conviction of a crime may not be interpreted as imposing an automatic bar against the licensure of those who have received a…

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