KATHLEEN RAE WATSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court improperly suspended the appellant's driver's license as the offenses did not meet the statutory criteria for suspension.
Appellant was convicted of felonies and misdemeanors, and her driver's license was suspended as part of the sentence. The state argued that the offens…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Driver'S License Suspension cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of various felonies and misdemeanors. Part of the sentence imposed was suspension of her driver’s license for forty-eight months. None of the offenses were the type of crime for which a trial court is authorized to suspend a driver’s license. The state contends, however, that the felonies involved the use of a motor vehicle in which case, pursuant to section 322.26(3), Florida Statutes (1987), the trial court could send the record of the convictions to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles which would then revoke her driver’s license.
The only connection that the state points to is that the appellant drove to the scene of the crimes in a motor vehicle. It is not alleged that any of the crimes took place while the appellant was in her vehicle. Prom the sparse record (this was a nolo contendere plea), it appears that all but one of the crimes clearly took place outside the vehicle. The other charge, the shooting into an occupied dwelling, did not allege that it was perpetrated from a motor vehicle and the colloquy at which the plea was taken does not show whether this was the case. We, thus, find section 322.26(3), Florida Statutes (1987) not applicable to this case.
We, therefore, vacate that portion of the appellant’s sentence suspending her driver’s license. Otherwise, affirmed.
FRANK, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Nichols v. State, 559 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…two years as part of the sentence for some crimes, the crimes committed by Nichols are not ones set forth in this statute. See Nowling v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Spera v. State, 556 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA. 1990); Watson v. State, 556 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The portion of Nichols’ sentence suspending his driving privileges for six years is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. DANAHY and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.…
-
Norris Hubbard v. State, 559 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…, so that the department could revoke or suspend the driver’s license. However, based upon this record that statute is inapplicable because it has not been demonstrated that Hubbard utilized a vehicle in committing these crimes. See Watson v. State, 556 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) [15 F.L.W. D318], We vacate that portion of Hubbard’s sentence suspending his driver’s license. Otherwise, we affirm. LEHAN, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. * That statute provides: 322.26 Mandatory revocation of license…