CARMEN M. KIENZLE, APPELLANT,
v.
ROSEMARY KIENZLE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-01-30
No. 89-1813
Before COPE, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
556 So. 2d 1173 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal dismissed Carmen Kienzle's appeal of an interlocutory order modifying temporary child support on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the order denying rehearing did not restart the appeal period.


Holding

The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Although the May 26, 1989 order was an appealable non-final order under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii) because it changed temporary child support, the notice of appeal was untimely; the motion for rehearing was not an authorized motion that suspended the rendition period, so the thirty-day appeal deadline was not extended.


Headnotes

[1] An order approving a general master's report, which modifies a party's temporary child support obligation, is an appealable non-final order.

[2] A motion for rehearing of an order that determines the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in a domestic relations matter does not suspend rendition of th…

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Key Quotes

“The May 26,1989 order approving report of general master accomplished a change in the husband's temporary child support obligation and therefore was an appealable non-final order pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).”

Establishes that the order was technically appealable as an interlocutory order modifying temporary support.

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court entered a partial final judgment dissolving the marriage and reserved jurisdiction over remaining issues. Subsequently, on May 26, 198…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We dismiss the appeal upon the following analysis.

The trial court entered a partial final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, indicating that a final hearing would be held at a subsequent time, and reserving jurisdiction over all issues. The subsequently entered order dated May 26, 1989, approving a report of the general master, does not contain sufficient indicia of finality to constitute a final judgment. It is an interlocutory order entered pursuant to the order of reference to general master, which conferred jurisdiction on the general master to entertain matters pertaining to temporary relief.

The May 26,1989 order approving report of general master accomplished a change in the husband’s temporary child support obligation and therefore was an appealable non-final order pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii). However, when treated under Rule 9.130, the interlocutory appeal is untimely. That is so because the notice of appeal was not filed until after denial of the husband’s motion for rehearing, which occurred more than thirty days after rendition of the May 26, 1989 order. Because the motion for rehearing was not an authorized motion which suspends rendition, see Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(g) & 9.130, the notice of appeal is untimely with respect to the May 26, 1989 order. The trial court does, of course, have jurisdiction to reconsider its interlocutory orders prior to final judgment. Margulies v. Levy, 439 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). However, if the motion for rehearing is instead treated as a motion for reconsideration, see Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, 486 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986), the motion was denied. It is the original order of May 26, 1989 which determined the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in a domestic relations matter, see Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)-(3)(C)(iii), not the order denying rehearing or reconsideration.* We are therefore without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as an interlocutory appeal. Review will, of course, be available to the husband on appeal from the final judgment in the case.

Appeal dismissed.

*

A different issue would be presented if the motion had been granted and the order granting the motion effected an immediate modification of the child support or custody obligation.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …rical meaning. R.J.B. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1048 (Fla.1982); In re M.A., 593 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see C.L.S. v. State, 586 So. 2d 1173, 1175 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Garcia v. Garcia, 560 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Kienzle v. Kienzle, 556 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Chase v. Chase, 519 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). But see In re Unknown P., 546 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The purpose of the dependency portion of chapter 39 is to ensure adequate protection for children from neglect, abuse…
  • Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady Decor, Inc., 724 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …ffs’ motion for reconsideration, the court issued an order vacating the disqualification order. Although plaintiffs correctly assert that the trial court has authority to revisit its previous orders prior to entry of a judgment, Kienzle v. Kienzle, 556 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bettez v. City of Miami, 510 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Margulies v. Levy, 439 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), in vacating its prior order and denying the motion to disqualify, the trial court departed from the essential requ…
  • Mahmoud S. Mahmoud and Mizhar Mahmoud v. King, 824 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …unds to warrant granting the Motion for New Trial, Motion for Remittitur, or Motion to Vacate. “2. This Court is without authority to reconsider the partial summary judgment as a final judgment has been entered in this case. See Kienzle v. Kienzle, 556 So. 2d 1173 ([Fla.] 3rd DCA 1990); North Shore Hospital Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla.1962); Gordon v. Hollo, 636 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1994). “3. The partial summary judgment may not be reviewed under Rule 1.540. Rule 1.540 ‘provides for review of fi…

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