THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RODNEY KNOX, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of an escape charge against Rodney Knox, arguing the trial court erred in granting his motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Knox could not have committed escape as a matter of law because he reasonably believed the person who released him from police custody was a police officer, negating the required criminal intent.
The trial court properly dismissed the escape charge because, based on the undisputed facts, Knox was entitled to believe the white male was a police officer authorized to release him, and therefore lacked the criminal intent required for escape under Florida law.
[1] A defendant charged with escape may be entitled to dismissal if undisputed facts establish the defendant reasonably believed they were authorized to leave confinement.
[2] A person's belief that they are being released by a police officer can negate the criminal intent required for an escape conviction.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant was entitled to believe that the white male was, in fact, a police officer who was authorized to release the defendant, because only a person with apparent police authority could have unlocked the police car in which the defendant was confined”
Establishes the reasoning for why Knox could not be guilty of escape—his reasonable belief negates criminal intent
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnox was arrested and placed in the locked back seat of a police car. A white male subsequently unlocked the car and authorized Knox to leave. Knox, b…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the state from a trial court order dismissing an information under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). The information charged the defendant Rodney Knox with the crime of escape [§ 944.40, Fla. Stat. (1987)]. We affirm.
The sworn motion to dismiss together with the state’s traverse alleged without dispute that* after the defendant was arrested by a police officer and placed in the back seat of a police car which could not be unlocked from the inside, a white male subsequently came by, unlocked the police car, and authorized the defendant to leave; believing the white male to be a police officer, the defendant departed the area and was only later re-arrested. Contrary to the state’s central argument, we conclude that based on these undisputed facts the defendant was entitled to believe that the white male was, in fact, a police officer who was authorized to release the defendant, because only a person with apparent police authority could have unlocked the police car in which the defendant was confined. This being so, the state had no prima facie case of escape under section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1987), because the defendant, as a matter of law, had no criminal intent to escape from lawful confinement, Ramadanovic v. State, 480 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Muro v. State, 445 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), and, accordingly, the motion to dismiss was properly granted below. Fowler v. State, 492 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1987); see McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972, 976 (Fla.1977); Paz v. State, 480 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
We further reject the state’s procedural arguments. 1. The motion to dismiss did not, as in State v. Kagan, 529 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 537 So. 2d 569 (Fla.1988), merely parrot the testimony of a witness’ deposition; it alleged its own material undisputed facts. 2. The filing of the state’s traverse did not require a denial of the motion to dismiss because it did not specifically deny any fact alleged in the subject motion; to the contrary, the material facts presented to the trial court were entirely undisputed. See State v. Smulowitz, 482 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. dismissed, 486 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1987); Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Holliday, 431 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), approved, 465 So. 2d 524 (Fla.1985).
Finally, we find no merit in «the remaining arguments of the state. The final order of dismissal under review is therefore in all respects
Affirmed.
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Citator
Authorities Cited (12 total)
- Nadean O. McARTHUR v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977)
- Fowler v. State, 492 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- State v. Thaddeus Tyrone Holliday, 431 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- State v. Marlow K. Smulowitz, 482 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Muro v. State, 445 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- PAZ v. State, 480 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- State v. Marlow K. Smulowitz, 486 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1986)
- Washington v. State, 529 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- State v. Thaddeus Tyrone Holliday, 465 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1985)