MANSFIELD INDUSTRIAL COATINGS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
EMPLOYERS NATIONAL INSURANCE CORP., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Mansfield Industrial Coatings appealed a summary judgment dismissing its insurance claim against its carrier for damage to a leased lathe that was dropped during moving operations. The court affirmed, holding that the insurance policy's exclusion for property damage arising from operations performed by the insured applied to bar recovery.
The court held that moving the lathe constituted an 'operation' within the plain meaning of the policy exclusion, and therefore the exclusion barred appellant's recovery from the insurance company on the third-party claim.
[1] An insurance policy exclusion for damage to property "upon which operations are being performed by or on behalf of the insured" applies when the insured's sole purpose fo…
[2] The various stages of moving property are necessarily included in the plain meaning of the term "operation" as used in an insurance policy exclusion.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the undisputed sole purpose of appellant's involvement with the lathe was to move it. Therefore, unlike the situation in Topeka Railway Equipment, Inc. v. Foremost Insurance Company, 5 Kan.App.2d 183, 614 P.2d 461 (1980), the various stages of moving the lathe are necessarily included in the plain meaning of the term 'operation' as used in the above policy exclusion.”
Explains why the exclusion applies—the insured's only involvement was the moving operation itself, making it clearly within the exclusion's scope.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePearl Equipment Company owned a lathe that was leased to Pre-Tech Engineering, Inc. Pre-Tech contracted with Mansfield (appellant) to move the lathe t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's third-party complaint. We affirm.
The original action arose when Pearl Equipment Company sued appellant for damages to a lathe owned by Pearl. The lathe had been leased from Pearl by Pre-Tech Engineering, Inc., which, after obtaining permission from Pearl, entered into a contract with appellant providing for appellant to move the lathe to a storage warehouse. Appellant leased a crane to move the lathe. On November 13, 1985, while appellant was lifting the lathe from a flatbed truck with the crane at a location which was not owned by appellant, the lathe was dropped and substantially damaged.
Appellant filed its third-party complaint against its own insurance company, appel-lee, as well as others. In answer to the third-party complaint, appellee asserted that the following exclusion in the policy of insurance issued to appellant precludes appellant’s recovery from appellee on the third-party claim:
(d) To that particular part of any property, not on premises owned by or rented to the insured,
(i) Upon which operations are being performed by or on behalf of the insured at the time of the property damage arising out of such operations, or (ii) Out of which any property damage arises....
The parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that the above exclusion was contained in the policy issued by appellee to appellant and both parties moved for summary judgment. The judge found that, as a matter of law, the moving of the lathe constituted an operation upon the lathe and therefore the above exclusion applies to bar appellant’s recovery from appellee on the insurance policy.
The record shows that the undisputed sole purpose of appellant’s involvement with the lathe was to move it. Therefore, unlike the situation in Topeka Railway Equipment, Inc. v. Foremost Insurance Company, 5 Kan.App.2d 183, 614 P. 2d 461 (1980), the various stages of moving the lathe are necessarily included in the plain meaning of the term “operation” as used in the above policy exclusion. Consequently, we find that the trial judge was correct in applying the policy exclusion to appellant’s third-party claim against appellee.
AFFIRMED.
MINER and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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