GERALD S. KAUFMAN, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
PATRICIA MACDONALD, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a court may award attorney's fees exceeding the percentage specified in a medical malpractice contingency fee agreement when the agreement explicitly provides that compensation shall be the higher of the percentage amount or a court-awarded amount. The Court held that courts may apply a contingency multiplier and award fees exceeding the percentage alternative when the fee agreement itself permits such higher awards.
No. A court may apply a contingency multiplier and award a reasonable fee which exceeds the amount of the fee recoverable under the percentage alternative of a contingency fee agreement, provided the fee agreement itself explicitly permits the court to award the higher of the percentage amount or a court-awarded amount.
[1] A court-awarded attorney's fee in a medical malpractice action may exceed the percentage amount set out in a contingency fee agreement if the agreement provides that the…
[2] A fee agreement allowing for the higher of a percentage of recovery or a court-awarded amount does not violate the principle that a court-awarded fee should not exceed th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Further, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and his client.”
Establishes the foundational principle from Rowe that court-awarded fees cannot exceed the fee agreement between attorney and client.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatricia MacDonald entered into a contingency fee agreement with her attorney in a medical malpractice action. The agreement provided that the attorne…
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GRIMES, Justice.
We review Kaufman v. MacDonald, 545 So. 2d 913, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), in which the court certified as an issue of great public importance the following question:
Does the holding in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985) preclude an attorney’s— fee in a medical malpractice action above the percentage amount set out in the contingency fee agreement between claimant and her counsel, where the agreement provides that the fee upon recovery shall be the higher of the percentage amount or an amount awarded' by the court?
We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution.
In the course of adopting the lodestar principle for court-awarded fees, this Court in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985), stated:
Further, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and his client.
We later applied this principle in Miami Children’s Hospital v. Tamayo, 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla.1988), in which we held that the court-awarded fee could not exceed the maximum permitted under the plaintiffs contingent fee contract.
In the instant case, Kaufman argues that as in Tamayo the court-awarded attorney’s fee cannot exceed the percentage of recovery prescribed by the contingent fee contract. However, this case differs from Ta-mayo in that the fee contract provided that the attorney’s compensation upon recovery in the medical malpractice action would be either a specific percentage of the recovery or the amount awarded by the court under the prevailing party statute — whichever yielded the higher fee. Thus, unlike Ta-mayo, the court-awarded fee did not exceed the fee agreement reached by MacDonald and her attorney. We hold that under the provisions of a fee agreement of the type involved in this case, the court may apply a contingency multiplier and award a reasonable fee which exceeds the amount of the fee which would be recoverable under the percentage alternative of the fee agreement. Accord Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Tampa Bay Publications, Inc. v. Watkins, 549 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Moxley, 545 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), review granted, No. 74,431 (Fla.1989).
We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the opinion of the district court of appeal.
It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (22 total)
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Orlando Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Boleslaus J. Chmielewski, 573 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…overy if post-trial work were necessary. There was no additional language in the contract permitting recovery of a reasonable attorney fee, if awarded and if greater than the agreed percentage of the total gross award. Compare, Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1990); Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Moxley, 545 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), affirmed in part, quashed in part, 557 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1990); Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Poole, 547 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1…
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Trishia Wolfe v. Nazaire, 758 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…appellant objected to the trial court’s award of $7,500 to appellee on the grounds that the court’s award could not exceed the hourly rate agreed upon in the contract between appellee and her attorney. This court, relying upon Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla.1990), held that a trial court could award attorney’s fees that was higher than the hourly rate set out in the contract, where the contract provided that the attorney’s compensation would be either by a specified hourly rate or by an amoun…
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Nelson v. THE Marine Grp. OF Palm Beach, Inc., 677 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…responsible for paying more than the amount billed by the law firm. This is also not a case where the agreement between the parties was for the attorney to receive a court-awarded fee or a specified fee, whichever was greater. Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1990). As to the fee awarded broker pursuant to contract, broker was precluded from receiving an award based on combining the hours expended in the combined representation of both broker and seller where the fee agreement provided otherwise. B…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Miami Child's. Hosp. v. Ulises Tamayo, 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1988)
- Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Tampa BAY Publ'ns, Inc. v. Watkins, 549 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Thompson v. State, 545 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Kaufman v. MacDonald, 545 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Alphonzo Carter v. State, 545 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)