AUGUSTIN ANTONIO LEDO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-02-27
No. 88-1359
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.
557 So. 2d 891 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Augustin Ledo appeals his cocaine trafficking conviction, arguing that the trial court violated reversible error procedures by responding to a jury question without advising counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the trial court's procedural error in handling jury communications.


Holding

The trial court committed reversible error by responding to the jury's question without advising counsel, requiring a new trial. The admission of the 'gift' statement was proper under Miranda based on the officer's trial testimony, but defendant may renew his objection at retrial if evidence shows the statement was made before Miranda warnings were administered.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court commits reversible error by responding to a jury's question during deliberations without advising counsel of the question or the court's answer.

[2] A defendant's statement made while under arrest is admissible if made after Miranda warnings have been properly administered.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the trial court erred by responding to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations, without advising counsel of the question or the court's answer. Such action by the trial court constitutes reversible error.”

Establishes the primary basis for reversal—the trial court's procedural violation in handling jury communications

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Ledo was lawfully stopped by police and arrested for marijuana possession. During a search of his car, an officer found a box containing cocaine and a…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Augustin Ledo, defendant below, appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Ledo’s principal claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by responding to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations, without advising counsel of the question or the court’s answer. Such action by the trial court constitutes reversible error. Bradley v. State, 513 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla.1987); Williams v. State, 488 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla.1986); Curtis v. State, 480 So. 2d 1277, 1278-79 (Fla.1985); Ivory v. State, 351 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1977). There must therefore be a new trial.

Ledo next contends that his statements to the arresting officer — that the box in the car was a gift — should not have been admitted at trial. Ledo was initially arrested for possession of marijuana after having been lawfully stopped by a police officer. During the search of the car after arresting Ledo, the officer asked appellant about a box in which cocaine was subsequently found. Ledo maintains that his answer, that the box was a gift, should not have been admitted at trial.

It is undisputed that Ledo made the “gift” statement while under arrest. There is, however, a dispute between the officer and the defendant as to whether the “gift” statement was made before or after Ledo was given Miranda1 warnings, and the officer gave varying accounts.

At trial, the officer testified that the “gift” statement was made after Miranda warnings were given. That being so, Ledo’s Miranda-based objection to admission of the statement was correctly overruled. Our ruling is without prejudice to the defendant to renew his objection at the new trial, should it develop that the “gift” statement was made after the initial arrest but before the administration of Miranda warnings. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690 n. 5, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 n. 5 (1980). Ledo’s other statements to the officer were properly admitted at trial. After Miranda warnings were given, Ledo made a statement to his brother to the effect that the brother should not speak to the officer but should let a lawyer handle the situation later. Despite this comment to his brother, Ledo did not request counsel and then made statements to the officer.

We find no merit in appellant’s argument that appellant’s statement to his brother sufficed either to assert Ledo’s own Miranda rights or to create a duty on the part of the officer to inquire further whether Ledo wished to make a statement. See Doyle v. State, 460 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla.1984). We also find no merit in Ledo’s contention that he should have been able to introduce the fact that he had had no prior convictions on the ground that such a showing would demonstrate a lack of sophistication regarding his Miranda rights under the circumstances. See § 90.404, Fla.Stat. (1987); cf. Doyle v. State, 460 So. 2d at 356. (It was sufficient that the defendant was capable of understanding the Miranda warnings).

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw