JAMES L. DORAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLEE
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James Doran appealed his disqualification from Medicaid ICP benefits based on alleged excess assets. The court reversed the administrative order because the department's case relied entirely on uncorroborated hearsay documents from a bank, which were inadmissible under Florida evidence law and insufficient to support the termination decision.
The court held that the hearing officer's order must be reversed because the bank documents were inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within any recognized exception (including the business records exception, which requires testimony from a qualified witness), and hearsay evidence alone cannot support an administrative finding.
[1] An agency finding of fact cannot be based solely on hearsay evidence that would be inadmissible over objection in a civil action.
[2] Unsworn documents from a bank, not presented through the testimony of the bank's records custodian or other qualified witness, constitute inadmissible hearsay in an admin…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.”
States the governing standard for hearsay evidence in agency proceedings under Florida law, which is the basis for reversing the hearing officer's order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoran received ICP benefits beginning in January 1988. In November 1988, the Department notified him his benefits would be terminated because he alleg…
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ALLEN, Judge.
James L. Doran (Doran) appeals from an order of the Office of Public Assistance Appeal Hearings which found him disqualified to continue to receive Medicaid Institutional Care Services Program (ICP) benefits due to his ownership of assets in excess of program limits. He contends that the order was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Because an essential finding of fact supporting the order was based exclusively upon hearsay evidence, we agree and reverse.
Doran began to receive ICP benefits in January of 1988. In November of 1988 he was notified by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the department) that his benefits would be terminated the following month due to the department’s belief that he held assets in excess of the $1900 limitation for program eligibility. He appealed to the Office of Public Assistance Appeal Hearings and a hearing was held on February 23, 1989. The only witness to testify in behalf of the department was a department employee who presented documents, which she had received through the mail, as evidence that Doran was ineligible for ICP benefits. The unsworn documents had purportedly been provided by the customer service department of the Household Bank, FSB of Baltimore, Maryland. The documents indicated that Doran had funds on deposit with the bank totaling $2500 in February of 1987, and $2389.32 in October of 1988. No other evidence of his ineligibility was presented. The hearing officer found the documents sufficient to support the department’s termination of benefits, and entered a final order affirming the department’s action.
The dispositive issue is whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s final order. We find that there was not. Section 120.-58(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), which relates to evidence presented in agency proceedings, provides in pertinent part as follows: The documents presented before the hearing officer were hearsay and did not come within any recognized exception which would have made them admissible in a civil action. The business records exception of Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (1987), was inapplicable, despite the department’s arguments to the contrary, because the documents were not offered through the testimony of the bank’s records custodian or other qualified witness. Because the only evidence presented by the department to show that Doran held assets in excess of the eligibility requirements for receiving ICP benefits consisted of uncorroborated hearsay evidence, we must reverse the hearing officer’s final order. See Juste v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 520 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and Harris v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 495 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.
Accordingly, the hearing officer’s decision is reversed.
BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Scott v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 603 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…would not have been admissible over objection in a civil action. As indicated in § 120.58(l)(a), Florida Statutes, this evidence was not sufficient in itself to support the Board’s findings. See also, Doran v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 558 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Harris v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 495 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Because there was insufficient evidence to support the findings, pursuant to the cited authorities and § 120.68(10), Florida Statutes, the suspe…
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- Sylvina Juste v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 520 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
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- Harris v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)