ATLANTIC MASONRY, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
MILLER CONSTRUCTION, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Liberty Mutual erroneously issued a renewal workers' compensation policy to Atlantic Masonry after canceling coverage for nonpayment. Atlantic fraudulently presented this policy to Miller Construction as proof of active coverage. When an Atlantic employee was injured, Miller's carrier paid benefits and sought reimbursement from Liberty. The court affirmed that Liberty is equitably estopped from denying coverage and that a third party (Miller) may assert promissory estoppel.
Liberty is equitably estopped from denying coverage to Atlantic for the period of the erroneously issued renewal policy. A third party may assert promissory estoppel under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) when the promisor should reasonably expect a third party to rely on the promise and the third party does so rely.
[1] A party may be equitably estopped from denying coverage under an erroneously issued insurance policy when the insurer should reasonably expect the policy to induce action…
[2] Promissory estoppel may be asserted by a third party who reasonably relies on a promise, even if the promise was made directly to another party.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) establishing that promissory estoppel may be asserted by third parties, directly supporting the court's holding that Miller Construction could assert estoppel even though Liberty's erroneous representation was not made directly to Miller.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLiberty Mutual cancelled Atlantic Masonry's workers' compensation policy on October 24, 1986 for nonpayment of premiums. Liberty then erroneously sent…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Imputed Knowledge cases and more on FLexlaw
ERVIN, Judge.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”) provided workers’ compensation coverage to Atlantic Masonry (“Atlantic”), a subcontractor, from January 10, 1986 until October 24, 1986, when Liberty cancelled Atlantic’s policy for nonpayment of premiums. However, Liberty erroneously sent a renewal policy and declarations page to Atlantic, indicating coverage would be provided for the year January 10, 1987 through January 10, 1988. The president of Atlantic provided this declarations page and policy to general contractor Miller Construction Co. (“Miller”), in December of 1986, as proof of workers’ compensation coverage for the coming year when, in fact, Atlantic had no such coverage. On January 12, 1987, an employee of Atlantic, Michael Powell, was injured on the job site, and FEISCO, Miller’s workers’ compensation carrier, thereafter complied with its statutory duty to pay Powell compensation and medical benefits.
FEISCO sought and obtained reimbursement of benefits from Liberty on the ground that Liberty should be equitably estopped from denying coverage to Atlantic under the erroneously issued policy. Liberty now appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (“JCC”) requiring Liberty to reimburse FEISCO for workers’ compensation benefits paid and to provide future benefits to Michael Powell. We affirm.
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Liberty is estopped from denying its promise to provide workers’ compensation coverage to Atlantic between January 10, 1987 and January 10, 1988. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660 (Fla.1987). According to the testimony presented by Miller, if Atlantic had failed to produce proof of insurance by January 10, 1987, it would not have been permitted on the job site, thus Powell would not have been injured there on January 12, 1987.
Liberty claims that a third party (Miller) may not assert this equitable doctrine, and that it is available only to the entity to whom the erroneous representation was directly made (Atlantic). Liberty relies upon Crown Life for the position that the supreme court did not extend the remedy of promissory estoppel to third persons in that case. However, Crown Life did not involve a claim by a third party; therefore the court cannot be said to have decided that issue.
On the other hand, we find that the following provision from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts furnishes support to the appellees’ argument that promissory estoppel may be asserted by third parties:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
The JCC properly found that Atlantic’s fraudulent use of the renewal policy was a foreseeable consequence of Liberty’s erroneous issuance of the policy. In the application for compensation coverage which Atlantic submitted to its insurance agent, Atlantic represented that it was a masonry contractor. Liberty was therefore on notice 1 that its insured would likely operate at times as a subcontractor. Moreover, the insurance contract entered into between Liberty and Atlantic necessarily was written in contemplation of existing workers’ compensation law. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Bedingfield, 60 So. 2d 489, 493 (Fla.1952). Because a general contractor is statutorily obligated to pay workers’ compensation benefits to a subcontractor’s employee if that subcontractor does not have its own coverage,2 Liberty should reasonably expect that contractors will rely upon a subcontractor’s proof of such coverage.
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Ruotal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (knowledge of agent imputed to principal).
. See Section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Rissman v. Kilbourne, 643 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…cipal due on Good Life’s mortgage. See Council Brothers, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, supra (misrepresentation by city’s agent estopped city from requiring subcontract to pay systems changes on facility); see also Atlantic Masonry v. Miller Constr., 558 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (third party may assert promissory estoppel); Fotomat Corp. of Florida v. R.B. Films, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (same). In reliance thereon, Rissman changed his position to his detriment by proceeding to close on…
-
Criterion Leasing Grp. & Hartford Ins. Grp. v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…isor rather than to an existing fact.” Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBride, 517 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla.1987) (citations omitted). Because the JCC found the elements of promissory estoppel present and followed the dictates of Masonry v. Miller Construction, 558 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we affirm. A party will be estopped from denying liability under the principle of promissory estoppel when the party makes “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite a…
-
Curtis-Hale, Inc. v. Geltz, 610 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…erage with Aetna at the time of Claimant’s accident, with the result that Appellants were required to provide WC benefits to Claimant, their statutory employee. See section 440.10(1), Florida Statutes (1987); Atlantic Masonry v. Miller Construction, 558 So. 2d 433, 435 & n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). We affirm the Order. In August 1987, in response to a promotional mail-out, Geltz contacted Anthony Brooks, of the Brooks-Starling-Ruiz Agency (Brooks-Starling), to obtain WC coverage. CSE supports the finding that…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crown Life Ins. Co. v. McBRIDE, 517 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1987)
- Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Bedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952)
- Ruotal Corp. v. Ottati, 391 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)