RICHARD NAMON AND HENRY HERMAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, APPELLEE
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Appellants challenged an inverse condemnation claim after being denied permits to fill wetlands on their property in Dade County. The court affirmed summary judgment for the state, holding that appellants had no compensable taking because they purchased unimproved wetland property with constructive and actual notice of environmental restrictions and thus had no reasonable investment-backed expectation of development rights.
The court held there was no compensable taking and no inverse condemnation. Appellants purchased the property with constructive knowledge of applicable land use regulations and actual notice in their contract that development might be precluded. A subjective expectation to develop unimproved property does not constitute a reasonable investment-backed expectation rising to constitutionally protected property rights.
[1] A subjective expectation of property development does not create a vested right to develop when the property is purchased with constructive knowledge of applicable land u…
[2] Purchasing land with notice of statutory impediments to development limits legitimate investment-backed expectations to constitutionally protected property rights.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellants are deemed to purchase the property with constructive knowledge of the applicable land use regulations. Appellants bought unimproved property. A subjective expectation that the land could be developed is no more than an expectancy and does not translate into a vested right to develop the subject property.”
Establishes the core principle that purchasers take property with knowledge of existing restrictions and lack vested development rights based on subjective expectations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1987, Namon and Herman entered an Agreement for Deed for a six-acre unimproved wetland parcel in Dade County zoned to allow one home per five acres…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, plaintiffs below, appeal an adverse summary judgment on a claim of inverse condemnation. We affirm.
In 1987 appellants Namon and Herman entered into an Agreement for Deed for a six acre parcel in unincorporated Dade County. The property is located in wetlands and is unimproved. Applicable Dade County zoning allows construction of one home per five acre tract. However, the land will not support construction of a home without the filling of a one-half acre area to support the homesite and allow drainage for a septic tank. Such filling is prohibited unless the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) and the Army Corps of Engineers consent and issue a permit.
Appellants applied for the permit, which was denied. Appellants did not appeal the denial of the permit, and for present purposes the denial is deemed to have been correct. Appellants then brought this inverse condemnation action, arguing that they have been deprived of all beneficial use of the property. We disagree.
Appellants are deemed to purchase the property with constructive knowledge of the applicable land use regulations. Appellants bought unimproved property. A subjective expectation that the land could be developed is no more than an expectancy and does not translate into a vested right to develop the subject property. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382, 1383 (Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 640, 70 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981) (“ ‘[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which [injures] the rights of others” ’) (citation omitted); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874, 81 L.Ed.2d 815, 834 (1984) (“A ‘reasonable investment-backed expectation’ must be more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract need’ ”); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 125 N.H. 745, 485 A. 2d 287, 291 (1984) (“A person who purchases land with notice of statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if any, legitimate investment-backed expectations of development rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property rights”); cf. Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA) (“One who purchases property while it is in a certain known zoning classification, ordinarily will not be heard to claim as a hardship a factor or factors which existed at the time he acquired the property.”), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d 773 (Fla.1959). The property continues to exist in the state in which appellants have contracted to acquire it. Under the authorities just cited, there has been no compensable taking and no inverse condemnation. We therefore affirm.
On the particular facts of the present case, there is an additional reason for af-firmance. The Agreement for Deed provided the following contingency:
Purchase is subject to approval at [sic] attached joint application to Department of Army/FL Department of Environmental Regulation to be submitted within 10 working days of contract acceptance. Payments will start on the 1st day of the second month following application approval.
Elsewhere the contract also stated, “THIS PROPERTY WAS NOT OFFERED FOR USE AS A HOMESITE AND NO REPRESENTATIONS AS TO ITS SUITABILITY FOR BUILDING PURPOSES WAS MADE OR IMPLIED.” The contractual language created actual notice, in addition to constructive notice, that land use restrictions may preclude development of the property.
Affirmed.
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Fontainebleau GAS & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…s’n, Inc., 216 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Cook v. Di Domenico, 135 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Owners are deemed to purchase property with constructive knowledge of applicable land use regulations. Namon v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 558 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), review denied, 564 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1990). See Allstate Mortgage Corp. of Florida v. City of Miami Beach, 308 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 763 (Fla.1975), citing McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So.…
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City OF Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…thus, requests for an amendment to the plan and a request to fill the submerged lands would not solely be the decision of Riviera Beach but would require approval from state agencies, including the DER. See, e.g., Namon v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 558 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 564 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1990); Vatalaro. Riviera Beach should not be held responsible in damages for a regulatory taking where it has not unequivocally prevented all economically viable use of the property, especially wh…
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Orange Cnty. v. Lust, 602 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…other than as a billboard site, maintenance of present zoning which prevents erection of a billboard does not necessarily make the zoning confiscatory and does not invalidate the county’s decision to deny rezoning. See Namon v. Dep’t of Envtl. Reg., 558 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 564 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1990). What really occurred in this ease was that the circuit court simply disagreed with the Board. The trial court’s lengthy written order never mentions either the “not fairly debatable” or t…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (U.S. 1984)
- Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)
- Martins Ferry Hosp. Assn. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 454 U.S. 1083 (U.S. 1981)
- Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, 454 U.S. 1083 (U.S. 1981)
- Elwyn v. City OF Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Reid v. Reid, 116 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1959)
- Lowry of Fla., Inc. v. Dekle, 116 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1959)