DWIGHT TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dwight Taylor appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and his sentencing as a habitual felony offender. The court affirmed his conviction but reversed his sentence, holding that the State must prove the second felony conviction was subsequent to the first conviction, which it failed to do when all prior convictions were contained in a single judgment.
Enhancement of a sentence as a habitual offender requires the State to prove that the second felony conviction was subsequent to the preceding conviction. Because all of Taylor's prior felonies were contained in a single judgment, the court erred in enhancing his sentence as an habitual offender.
[1] A second felony conviction relied upon by the state to sentence a defendant as an habitual offender must be subsequent to the defendant's preceding conviction.
[2] A habitual offender sentence enhancement requires proof that the second felony conviction occurred after the initial felony conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a second conviction relied upon by the State to sentence a defendant as an habitual offender must be subsequent to the defendant's preceding conviction”
States the controlling legal rule from Joyner v. State that the court applies to Taylor's case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The State proved Taylor had 12 prior…
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GOSHORN, Judge.
Dwight Stewart Taylor raises numerous issues arising from his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon1 and his sentence as a habitual felony offender. While affirming his conviction, we reverse his sentence for the reason discussed below.
In 1988 the legislature amended section 775.084, the habitual offender statute, to define an habitual offender as a defendant upon whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment if it finds, inter alia, that the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more felonies in this state. § 775.084(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988).2 Taylor contends that enhancement of his sentence as an habitual offender requires the State to prove not merely that Taylor was convicted of two prior felonies, but that the second felony conviction was imposed for a crime committed after the initial felony conviction. Taylor’s assertion is correct. In Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So. 2d 304 (1947), the Florida Supreme Court announced the rule that a second conviction relied upon by the State to sentence a defendant as an habitual offender must be subsequent to the defendant’s preceding conviction. This rule continues to be followed. Lovett v. Cochran, 137 So. 2d 572 (Fla.1962); Harvey v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 965, 75 S.Ct. 898, 99 L.Ed. 1287 (1955); Perry v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 382 (Fla.1954); Snowden v. State, 449 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), quashed on other grounds, 476 So. 2d 191 (Fla.1985); Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In the case sub judice, although the State did prove that Taylor had been previously convicted of 12 felonies, each felony was contained in the same judgment of conviction. Thus, none of the felonies could have been committed after conviction of an initial felony and the court erred in enhancing Taylor’s sentence.
We do not address the other issues raised by Taylor on appeal because we find them to be without merit.
Conviction AFFIRMED; sentence REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing.
DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . § 790.25, Fla.Stat. (1987).
. The statute was again amended in 1989 to provide, in pertinent part:
The defendant was again previously convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or any other qualified offense. [Emphasis added].
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
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Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…he habitual offender sentence imposed by the trial court. He urges, and the state concedes, that the two previous convictions relied upon for the imposition of a habitual offender sentence were entered on the same date. The court in Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), held that in order to be relied upon to sentence a defendant as a habitual offender, a second conviction must occur subsequent to the initial conviction. A like result was reached in Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA…1 / 5
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Romerio Latee Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…reer criminals and to incarcerate them for extended terms. [*547] This statement of legislative intent does not suggest that a defendant whose previous convictions were entered on the same date now qualifies for habitualization. See Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing. LEHAN, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.…
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Bernard v. State, 571 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…d exceeded the statutory maximum, if Bernard did not qualify for sentencing as an habitual offender.1 He did not. Thus, we must quash the sentences. After Bernard was sentenced, but while this appeal was pending, this court decided Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th [*561] DCA 1990). Taylor clarified our view that in order to qualify as an habitual offender pursuant to the 1988 version of the statute,2 it must be established that a defendant has been convicted of two or more felonies, and that at leas…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 (Fla. 1947)
- Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Snowden v. State, 449 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Perry v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1954)
- State v. Snowden, 476 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1985)
- Lovett v. Cochran, 137 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1962)
- Harvey v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1954)
- Davis v. Summerfield, 349 U.S. 965 (U.S. 1955)
- Pratt v. Dep't of the Army, 349 U.S. 965 (U.S. 1955)