CHARLES C. PETERSON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 2d DCA | 2023-10-25
No. 2022-2958
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2023)

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Holding

When a trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence uses the word "to" in stating a range (e.g., "three years to life"), it imposes an indeterminate sentence under § 921.18, not a statutory maximum sentence, and the postconviction court erred in amending the written sentences to reflect statutory maximums that conflicted with the oral pronouncement.


Headnotes

[1] When a trial court pronounces sentence using the word "to" in stating a range of years (e.g., "three years to life"), the pronouncement imposes an indeterminate sentence…

[2] A postconviction court may not amend written sentences to impose terms that conflict with the trial court's original oral pronouncement of sentence, even if the written s…

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Key Quotes

“By ruling that the trial court used a "strange syntax" to pronounce statutory maximum sentences with three-year mandatory minimum terms, the postconviction court found an ambiguity where one did not exist. The trial court's use of the word "to" in both the oral pronouncement and written sentences consistently imposed indeterminate sentences.”

This establishes that the use of "to" in sentencing language creates a clear indeterminate sentence under § 921.18, not an ambiguous or unusual construction.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1981, Peterson was convicted by jury of armed robbery with firearm possession in three cases and aggravated assault with firearm possession in one …

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam

PER CURIAM. Charles C. Peterson appeals from the order denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) but directing the clerk to amend his judgments and sentences. We affirm the portions of the order that deny Mr. Peterson's claims of illegal sentence and direct correction of the judgments, but we reverse the amended sentences and remand for the postconviction court to enter corrected amended sentences. The postconviction record reflects that in 1981, juries found Mr. Peterson guilty of armed robbery with possession of a firearm in case

numbers 1981-CF-5360, 1981-CF-5362, and 1981-CF-4274 and of aggravated assault with possession of a firearm in case number 1981-CF-5420. When imposing the sentences for the armed robbery convictions, the trial court stated: "I sentence you to a term, a minimum term, of three years to life imprisonment." When imposing the sentence for the aggravated assault conviction, it stated: "I sentence you to a term of, a minimum term of, three years to a maximum term of five years consecutive to the robbery sentences." The written sentences similarly impose sentences of "three years to life" and "three to five years." The trial court amended Mr. Peterson's sentences in 1983 to specify that three-year mandatory minimum terms were imposed pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1981), which required trial courts to impose a three-year mandatory minimum term when a defendant possessed a firearm or destructive device during designated felony offenses. In rejecting Mr. Peterson's meritless challenges to these sentences, the postconviction court interpreted the transcribed oral pronouncement of sentence as using a "strange syntax" to impose life sentences with three-year mandatory minimum terms for the armed robbery convictions and a five-year sentence with a three-year mandatory minimum term for the aggravated assault conviction. It found that although the sentencing court had the option of imposing indeterminant sentences pursuant to section 921.18, Florida Statutes (1981), indeterminate sentences of three years to life and three years to five years were illegal. It ruled that Mr. Peterson's judgments and written sentences should be corrected to remove "the ambiguities in the sentence that gave rise to this motion."1 1 The judgments inaccurately reflected that Mr. Peterson's armed robbery convictions were life felonies rather than first-degree felonies punishable by life in prison. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981).

The amended sentences reflect that Mr. Peterson is sentenced to life in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum term pursuant to section 775.087(2) for each armed robbery conviction and to five years in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum term pursuant to section 775.087(2) for the aggravated assault conviction. Mr. Peterson challenges these sentences in this appeal, arguing that they are inconsistent with the oral pronouncement. We agree. As the postconviction court noted, section 921.18 authorized trial courts to impose for noncapital felony convictions indeterminate sentences of six months up to the applicable statutory maximum term of imprisonment. 921.18 Sentence for indeterminate period for noncapital felony.—The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant convicted of a noncapital felony to the custody of the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate period of 6 months to a maximum period of imprisonment. The maximum sentence may be less than the maximum prescribed by law, but shall not be less than the minimum, if any, prescribed for the offense. This section shall not apply to sentences imposed under s. 775.084 or any other statute providing for punishment of habitual criminals. § 921.18. By ruling that the trial court used a "strange syntax" to pronounce statutory maximum sentences with three-year mandatory minimum terms, the postconviction court found an ambiguity where one did not exist. The trial court's use of the word "to" in both the oral pronouncement and written sentences consistently imposed indeterminate sentences. By concluding otherwise and directing the clerk to amend the written sentences to impose the statutory maximum terms, the postconviction court imposed sentences that conflict with the oral pronouncement of sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the amended sentences and remand for the postconviction court to enter corrected

amended sentences that impose indeterminate sentences of six months to life in prison for the armed robbery convictions and six months to five years in prison for the aggravated assault conviction pursuant to section 921.18, each with a three-year mandatory minimum term imposed pursuant to section 775.087(2). See Pack v. State, 161 So. 3d 589, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Cox v. State, 344 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. VILLANTI, KHOUZAM, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.


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