CLEVE EDMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cleve Edmond appeals his conviction and life sentence for the strangulation murder of his great aunt during a burglary attempt. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to the admission of his confession, exclusion of a defense witness, comments on his right to silence, and the admissibility of a child witness's excited utterances.
The court affirmed the conviction on all grounds. The confession was voluntary despite any alleged police deception; the exclusion of the unlisted witness was within the trial court's discretion; the elicitation of testimony about Edmond's refusal to answer further questions without counsel was not reversible error; and the child witness's excited utterances were properly admitted under Florida law.
[1] A confession is voluntary and admissible even if law enforcement officers make false statements concerning the existence of incriminatory evidence, provided the defendant…
[2] A trial court has discretion to exclude testimony from an unlisted witness when the opposing party is deprived of the opportunity to depose that witness.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Even if there was an attempt to deceive, the trial court's determination that the incriminating statement was freely and voluntarily given is supported by the evidence.”
Establishes that police deception does not automatically render a confession involuntary if the trial court finds it was given freely and voluntarily.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCleve Edmond, a cocaine addict, broke into his seventy-two-year-old great aunt's home at approximately 4:00 a.m. with intent to burgle it. The victim …
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PER CURIAM.
Cleve Edmond, a cocaine addict, appeals convictions and a life sentence for the strangulation murder of his seventy-two-year-old great aunt during a forced entry and attempted burglary of her home. Edmond’s fingerprints were lifted from various locations in the house. A puncture wound on the victim’s neck was consistent with being caused by the single long nail of Edmond’s right little finger. The crime was committed at approximately 4:00 a.m. when the victim, who was alone with two small children for whom she cared, awoke to investigate the sounds of someone breaking into her home.
First, the defendant claims that his so-called confession was obtained because Detective Conley allegedly told him that his aunt was “looking down from heaven wanting him to tell the truth because it was an accident.” Even if there was an attempt to deceive, the trial court’s determination that the incriminating statement was freely and voluntarily given is supported by the evidence. In its finding that the defendant was not deceived, the trial court could have relied on the defendant’s own statement that he did not fall for the officer’s trick. See State v. Manning, 506 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (a sexual battery defendant’s confession was voluntarily given, even though officers made false statements con-cernmg the existence of incriminatory evidence).
Second, the trial court was within its discretion in excluding testimony of the defendant’s sister, Delores, as she was an unlisted witness and the State was deprived of the opportunity to depose her. Lewis v. State, 411 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1982). In our view, the inquiry made by the trial court was sufficient to satisfy Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971).
Third, the record in this case does not disclose an exercise by Edmond of his right to remain silent. He spoke freely to police officers before any incriminating statements were made. Further, he knowingly executed a Miranda waiver form. Edmond’s assertion on appeal, that the State improperly commented on his right to remain silent by eliciting testimony from Detective Conley that he, after implicating himself, refused to answer the next question without the advice of counsel, presents no reversible error. Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Lastly, the State did not impermissi-bly bolster the testimony of the only witness to the crime, an eleven-year-old boy. The frightened child gave an emotional description of the assailant to the police when they arrived two to three hours later, and the evidence shows that the child was excited, perhaps even hysterical, at the time his statements were made. His descriptions were, therefore, admissible, pursuant to section 90.803, Florida Statutes (1987), as excited utterances.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Rivera v. State, 718 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…the stress of the battery, as evidenced by the fact that she was crying hysterically, shaking uncontrollably, and telling Officer Laguna to keep the appellant away from her. See Young v. State, 637 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Moreover, even though she denied being punched by the appellant, the victim herself testified that the officer arrived “almost immediately once we were arguing.” Thus, as the trial court aptly concluded, the state established…
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Powell v. State, 99 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…period of time the courts would consider to be significant in this context is most often measured in hours. See Bell v. State, 847 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (admitting a statement made 50 minutes after an attempted kidnapping); Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (admitting a statement made two or three hours after the offense); Akien v. State, 44 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (admitting a statement made by a rape victim five minutes after she had been raped). As the supreme court explain…
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Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…, they were properly admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception. See § 90.803(2), Fla.Stat. (1991); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901, 109 S.Ct. 250, 102 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988); Edmond v. State, 559 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla.1990). The defendant’s conviction is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. . 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984), clarified, State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Manning, 506 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Walker v. State, 411 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)