MICHAEL THORNTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Thornton appeals his cocaine possession conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The appellate court affirms, finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on the totality of circumstances observed in a known drug area.
The officer possessed sufficient founded suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The evidence of appellant showing something in an outstretched hand in a known drug area, combined with appellant's furtive conduct of quickly turning away and placing his hands in his groin area when approached by the officer, collectively established reasonable suspicion.
[1] An investigatory stop is justified when, based on the totality of the circumstances, an officer possesses a reasonable or well-founded suspicion of criminal activity.
[2] Factors considered in determining reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop include the time of day, location, suspect's behavior, and anything unusual in the situat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In determining whether an officer possesses a reasonable or well-founded suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, one must look at the totality of circumstances observed by the police officer.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating whether reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory stop.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Brown was patrolling a known drug area at 8:20 P.M. on May 23, 1989, when he observed two males on a street corner known for cocaine sales. He…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
At 8:20 P.M. on May 23, 1989, Officer Brown was patrolling a known drug area in a marked police vehicle. He observed two males standing on the corner of an intersection known as a place where cocaine is sold. Officer Brown saw one male looking into appellant’s hand which was “outstretched in a cupped fashion,” but the officer was a short distance away and could not see anything in appellant’s hand. As Officer Brown came closer and was noticed by the man, appellant looked up. Appellant then made a quick move and turned his back towards Officer Brown, moving both hands to his groin area. Officer Brown thought that a drug deal was in progress and that appellant might have been secreting a weapon. Officer Brown exited his vehicle and asked appellant to slowly remove his hands. Appellant hesitated, so Officer Brown drew his weapon and asked a second time. The appellant slowly began to remove his hands from his groin area outward while he began to turn towards Officer Brown. Officer Brown was watching appellant’s hand and saw appellant drop an object to the ground. He retrieved the object, which proved to be a baggy of cocaine.
In determining whether an officer possesses a reasonable or well-founded suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, one must look at the totality of circumstances observed by the police officer. The time of day, the day of the week, the location, the physical appearance and behavior of the suspect, the behavior of any vehicle involved, or anything unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge may be considered in determining the possibility of criminal activity. State v. Pye, 551 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
The evidence that Officer Brown saw appellant showing something to another man in an outstretched, cupped hand, on a street corner known for drug trafficking, and that when Officer Brown approached, appellant quickly turned his back to Officer Brown and put his hands in his groin area, was sufficient to give Officer Brown a founded suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. This case is distinguishable from Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In that case this court ruled that officers observing, in a high crime area, the defendant huddled with two other persons behind a bar, engaging in what appeared to the officers to be a drug transaction, and the defendant’s flight from the approaching officers, did not give the officers a founded suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. This case presents the additional fact that when Officer Brown approached, appellant turned quickly and placed his hands in his groin area, a furtive, suspicious and potentially dangerous act. Compare Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no founded suspicion where officer observed defendant approach car in high crime area and talk to occupant who extended his hand, palm up, toward defendant).
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Huntley v. State, 575 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…noncriminal activity. Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The officer saw neither drugs nor money. See Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). But see Thornton v. State, 559 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The fact that the area was “high crime” is irrelevant. Gillion v. State, 573 So. 2d 810 (Fla.1991). The officer did not have a founded suspicion to detain appellant.1 Proof of lawfulness of the officer’s conduct is an essential…
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Anderson v. State, 576 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…*321] for cash. In the instant case, the officer admitted that he could not see what was being transferred and did not see the exchange of money; therefore, Blanding is distinguishable. Another case with somewhat similar facts is Thornton v. State, 559 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In Thornton, an officer observed the defendant showing something to another man in an outstretched, cupped hand, on a street corner known for drug trafficking. Upon seeing the officer, the defendant quickly turned his back to th…
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Faunce v. State, 884 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…s must examine the totality of the circumstances in which the detention was made. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Graham v. State, 714 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Thornton v. State, 559 So. 2d 438, 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Among other factors that might be relevant in a particular case, the court may consider the time of day, the physical appearance and behavior of the suspect, and anything that appears to be unusual in light of the officer’s…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- State v. PYE, 551 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)